第十一章 理性的优先性
THE PRIMACY OF THE INTELLECT
THE PRIMACY OF THE INTELLECT
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 11, pp. 141-145.)
- 理性：人的功能
Intellect: A Faculty in Man
现在我们讨论范泰尔对人「理性」（reason）的看法。我相信他没有写下「理性」的定义，可是很明显，他认为「理性」是人的一种功能（faculty）。具体地说，「理性」是人按照逻辑来思想与行事的能力，这包括了形成信念、作出推论、构成论据等的能力。而「合理的」或「理性的」（rational）一词就用来形容这种思想能力及其带来的结果（如合理的信念、合理的推论、合理的论据等），并形容这种行事的能力，以及形容这个人本身和他理性的能力（faculty）。
We will now look at Van Til’s view of human reason. I do not believe that Van Til defines reason anywhere, but it is clear that he views it primarily as a human capacity or faculty. Specifically, reason is the capacity of a person to think and act according to logical norms, including the capacity to form beliefs, draw inferences, and formulate arguments. The adjective rational can pertain to such thinking (and the resulting beliefs, inferences, and arguments) and acting, as well as to the person and his intellectual faculty.
- 「理性」或「合理的」有两种用法：形容人的理性、衡量人的理性
Reason/Rational: Descriptive, Normative
虽然范泰尔没有明确指出，但我们却必须了解「理性」与「合理的」有两种用法：一是形容人的理性（descriptive），二是衡量人的理性（normative）。人的思想都是「合理的」（这是前者的意义）；可是根据后者的意义，只有当理性形成真实的信念、作出有理据的推论、和按照正当准则行事的时候，那种思想才是合理的。
Although Van Til does not point this out, it is important for us to understand that reason and rational are used in both descriptive and normative senses. All thinking is “rational” in the descriptive sense. But in the normative sense, thinking is “rational” only when it formulates true beliefs, draws valid inferences, operates according to proper criteria, and so on.
- 理性的至终准则：上帝的启示
God’s Revelation: Ultimate Norm for Reason
对范泰尔来说，理性的至终准则乃是建基于上帝的启示，这就如同所有的人类活动一样，都必须服在上帝启示的准则下。所以说，「理性本身具有德性」（the intellectual itself is ethical，参DF2, 46 = DF4, 70；另参页17-18 = DF4, 39）。人的理性是被造的，因此，不是绝对（至终）的、也不是自足的（DF2, 90 = DF4, 113），我们必须把自己的理性（和我们所有的活动）都服在上帝的权柄下（IST, 192 = IST2, 307）。我们已经看见，在范泰尔的思想中，人类的思想必须是「类比的」，意思是说，必须接受上帝的启示为人类知识的「至终预设」或「参考点」。归根究底，真理就是与上帝的「自我完整本性和知识」符合（CA, 10）。因此，「人若不是自主的，人若诚如《圣经》所描述的那样，是一个上帝所造的人，且是一个在上帝面前的罪人，那么，人就必须把他的理性服在《圣经》之下，并寻求《圣经》的亮光来解释他的经验」（DF2, 108 = DF4, 130；另参页31-35）。
Ultimately, for Van Til, the norms of reason are found in the revelation of God. Like all human activities, reasoning is subject to the norms of divine revelation. Thus, “the intellectual itself is ethical.” (DF2, 46 = DF4, 70; cf. pp. 17-18 = DF4, 39.) The human mind is created, and therefore not ultimate or self-sufficient. (DF2, 90 = DF4, 113.) We must submit our reasoning, like every other activity, to God. (IST, 192 = IST2, 307.) In Van Til’s thought, as we have seen, human thinking is to be “analogical,” accepting God’s revelation as the ultimate presupposition or “reference point” for all human knowledge. Ultimately, truth is correspondence with God’s “self-complete nature and knowledge.” (CA, 10.) So, “if man is not autonomous, if he is rather what Scripture says he is, namely, a creature of God and a sinner before his face, then man should subordinate his reason to the Scriptures and seek in the light of it to interpret his experience.” (DF2, 108 = DF4, 130; cf. pp. 31-35.)
