第七章　类比的知识

ANALOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

1. 类比的知识

ANALOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 7, pp. 89-95.)

1. 范泰尔的知识形而上学如何影响知识

How Van Til’s Metaphysics of Knowledge Impacts Knowledge

在我们对范泰尔「知识形而上学」的分析中，我们已经讨论了他的上帝论，和他对「上帝与世界的一般关系」的看法。现在我们必须继续讨论，这个知识形而上学如何影响人的知识。

In our analysis of Van Til’s “metaphysics of knowledge,” we have discussed his doctrine of God and his view of the general relationship between God and the world. Now we must proceed to discuss how this metaphysical perspective bears upon human knowledge.

我们已经看见，范泰尔的形而上学强调：（一）创造主与被造物的区别；（二）上帝对被造者的主权。因此，我们可以预料，范氏的知识论也会在知识的范畴里强调同样的关系，即「上帝的知识」与「我们的知识」的区别，以及上帝在知识范畴的主权。

As we have seen, Van Til’s metaphysics emphasizes (1) the distinction between Creator and creature and (2) the sovereignty of the Creator over the creature. We may well anticipate, therefore, that his epistemology will emphasize precisely those relationships in the area of knowledge: the distinction between God’s knowledge and ours, and the sovereignty of God in matters of knowledge.

2. 范泰尔的主要观念：类比

Van Til’s Idea of Analogy

范泰尔以「类比」这个观念来归纳他的重点。人的知识是上帝的知识的 「类比」，

意即：（一）人的知识是被造的，因此，与上帝自己的知识截然不同；（二）人的知

识是服在上帝的掌控和权威之下。

Van Til sums up these emphases in the term analogy. Human knowledge is “analogous” to God’s, which means that it is (1) created and therefore different from God’s own knowledge, and (2) subject to God’s control and authority:

基督徒想要获得的知识系统，可称为「类比的」知识。意即：上帝的知识是原本的，人的知识则是衍生自上帝的知识（derivative）。上帝在祂自己里面有绝对的自含系统（self-contained system）。历史当中所发生的事，都是根据上帝的自含系统、和祂用以掌管宇宙的计划。可是，人身为上帝的被造者，不可能拥有上帝自含系统的复制品。不错，人必须效法上帝的思维而思维；可是，这意味着，人在尝试形成自己的思想系统时，必须不断服在「上帝向人启示的系统」的权威之下（CTK, 16；参DF2, 39; DF1, 64）。

The system [of knowledge] that Christians seek to obtain may … be said to be analogical. By this is meant that God is the original and that man is the derivative. God has absolute self-contained system within himself. What comes to pass in history happens in accord with that system or plan by which he orders the universe. But man, as God’s creature, cannot have a replica of that system of God. He cannot have a reproduction of that system. He must, to be sure, think God’s thoughts after him; but this means that he must, in seeking to form his own system, constantly be subject to the authority of God’s system to the extent that this is revealed to him. [CTK, 16, (emphasis by Van Til); cf. DF2, 39; DF1, 64.]

3. 带来问题的名词：共在、错置共在、类比（阿奎那的用法）

Problematic Terms:

Analogy, Univocal, Equivocal (Aquinas’s Usage)

范泰尔选用的「类比」这个词，和历史上另一些相关的反义词，如univocal（共在）、equivocal（错置共在），可能会带来一些问题（JA, 321-327）。多马‧阿奎那和后来几世纪的天主教思想家，对这些词汇的用法，都与范泰尔不同。当阿奎那谈论存有和谓语时，使用了「类比」一词，即「存有的类比」（analogy of being）和「谓语的类比」（analogy of predication）。

Van Til’s choice of the word “analogical,” together with the terms historically contrasted with it, namely, “univocal” and “equivocal,” poses some problems. (In what follows, I am borrowing heavily from Gilbert Weaver’s excellent article, “Man: Analogue of God,” in JA, 321-327.) Thomas Aquinas, followed by centuries of Roman Catholic thinkers, used these terms in a way quite different from Van Til. Aquinas speaks of “analogy” in terms of being, and then in terms of predication.

