神学导论 阅读资料 035D 傅兰姆论范泰尔论上帝的主权与人的自由
John Frame on Cornelius Van Til’s View of
God’s Sovereignty and Man’s Freedom
(John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought , Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, from pp. 79-83. 林慈信译。)
…上帝的预旨 (decree) 「 是时间、空间中所发生一切事情的至终、唯一的决定性力量。」（CA，11。）祂的预旨是 「被造宇宙里所有实体 (substance) 和能力的来源。」（IST，247。）
God’s decree … “is the final and exclusively determining power of whatsoever comes to pass.” (CA, 11.) It is “the source of all substance and power in the created universe.” (IST, 247.)
决定论与人的自由
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM
范泰尔是否决定论者？
Is Van Til a Determinist?
范泰尔否认他的立场是一种哲学上的决定论。假如我们的意思是﹕对范泰尔来说，有限世界里的每一个事件都有一个成因；我想，我们可以称范泰尔为一位决定论者 (determinist) 。当然，对范氏来说，有限世界里所有的事件，它们的必要成因 (necessary cause)和充份成因 (sufficient cause)都在上帝的预旨里。
Van Til denies that his position is a form of philosophical determinism. We may, I think, call Van Til a determinist if by that we mean simply that for Van Til every event in the finite world has a cause. Certainly, for Van Til, it is the case that all events in the finite world have their necessary and sufficient cause in God’s decree.
范泰尔﹕上帝的预定=位格性的
Van Til: God’s Foreordination = Personal
可是，范泰尔的立场与哲学史中典型的决定论有显著的不同。首先，我们已经看到，在范氏的思想中，上帝的预定 (foreordination) 是有位格的；而哲学史中决定论的典型则认为，事物的成因至终是非位格性的。 「哲学上的必然论 (necessitarianism) 代表了一种终极的非位格主义 (impersonalism)，而贯彻一致的基督教则代表着一种终极的位格主义。」（CTETH，页35；DF2，页62。）
But Van Til’s position is different in significant ways from typical deterministic systems in the history of philosophy. For one thing, as we have seen, God’s foreordination on Van Til’s view is personal, while determinism in philosophy typically ascribes events to causes that are ultimately impersonal. “Philosophical necessitarianism stands for an ultimate impersonalism: consistent Christianity stands for an ultimate personalism.” (CTETH, 35; DF2, 62.)
范泰尔﹕次等成因可以是 「自由」 的
Van Til: Secondary Causes Can Be “Free”
范氏的立场与世俗决定论之间另外一个不同之处，在于 「第一因」 和次等成因之间的区别。范泰尔坚持，虽然我们从来没有脱离上帝的掌控，但有时候我们可以脱离宇宙的因果结构 (causal nexus)。范泰尔关于这一点的说明并不多，不过他在一段讨论中暗示了这观点。他引用亚米念的一段话，说后者否认 ：「一件事，从次等成因 (second causes)的角度来看是自由的(contingent偶发的)；同时，从上帝预旨的角度来看，则是必然 (necessary) 的。」（CTK，页211。）在这里被亚米念所否认的，是范氏明显地予以肯定的；换句话说：一个事件，根据上帝的预旨是被必然预定（necessarily foreordained）的；同时，从它与「有限成因」的关系来看，也可以是自由的 (free, contingent)。
Another difference between Van Til’s position and secular determinism lies in the distinction between primary and secondary causes. Van Til maintains that although we are never free from divine control, we are sometimes free from the “causal nexus” of the universe. This point is less explicit in Van Til, but it is implicit, for example, in a passage where he quotes Arminius as denying “that a thing which, in regard to second causes, is done contingently is said to be done necessarily in regard to the divine decree.” (CTK, 211 (emphasis by Van Til). Evidently Van Til here intends to affirm what Arminius denies, namely, that events that are foreordained necessarily according to the divine decree may nevertheless be contingent (i.e., free, not determined) in relation to finite causes.
范泰尔颂扬（基督徒的）人的自由﹕
自发性、自决性、动力
Van Til Celebrates (Christian) Human Freedom:
Spontaneity, Self-Determination, Momentum
借着摒弃决定论，范泰尔因此可以积极地坚持人的自由。他的自由观是非常健全的。举例来说，我们应该注意到，范泰尔一方面坚持上帝的国度是人最高的良善；另一方面，他说 ：「人的『伦理的理想』应该是自我实现 (self-realization)。」（CTETH，页44。）自我实现的意思是﹕ 「人必须努力锻炼 (work out)自己的意志。」（CTETH，页45。）也就是说﹕人的意志，在他的反应上 (reactivity) 应该越来越有自发性 (spontaneous)；…在他的自决性上(self-determination) 应该越来越坚定 (fixed) ；…他的动力 (momentum) 应该越来越强。」 （CTETH， 45。）
By rejecting determinism, Van Til is able, positively, to maintain a robust view of human freedom. We should note, for example, that he sees no difficulty in maintaining both that the kingdom of God is man’s highest good, and that “the ethical ideal for man should be self-realization.” (CTETH, 44.) Self-realization means that “man must work out his own will.” (CTETH, 45. Emphasis by Van Til.) That means that man’s will must “become increasingly spontaneous in its reactivity … become increasingly fixed in its self-determination. … increase in momentum.” (CTETH, 45. Emphasis by Van Til.)
非常有意思！在这里，范泰尔并没有呼吁消除人的意志，反之，人的意志需要被强化。当然，他并不提倡人应该越来越任性、自私；也不是说人的意志应脱离被造的地位，从「依靠上帝」的情况中解放出来！更确切的说，范氏的意思是﹕人的灵魂应该越来越坚决委身于遵行上帝的旨意；而这个委身应该越来越自发、坚决，它的动力也应该越来越强。范泰尔的意思是﹕属灵的成熟，应带来更多内在的自我约束，并且越来越不需要外在的强迫。「在基督里长进」的意思是：我们变得越来越愿意遵行祂的旨意；我们的顺服越来越带着喜乐，也越来越成为我们内心的热望 (passion of our heart)。遵行上帝的旨意成为我们的习惯（「习惯」 一词的意思在这里是正面的）。上帝的成熟仆人，不需要因为被别人（父母亲、牧师或其他人）恫吓才追求上帝的义。他爱慕圣洁，并且在圣洁上不断地稳定成长。对范泰尔来说，人的自由，并不是一个与亚米念派人士辩论时迫不得已、勉强承认的概念；人的自由，在基督徒的生活中，是一个事实，并且具有积极、实用的重要性！
Remarkably, here, Van Til calls for the strengthening of the human will, not its abolition. Of course, he is not advocating an increase of willfulness or selfishness, or an attempt to sever the will’s created dependence on God. Rather, he calls for an increase in the soul’s resolve to do God’s will. But that resolve is to become more and more spontaneous, fixed, and growing in momentum. What he means is that spiritual maturity brings more internal and less external constraint. Growing in Christ means that we become more and more willing to do his will; our obedience becomes more delightful, more the passion of our own heart. It becomes habitual, in a good sense. A mature servant of God does not need to be browbeaten (by parents, preachers, and others) into seeking God’s righteousness. He loves holiness and steadily increases in it. For Van Til, then, human freedom is not a concept grudgingly conceded in the debate with Arminians. It is a fact of positive and practical importance in the Christian life.
林慈信译
网络圣约ccnci.org
中华展望圣约学院[email protected]（PayPal）