- 范泰尔对贺治的回应：微妙
Van Til’s Response to Hodge: Subtle
因着对十九世纪普林斯顿神学家贺治（Charles Hodge）的主张作出回应，范泰尔似乎更仔细地讨论「理性」的功能（意思是：理性在神学上的功能，但范泰尔并没有将神学和其他学科明确地区分。参IST, 14-16 = IST2, 36-38）。贺治指出理性在神学上的三种功能：领受启示、判断信念（甚么是可能的，甚么是不可能的）与判断启示的证据（IST, Chapter IV, 31-42 = IST2, 71-88）。
Van Til looks more closely at the functions of reason (i.e., reasoning in theology. But Van Til does not draw a sharp distinction between theology and other fields: see IST, 14-16 = IST2, 36-38) by interacting with the views of the nineteenth-century Princeton theologian Charles Hodge. Hodge lists three functions of reason in theology: to receive revelation, to judge contradictions (possibilities and impossibilities), and to judge the evidences of revelation. (IST, Chapter IV, 31-42 = IS2, 71-88.)
我们可能认为，范泰尔必然在第一点上同意贺治的看法，仅仅拒绝贺治的第二和第三点。可是范泰尔对贺治的回应比较微妙，在其讨论中引发了他三点的关怀：理性的优先性、逻辑的地位和证据的角色。我们会逐一讨论这三点，本章先讨论「理性的优先性」。
We might expect Van Til to agree with Hodge on the first point and simply reject his second and third points. But his response to Hodge is more subtle than that, and his discussion introduces three of his main concerns: the primacy of the intellect, the place of logic, and the role of evidence. We shall consider these in turn. This chapter will deal with the primacy of the intellect.
贺治认为，上帝的启示主要向人的理性发出，因此，只有理性的活物才能领受启示；野兽与「蠢材」（idiots）都不能领受。范泰尔对这点的理解是，领受上帝启示的是人的理性，而不是人的意志或情感。他形容贺治的立场为「理性的优先性」。
Hodge argues that revelation is directed specifically to the mind, and therefore may be received only by intellectual beings, not “brutes” or “idiots.” Van Til takes this to mean that it is the intellect, rather than the will or the emotions, which receives the revelation of God. He describes Hodge as holding to “the primacy of the intellect.”
- 理性的优先性：Clark在OPC的争论
Primacy of the Intellect: The Clark Controversy in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church
「理性的优先性」这教义，并没有在改革宗的信条中出现，不过有些改革宗神学家的确这样主张，例如梅钦、克拉克（Gordon Clark）和贺治。克拉克在信正长老会（Orthodox Presbyterian Church）引起的争议，不仅关乎上帝的不可知性（incomprehensibility），还涉及（上帝和人的）理性与意志和感情之间的关系。OPC总会对克拉克的指控包括：（一）否认上帝有感情；（二）相信在宗教信仰上，人的理性比意志和情感更重要（Complaint, 16）。根据指控文件（Complaint）所言，克拉克将「以理性默想上帝」视为荣耀上帝和享受上帝同在的最高形式；他把意志与情感服在理性之下，作为理性的工具。
The doctrine of the primacy of the intellect is not found in the Reformed creeds, but it is advocated in the writings of various Reformed theologians, including J. Gresham Machen and Gordon H. Clark, as well as Hodge. The Clark controversy, besides dealing with the incomprehensibility of God, also dealt with the relation of intellect to will and emotions, both in God and in man. The Complaint charges Clark with (1) denying that God has emotions and (2) believing that the human intellect has a far greater religious importance than the human will or emotions. (Complaint, 16.) According to the Complaint, Clark makes intellectual contemplation of God the highest form of glorifying and enjoying him, and he subordinates will and emotion to intellect as means to an end.