「存有的类比」（这是阿奎那从亚里士多德和新柏拉图主义借来的观念）是指从上帝（最高的存有）到纯物质（存有的最低层，即「非存有」）的连续统（continuum）[参本书（CVT）第19及25章]。上帝是最高的存有，纯物质是最低的存有。在这个连续统里，较高的存有在「本质（essence）」和「存在（existence）」之间比较合一（unity）；意思是说：大体说来，他们的动作和经验是由他们的本性所支配。上帝的作为和经验，完全是由祂自己根据自己的本性（祂是甚么）来掌管；人的行为和经验，至少会有部份是由外界掌控的；而纯物质（undifferentiated matter）──就是最低的存有──则没有任何本质可以表达；它就是「非存有」，或说是「无有」 [参本书（CVT）第5章]。

The “analogy of being,” which Aquinas borrowed from Aristotle and Neoplatonism, is a continuum that runs from God at the top to undifferentiated matter at the bottom. [Certainly Aquinas did not intend to deny the Christian doctrine of creation, or the distinction between Creator and creature. But alongside his orthodox statements of these doctrines, he employed ideas from Greek philosophy that were inconsistent with these doctrines. See other discussions of Aquinas in chaps. 19 and 25 of this book (CVT).] God has the most being, bare matter the least. Beings higher on the scale have a greater “unity between essence and existence,” which means, roughly, that their nature governs their actions and experience. God’s actions and experience are completely governed by himself, by what he is. Man’s actions and experience are at least partly governed by factors outside himself. Undifferentiated matter, at the bottom of the scale, has no essence to express; it is strictly nonbeing or nothing. [Compare my discussion in chap. 5 (CVT) of the attempt to gain knowledge by ascending and descending the abstraction ladder. Van Til believes that Aquinas’s continuum of being and nonbeing is essentially the same as the continuum of empty abstractions and ultimate matter.]

按照阿奎那的模式，同一个存有层面上的存有，它们之间的关系是「共在的」（univocal）；存有层面大不相同的存有，它们之间的关系是「错置共在的」（equivocal）；而存有层面比较接近的存有，它们之间的关系则是「类比的」（analogical）。整个连续统（continuum）的存有之间，都有类比或相似的地方；又或许，除了「纯物质」与「在它上一层的存有」的关系以外，一切事物都有相似的地方；因为，至少它们都「是」（存在）。

Beings at the same level on the scale are related “univocally,” in Aquinas’s construction. Beings at far different levels are related “equivocally.” Beings at closer levels are related “analogously.” There are analogies, or similarities, between being at every point on the continuum, except, perhaps, between pure matter and the beings above it. Everything is alike, at least in that it is.

4. 字的意义：字意？喻意？

Meaning of Words: Literal, Figurative?

阿奎那的「谓语论（predication）」──即「名词的意义」，乃沿用了这方面的分析。以「智慧」一词为例，用在连续统内不同的事物上，就会有不同的意义：对于同一个存有层面上的存有来说（例如：老李与老张），这个词汇的意义是「共在的」（univocal）；对存有层面大不相同的事物来说（例如：老李的智慧和下棋策略的智慧），「智慧」的意义是「错置共在的」（equivocal）；而对于存有层面相类似的存有来说（例如：上帝的智慧和老李的智慧），词汇的意义是「类比的」（analogical）。上帝的智慧与老李的智慧不同，但它们仍然是相似的──虽然我们不能确定它们究竟是在甚么意义上相似。因着上帝的单一性（simplicity），也因着祂的本质和存在完全合一，因此，「上帝的智慧」指的是上帝的所「是」（everything God is）。可是老李的智慧就不同了，它可能与愚妄共存。

Aquinas’s doctrine of predication, or the meaning of terms, follows this analysis. A word like wise applies in different senses to objects at various points along the continuum. It applies “univocally” to beings who are at the same level, e.g. to Bill and to Charles. It applies “equivocally” to beings far removed from one another, e.g., to Bill and to a chess strategy. To beings closely related, but at different levels on the scale, terms are used “analogously.” God’s wisdom is different from Bill’s, but it is also similar, although we cannot be sure precisely wherein the similarity lies. Because of God’s simplicity, his unity of essence and existence, wisdom refers to everything God is. But Bill’s wisdom may coexist with foolishness.