这指控文件也公允地赞扬克拉克并没有把上帝或人的不同功能（理性、意志、情感）分开；它指出克拉克尝试维持这三种功能的合一性，并坚持（不论上帝或人的）理性的思想与行为都是整体性的。可是，指控文件却指出，当我们尝试形容和审核这些整体人格的不同「层面」（aspects），并试图说明它们之间的关系时，克拉克却会要求我们高举理性的「优先性」。指控文件认为这种观点与《圣经》和改革宗信仰有出入。（指控文件又指克拉克对「信徒使用理性」与「非信徒使用理性」两者的分辨不够明确。……）
The Complaint concedes that Clark does commendably resist separating these faculties in either God or man; Clark wishes to maintain a unity among these faculties so that the mind (whether divine and human) always thinks and acts as a whole. Nevertheless, says the Complaint, when we seek to describe, relate, and evaluate these different “aspects” of the unity of personality, Clark would have us attribute “primacy” to the intellect. The Complaint considers this view out of accord with the Scriptures and the Reformed faith. (The Complaint also alleges that Clark makes an inadequate distinction between the believer’s and the unbeliever’s use of reason. I shall not specifically discuss Clark’s view of that distinction, but Van Til’s view will be discussed in the chapter on “Antithesis.”)
- 克拉克：上帝没有情感？
Clark: Does God Have Emotions?
根据克拉克的答辩文件（The Answer），克拉克这样答复：他之所以否认上帝有情感，是因为他对「情感」的定义是根据威敏斯特信仰告白第二章第1条（答辩文件，页26），该处否认上帝有「激情」（passions），可是克拉克并不否认上帝有感觉。他只不过是坚持上帝的感觉不是起起落落的，好像Dabney（Robert Lewis Dabney罗伯特·刘易斯·达布尼）所说的「ebbing and flowing accesses of feeling」（答辩文件，页27。弗兰姆注：这里的accesses一词，可能应该是excesses。译者按：意即「过分激情」的意思）。克拉克在答辩文件中指出，除非我们坚持理性的优先性，不然的话，「我们不能分辨自己是跟随理性对真理作出判断，或是跟随愤怒。」（答辩文件，页29。在信正长老会的报告中并没有讨论这问题。）
The Answer replies that Clark denies emotions to God because he defines them as among the “passions” that are denied to God in the Westminster Confession of Faith, II, 1. (Answer, 26.) Clark, however, does not deny that God feels. He only insists that God’s feelings are not, in Dabney’s words, “ebbing and flowing accesses of feeling.” (Answer, 27. Should “accesses” be “excesses?” – Frame.) The Answer argues that unless we assert the primacy of the intellect, “it would be a matter of indifference whether one followed one’s anger or his sober judgment of truth.” (Answer, 29. The General Assembly’s Report did not discuss this issue.)
据我理解，范泰尔并没有讨论上帝是否有情感这问题，即使在其《系统神学导论》一书中，当讨论上帝的属性时，他也没有对此作出讨论。[弗兰姆注：我猜想，他若讨论这问题，他会鼓励我们「尽量地拟人化」（fearlessly anthropomorphic），接受上帝是有情感的。] 然而，当他讨论到人理性的优先性时，他作了两个区分：一是基督徒与非基督徒对于「理性的优先性」在看法上的区分；一是「本体上的优先性」（ontological primacy）与「实际上的优先性」的区分（economic primacy）。
Van Til does not, to my knowledge, address the question of emotions in God, even in the part of An Introduction to Systematic Theology where he discusses the divine attributes. (I suspect that if he had, he would have urged us to be “fearlessly anthropomorphic” in accepting the existence of divine emotions.) But in discussing the primacy of the intellect in man, he makes two distinctions: one between Christian and non-Christian views of the primacy of the intellect, and one between ontological and economic primacy.
- 史鲍尔等对范泰尔的批判
Sproul et al Critique Van Til
范泰尔认为基督徒对理性的优先性是「根据创造主与被造物之间的区分」（IST, 31 = IS2, 71-72；另参页161 = IST2, 265。）。史鲍尔（R. C. Sproul）、John Gerstner和Arthur Lindsley在其合着的《古典派护教学》（Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984。页227）中提出异议：「任何的优先若根据其他因素，它就不再是优先。」这个说法没有分辨出「理性的优先」中的「优先」是指理性相对于意志和情感的优先，而不是相对于人以外权威的优先。
The Christian view of the primacy of the intellect, according to Van Til, is “based on the Creator-creature distinction.” (IST, 31 IST2, 71-72; cf. p. 161 = IST2, 265.) Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, in Classical Apologetics, object that “if any primacy is based on something else, it does not have primacy.” [R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), 227.] This objection fails to see that the primacy alleged in the phrase “primacy of the intellect” is a primacy with respect to other faculties of the mind, not a primacy of the mind with respect to authorities outside itself.
- 史鲍尔等人的误会
Sproul’s Misunderstanding
人的理性可以比意志或情感优先，但不会先于上帝的启示，也不会称之为人自己的至高真理准则。我想，范泰尔的意思，连《古典派护教学》的三位作者都会在经过反省之后而同意他的。也就是说：基督徒对理性优先性的任何观点，都必须与《圣经》所启示的神人关系一致。
Intellect may be prior to will or emotion, without being prior to God’s revelation and without being its own ultimate standard of truth. Van Til’s point, however, is one that I think even the authors of Classical Apologetics would concede after a little reflection, namely, that any Christian view of the primacy of the intellect must be consistent with the relationship between God and man as revealed in Scripture.
- 范泰尔用三位一体说明人的功能
Van Til on Faculties: Trinity as Analogy
范泰尔接着说，人的功能（知、情、意）之间的关系有如三位一体之间的关系（有关这类比的整全观点，参CVT第5章）。正如圣父、圣子、圣灵在本体上是同质的，同样地，人的知、情、意也是如此。三者之间不分优劣，没有一方本身更具犯罪的倾向。可是，三一真神在宇宙中工作时，圣子与圣灵自愿服从圣父；同样地，理性在人心中有 「工作上的」优先地位（economic primacy）（IST, 32 = IST2, 73）。范泰尔解释道：「人的意志不能正确地运作，除非它知道朝向甚么方向运作。人若要运用意志、感情回应真理的话，必须先认识这真理。」（IST, 32 = IST2, 73。）
Van Til then argues that the relations between the various faculties of the human mind are analogous to the relations between the persons of the Trinity. (See John Frame, CVT, chap. 5 for his overall perspective on this analogy.) As Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are ontologically equal, so are the human intellect, will, and emotions. (As we saw earlier, Van Til takes the Creator-creature distinction to imply that there are only two levels of being. This implies that there are only two kinds of ontological status: God’s and the world’s. Everything in the world has the same ontological status: see DF2, 26-27 = DF4, 50. Van Til’s metaphysic does not rule out the presence of hierarchy within the creation, but it does not encourage hierarchical thinking, as does the Greek philosophical scheme of traditional Roman Catholicism.) Not one is better or worse than the others; not one is inherently more or less prone to error or sin. Nevertheless, as the Son and Spirit relate “economically” to the creation in voluntary subordination to the Father, so the human intellect has an “economic” primacy over the will and emotions. (IST, 32 = IST2, 73) Van Til explains: “The will of man cannot function unless it knows in relation to what to function. Man must know the truth if he is to react with his will and feelings to it.” (IST, 32 = IST2, 73.)
范泰尔并没有用解经来发展这个三一关系，要这样做实在不易。可是他所讲的一点是有《圣经》根据的。在《圣经》里，人所有功能的目的都是为了荣耀上帝，因为这是人生本身的目的。当亚当堕落时，是整个人性的堕落，包含了他所有功能的堕落。《圣经》在这方面是非常清楚的，在创世记3:6，撒但用诡计刺激夏娃的感情、理性与意志；而我们在基督里，也是整个人，包括所有的功能，都借着基督被救赎、被重生、被成圣。
Van Til does not attempt to develop his Trinitarian analogy from Scripture itself; that would be difficult to do. But there is a legitimate scriptural point here. In Scripture, all human faculties have the purpose of glorifying God, for that is the purpose of human life itself. When Adam fell, his whole personality fell. All his faculties were involved in his sin. Scripture is quite explicit on this point: in Genesis 3:6, Satan perversely stimulates Eve’s emotions, intellect, and will. Through Christ, we ourselves, as whole persons, including all our faculties equally, are redeemed, regenerated, and sanctified.