按照阿奎那的语言观，「共在」大约相当于「字意性」的意思；「错置共在」大约相当于「隐喻性」的意思。「类比」的语言是喻意的语言，可是在某种程度上，却比「错置共在」更接近字意性。

In Aquinas’s view of language, “univocal” is more or less equivalent to “literal”,and “equivocal” to “merely metaphorical.” “Analogical” language is figurative language, but somehow closer to the literal than equivocal language is. (I am making vague distinctions. I do not believe that his own account can be made more precise than this.)

5. 阿奎那：用人的语言，可以认识上帝吗？

Is Aquinas Agnostic Toward God?

阿奎那的立场，在某一个程度上意味着对上帝的不可知论（agnosticism）；也就是说，我们永远不可能用「共在」的方式述说上帝，只能用「类比」的方式。当我们查经时，当读到基督是「羔羊」或「犹大的狮子」时，我们会辨认出这种表达方式里面的隐喻（metaphor）；而这些形容基督的词汇，可以用更「字意性」的方式来表达。可是对阿奎那来说，所有对上帝的称谓都是隐喻的，不可能字意化；无论我们如何描述上帝，至终，喻意的言语不能以字意性的方式来表达。

Aquinas’s doctrine implies a certain agnosticism about God. We can never speak univocally of God, only analogously. In our usual Bible study, when we read about Christ being a “lamb” or the “Lion of Judah,” we recognize in these expressions metaphors that can (apart from literary nuance) be expressed more literally. But, for Aquinas, there is always a point beyond which such literalization cannot go. Whatever we say about God is, ultimately, figurative language that cannot be expressed literally.

6. 克拉克批判阿奎那，也批判范泰尔

Clark Critiques Aquinas And Van Til

有一些学者，如克拉克（Gordon Clark），认为阿奎那的观点等于怀疑论。克拉克等人提出一个问题：除了字意性的解释，还有甚么样的「意义」能被喻意性语言所乘载？他们还问：是否所有的语言都带有某种程度的隐喻性（metaphor）？答案若是肯定的，那么，就没有纯字意性的语言。「字意性」和「喻意性」之间也只是程度上的差别，而不是指两种截然不同的范畴。如果字意和喻意之间的差别只是程度上的不同，那么，当我们需要将喻意性的词汇予以字意化解释时，我们就会问：「要多字意化？」于是，究竟是字意性的语言较好？还是喻意性的语言更好？那就很难界定了。

Some, such as Gordon Clark [Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951).], have argued that this view of Aquinas amounts to skepticism. Clark’s and similar arguments raise questions about what sort of meaning, if any, is carried by figurative language, apart from literal explanations of it. They also pose the question of whether there is an element of metaphor in all language. If there is, then no language is “purely literal,” and the difference between literal and figurative is a difference in degree, rather than a difference between two sharply contrasted categories. And if the difference between literal and figurative is a difference of degree, then the demand for literal explanations of figurative terms raises the question, “How literal?” And the advantage of relatively literal language over relatively figurative language becomes rather hard to define.

无论如何，克拉克指出范泰尔的类比观与阿奎那的观念一样，因此，克拉克对阿奎那立场的批判，范泰尔也必须接受。

At any rate, Clark wrote that Van Til’s view of analogy was the same as that of Aquinas and therefore subject to Clark’s assessment of Aquinas’s position. [Clark, “The Bible as Truth,” Bibliotheca Sacra 94 (April 1957): 166.]

7. Weaver和傅兰姆为范泰尔辩护：范泰尔的类比观与阿奎那截然不同

Weaver and Frame Defend Van Til:

Van Til Different from Aquinas on Analogy

相反，Weaver却主张范泰尔的类比观与阿奎那的截然不同；这样的评论当然是正确的。范氏坚决反对阿奎那的存有类比观、以及与其相关的知识论（IST, 206-210 = IST2, 333; CTK, 16-17; SCE, 60; RP, 83-105; WSA, 32-61; GH, 267-286）。范泰尔认为，阿奎那的类比观预设了上帝与人之间的连续统（continuum）。

On the contrary, Weaver is surely correct in arguing that Van Til’s view of analogy is very different from that of Aquinas. Van Til strongly opposes Aquinas’s view of the analogy of being and the view of knowledge connected with it. (IST, 206-210 = IST2, 333; CTK, 16-17; SCE, 60; RP, 83-105; WSA, 32-61; GH, 267-286.) He believes that Aquinas’s view of analogy presupposes a continuum between God and man.

8. 范泰尔：人的知识是上帝知识的有限副本

Van Til: Human Knowledge is Finite Replica of God’s Knowledge

我们可以用前文所引范泰尔的话，来总结他的类比观，即人的知识是上帝知识的「有限的副本」(IST, 206=IST2, 292)。也就是说，在人的知识里，我们的思想反映出(image) 上帝的知识到一个程度，我们可以说我们的知识是真知识。因为当我们获得真知识的时候，我们是「效法上帝的思维而思维」(think God’s thoughts after him)。

His own view of analogy, summarized in our earlier quotation, is that human knowledge is a “finite replica” of God’s. (IST, 206 = IST2, 292.) It is not God’s own knowledge, nor is it on a continuum with God’s knowledge. Like everything human, it is created, creaturely, finite. Nevertheless, our knowledge is a finite replica of God’s knowledge. [Van Til was not absolutely consistent in his terminology. In the earlier passage quoted from CTK, he denies that we can have a “replica” of God’s knowledge, while in IST, 206 [=IST2, 292], he asserts that we can have a “finite replica.” There is an apparent contradiction here, but I think it is plain what he is saying. The “replica” denied in CTK is clearly not the “finite replica” of IST. See the following chapter (CVT) for a more complete view of Van Til’s position on the relation of God’s knowledge to ours.] That is to say, in human knowledge our thoughts image God’s in such a way that they can be judged to be true. When we obtain knowledge, we “think God’s thoughts after him.”

9. 范泰尔的类比思维法是降服于上帝启示之下的思维

Van Til’s Analogical Thinking: Thinking Submissive to God’s Revelation

范泰尔也用「类似」和「类比」等词汇，来说明推理的方法和求知的方法。注意前面

几处的引文：范泰尔提到「降服于上帝启示之下」的重要性。这就是「类比的思维」

或「类比的推理」（参PDS, 12-15）。范泰尔说，这种推理是有「高度自我意识的类比」（CTK, 16）。相对来说，共在的思维（univocal thinking）却预设了人的自主性，并且拒绝降服在上帝的权威之下。我将在后文里多谈一些…

中华网络圣约学院ccnci.org；中华展望圣约学院 [email protected]（PayPal）

Van Til also uses “analogous” and “analogical” to describe a method of reasoning, a method of obtaining knowledge. Note that in the quotation from A Christian Theory of Knowledge at the outset of this chapter and the other passages cited with it, Van Til mentions the importance of being subject to God’s revelation. This is “analogous thinking” or “analogous reasoning.” (Cf. also PDS, 12-15.) Van Til speaks of such reasoning as “self-consciously analogical.” (CTK, 16.) “Univocal” thinking, in contrast, presupposes human autonomy and renounces proper submission to divine authority. I shall have more to say about this later in connection with Van Til’s discussions of revelation and of the ethics of knowledge.

因此，范泰尔的类比观与阿奎那一样，都是表达一个形而上学立场；可是，两者的形而上学却截然不同。范泰尔与阿奎那都是从各自的类比观而得出知识论方面的结果；不过，他们所得的结论也截然不同。

Like Aquinas, therefore, Van Til’s view of analogy expresses a metaphysical position; however, the metaphysical views of the two men were very different. Both Van Til and Aquinas also drew epistemological consequences from their respective views of analogy; the consequences they drew, however, were very different.

10. 阿奎那的不可知论：人的语言不能在字意上形容上帝；

克拉克批判范泰尔；Weaver 和弗兰姆的回应

Aquinas’ Agnosticism: Human Language Cannot Literally Describe God;

Clark Critiques Van Til; Weaver and Frame Respond

阿奎那从他的类比观里，推理出一些关于「名词使用」的结论。他认为人类所有关于上帝的语言，都不可能是字意性或共在性的。就是这个结论被克拉克批判为不可知论。范泰尔的类比观有任何相似之处吗？我认为没有。Weaver说得对：「因为范泰尔的类比不是指字汇，而是指人类思想的整体过程：『人的被造，是在本质和知识上类似上帝（created analogue）。』」Weaver同时也正确地批判了克拉克有关错置共在（equivocation）的谬论（JA, 327）。克拉克错误地认定范泰尔对「类比」一词的界定和阿奎那一样。Weaver还建议范泰尔应该选用另外一个名词，来描述他所谓「有限副本」的观念（finite replication）；我认为这也是正确的。他说：「或许我们可以说，人的知识与上帝的知识之间，有着一个形象的关系（image-relationship），人的知识具有上帝的知识的形象；或者说，人的知识反映（reflective of）出上帝的知识。」（JA, 327）

From his doctrine of analogy, Aquinas also drew consequences concerning the use of terms, concluding that no human language about God can be literal, or “univocal.” That is the conclusion that Clark criticizes as skeptical. Does Van Til’s doctrine of analogy entail anything similar? I think not. Weaver is right to say, “For [Van Til] analogy applies not to terms, but to the overall process of human thought: man is God’s created analogue in both his being and his knowledge,” and he rightly accuses Clark of the fallacy of equivocation. (JA, 327.) Clark is wrong to suppose that Van Til means the same thing as Aquinas by the term “analogy.” I think Weaver is also right to suggest that Van Til should have chosen a different term by which to describe his concept of finite replication. He suggests, “It might be said that man’s knowledge bears an image-relationship to God’s knowledge, or that man’s knowledge is reflective of that of God.” [JA, 327 (emphasis by Van Til).]

11. 人论述上帝的语言必须是「拟人」的：上帝的「俯就」

Human Language about God Necessarily Anthropomorphic: God’s Accommodation

我们在这里可以问（虽然Weaver并没有问）：范泰尔是否曾经讨论过「用人类语言字意性地述说上帝」的可能性。据我所知，范泰尔没有讨论过。不错，他的确坚持人类论述上帝的语言必须是「拟人」的（IST, 205 = IST2, 326*; CGG, 73; CTK, 37）。在这些讨论中，范泰尔所强调的是改革宗神学有关「上帝的俯就」（accommodation）的教义；也就是说，上帝用我们人──有限的被造者──所能理解的方式向我们说话。上帝使用的全然是人类的语言，而不是三位一体之间那种奥秘的沟通。可是问题仍然存在：人类的语言可否字意性地讲述关于上帝的真理？（*林按：另参：IST2, 270。）

We might well ask at this point (though Weaver does not) whether Van Til ever discusses the possibility of literal human language about God. So far as I know, he does not. He does insist that human language about God is necessarily “anthropomorphic.” (IST, 205 = IST2, 326*; CGG, 73; CTK, 37.) In these contexts his concern is to emphasize the traditional Reformed doctrine of accommodation, namely, that God speaks to us in ways that we, as finite creatures, can understand. He uses fully human language, not some mysterious intratrinitarian communication. But that leaves open the question of whether a fully human language can speak literal truth about God.  (*Ling: cf. IST2, 270.)

12. 有信心地肯定非字意性的教义；例如：上帝改变态度

Affirm Nonliteral Teachings with Confidence, Example: “God Changed His Attitude”

范泰尔要我们「尽量地拟人」（fearlessly anthropomorphic）；他的意思不是要我们

成为不可知论者，使得《圣经》中明显的字意性教导成了非字意性的教导。相反，范

泰尔要我们放胆地肯定《圣经》中非字意性的教导，因为这些教导都含有真正的（我想说：字意的）真理。在《普遍恩典与福音》一书中（页73），他要我们放胆地说：「上帝对人类的态度改变了」，因为《圣经》是这样记载了上帝的态度。

When Van Til tells us to be “fearlessly anthropomorphic,” he is not telling us to be agnostic, fearing that apparently literal biblicl teachings may, after all, be nonliteral. On the contrary, he is telling us to affirm the nonliteral teachings with confidence, since they contain genuine (I am tempted to say “literal”) truth. In Common Grace and the Gospel (p. 73), he tells us to say fearlessly that “God’s attitude has changed with respect to mankind,” since Scripture represents God’s attitude that way.

一方面，我们从《圣经》得知，上帝「本身是不变的」。我想范泰尔会承认，前面的表述（上帝改变态度）比后面的表述（上帝是不变的）更为喻意。可是，他也要我们以严肃的态度领受前者（上帝改变态度）。我想，他相信，前者教导了我们一些真理，是我们不能单从后者学到的。因此，范泰尔不是要我们作不可知论者（像阿奎那的结论一般），而是要我们更有信心（confidence）！他不是说，《圣经》里看似字意的表达，其实是喻意的；乃是说，《圣经》里看似喻意的表达，其实包含了字意性真理的元素。他告诉我们，即使《圣经》中看上去最非字意性的词句，都应该被我们放胆地领受和宣讲，就如《圣经》宣讲它们的方式一样。若解释是必须的，而这些解释本身又合乎《圣经》，那么就让我们去解释吧！这整个过程将带领我们真正地理解上帝的启示。

We know, on the one hand, also from Scripture, that God “in himself is changeless.” I think that Van Til would admit that the former formulation is less literal than the latter. But he wants us to take the first seriously. I gather that he believes the first formulation teaches us something important that we could not learn from the second alone. So Van Til is not calling us to greater agnosticism, as did Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy, but rather to greater confidence. He is not trying to say that apparently literal expressions are really figurative, but that apparently figurative expressions contain some element of literal truth. He is telling us that even the most apparently nonliteral expressions should be set forth with confidence, as indeed Scripture sets them forth. If explanations are necessary, and those explanations are themselves scriptural, then let them be given too. This whole process leads us to true understanding of God’s revelation.

13. 「整本《圣经》都是拟人的」此一原则的涵义：缩短字意和喻意之间的距离

Implication of “All Scripture Anthropomorphic” Principle:

Literal and Figurative Less Distant

范泰尔「整本《圣经》都是拟人的」这个原则，已经产生了一个后果，使得字意和喻意之间的距离缩短了。这里的意思不是说，「上帝改变祂的态度」是一个纯粹喻意的表述，而「上帝不改变」则是一个纯粹字意性的表述。这两个表述都涉及到创造主与被造者之间的沟通，也都有其局限性；就好像父母亲与年幼的小孩讲话时，也会受到类似的限制。可是，喻意性的表达不是单单用以润色语言的装饰，随时都可被字意性的字句取代。确切的说，它们在传达一些信息，是我们不能从其他管道知道的；而这些信息，需要被加入我们「字意性真理」的知识库里。若仅仅知道「上帝是不改变的」，我们可能会忽略历史的重要性，例如：堕落前与堕落后、旧约与新约、道成肉身前和道成肉身后、基督复活前与复活后、使徒时代和后使徒时代……等变化。但「上帝改变祂的态度」则告诉我们，上帝非常认真地看待这些历史上的演变。我们会在本书（CVT）第16章「普遍恩典」里，看见这一点。

Van Til’s principle, “All Scripture is anthropomorphic,” has the effect of narrowing the gap between literal and figurative. It is not that the statement “God changed his attitude” is purely and simply figurative, while the statement “God does not change” is purely and simply literal. Both expressions partake of the limitations involved in conversations between Creator and creature – similar in some measure to the limitations in conversations between parents and small children. But the figurative expressions are not merely aesthetic decorations, easily replaced by literal truth. Rather, they convey some things that we would not otherwise know, some things that we need to add to our storehouse of literal truth. If we knew only that God did not change, we might be tempted to ignore the significance of history, the movements in time between pre-Fall and post-Fall, Old and New Tetament, pre-Incarnation and Incarnation, pre-Resurrection and post-Resurrection, apostolic age and postapostolic age. “God changed his attitude” tells us that God takes these movements in time seriously, as we shall see in our discussion of common grace in chapter 16 (CVT).

14. 非字意性并不妥协上帝的超越性

Nonliterality Does Not Compromise God’s Transcendence

因此，范泰尔的「拟人论」并没有清楚告诉我们，人的语言可否字意性地述说上帝。我有一次曾问过他，他的答复是：他从来没有仔细想过这问题，也没有整理出一个立场。显然，他不认为这个问题对他的知识论有多重要。在这方面，范泰尔和克拉克非常不同。我猜想，范泰尔的观点可能和我先前建议的一样：字意性（literality）有不同的程度和种类，并且，纯粹字意性的语言是不存在的。既然非字意性的语言并没有妨碍我们言说这个世界，它也不能妨碍我们言说上帝。而字意性地言说上帝，并不一定会妥协祂的超然性；虽然阿奎那不这么认为，但他的观念并不符合范氏的整个进路。

So Van Til’s doctrine of anthropomorphism does not settle the question of whether human language can speak literally of God. I asked him once about that, and his reply was that he had never thought much about it and had not formulated a position on the question. Evidently it was not an issue he considered important to his epistemology; in that respect he is very unlike Gordon Clark. I suspect that Van Til held the view I suggested earlier, that there are degrees (and perhaps kinds) of literality and no such thing as purely literal language. Since non-literality does not inhibit our language about the world, it cannot be said to hinder our language about God, either. Nor does literal language about God necessarily compromise his transcendence, although Aquinas thought it did. At least this sort of view would be compatible with Van Til’s overall approach.

15. 《圣经》给我们字意性的知识

Bible Gives Literal Knowledge

人的语言都有字意性（literality），那么，人用来言说上帝的语言有没有例外呢？范泰尔似乎认为没有一点例外。例如有关「上帝在历史中的作为」的宣称，像是「上帝带领以色列人走干地过红海」之类的记载，最好被看为字意性的记载，而非喻意性的记载。对上帝的反面宣称，例如「上帝不会撒谎」，也不应被视为喻意性的宣称，因为这句话将上帝和其他「在字意上而非喻意上」撒谎的人──也就是真正撒谎的人──区别出来。此外，还有很多对上帝的正面宣称，例如「上帝知道万事」等，都是字意性的。因为这样说的同时，我们是毫无疑问地相信，上帝的知识远远超越我们的知识。

There seems to be nothing in Van Til’s system that would prevent us from ascribing to language about God the same kind of (relative) literality that we regularly ascribe to language of other kinds. For example, statements about God’s acts in history, like “God brought Israel across the Red Sea on dry land,” are best described as literal rather than figurative. Negative statements about God, e.g., “God is not a liar,” are not figurative in any way useful sense; this statement distinguishes God from literal liars, not (or not only) figurative ones. And many of our positive statements, such as “God knows all things,” are literal. To say that, of course, is not to deny that God’s knowledge far transcends ours.

16. 上帝的启示不被字意的语言所限制

God’s Revelation Not Limited to the Literal

当然，「上帝用『全然人类的语言』向我们启示」此一事实，也许表示有些关于上帝的真理，是不可能用字意性的方式启示给我们的。的确，或许有一些真理完全不可能用人的语言来表达（罗8:26，林后12:4）；可是，这一点也不妨碍有些已经被启示的事情，乃是以字意性的方式被启示出来。

Of course, the fact that God speaks to us in “fully human” language may mean that some truths about God cannot be literally stated in revelation. Indeed, there may be some truths that cannot be stated at all in human language (Rom. 8:26; 2 Cor. 12:4). But that does not prevent some of the things that are revealed from being revealed literally.

罗8:26

况且我们的软弱有圣灵帮助，我们本不晓得当怎样祷告，只是圣灵亲自用说不出来的叹息替我们祷告。

林后12:4

他被提到乐园里，听见隐秘的言语，是人不可说的。

[ CTK = A Christian Theory of Knowledge ]

[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2^nd edition ]

[ DF1 = The Defense of the Faith, 1^st edition ]

[ JA = Jerusalem and Athens ]

[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]

[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]

[ SCE = A Survey of Christian Epistemology ]

[ RP = The Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought ]

[ WSA = Who Do You Say That I Am? ]

[ GH = The God of Hope ]

[ PDS = The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture ]

[ CGG = Common Grace and the Gospel ]

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