创3:6
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范泰尔把这个观念与一个非基督教的观念作出对照，后者「来自古代哲学家们」（IST, 32 = IST2, 73），他们否认上帝的创造与人类的堕落。此观念认为，人的理性有神性，并没有堕落，但是感情则「本质上是无法无天的」（inherently unruly）（IST, 34 = IST2, 77）。人类邪恶的行为，并不来自人完全的堕落，而是来自人跟着情感、不跟理性行事。这样，人的行为是可以改进的，不是借着全人的救赎，而是靠着竭力跟从理性、不跟从感情来行事。（范泰尔也在SCE, 58; CTEV, 112; PR, 67讨论到这观念。）
Van Til contrasts this view with a non-Christian approach “which hails from the ancient philosophers.” (IST, 32 = IST2, 73) That approach denies both the Creation and the Fall. It holds that man’s intellect is divine and unfallen, but that emotions are “inherently unruly.” (IST, 34 = IST2, 77.) Wicked human behavior comes, on this view, not from comprehensive depravity, but from following emotions rather than intellect. Improvement comes, not through comprehensive redemption, but through a determined attempt to follow reason rather than emotion. (Van Til also formulates this argument in SCE, 58; CTEV, 112; PR, 67.)
[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
[ CA = Christian Apologetics ]
[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]
[ SCE = A Survey of Christian Epistemology ]
[ CTEV = Christian-Theistic Evidences ]
[ PR = Psychology of Religion ]
EVALUATION
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 11, pp. 145-149.)
范泰尔反对这个哲学观念是对的；人所有的功能都服在罪之下，都需要救赎。罪（堕落）和救赎都不会高举人性中任何一个功能。罪与救赎都影响全人，影响人所有的功能。
Van Til is right, I think, in denying this philosophical view and in saying that all human faculties are equally subject to sin and redemption. Neither sin nor redemption involves the elevation of one faculty above another; rather, both sin and redemption equally affect all of our faculties.
有些基督徒在这方面的暸解出了错误，特别是三元论者，他们一般认为罪就是在于肉体和魂胜过了灵，而救赎则恢复了灵的优先性。
Some Christians have erred at this point, particularly trichotomists who typically argue that sin involves a primacy of body and soul over spirit, and that redemption restores the primacy of spirit.
克拉克在这问题上犯了错吗？（范泰尔在IST, 35, n. 1指出克拉克是他其中一个的目标。）据我看来，从目前所得的资料，他并没有犯错。克拉克肯定没有说「人的理性有神性」，或者说「理性没有堕落」。克拉克的确坚持人应该跟随理性对真理的判断，而不要跟随自己的怒气或一时的感受，可是，范泰尔主张理性的优先性时，也差不多有同样的意思。
Did Clark err at this point? (Van Til indicates in IST, 35, n. 1, that Clark is one of his targets.) Not so far as I can see, judging from the evidence available at the time. There was certainly no evidence that Clark regarded the human intellect as divine or unfallen. Clark did insist that one should follow one’s sober judgment of truth rather than his anger or other momentary emotions, but Van Til says virtually the same thing in describing the “economic” primacy of the intellect.
至于范泰尔，他显然承认理性在救赎上是重要的。救赎并不在于重组我们的功能，但「跟随我们的怒气」而「不谨慎地跟随理性」确实是一种罪；救赎的目的之一乃是重建与之相反的生活模式。克拉克指出，若我们没有重建「跟随理性」的模式，我们会堕入怀疑主义。
On Van Til’s side, he surely recognized that the role of the intellect is relevant to redemption. Redemption does not consist of a rearrangement of our faculties. But to “follow one’s anger” instead of “sober judgment” is certainly one form of sin, and the reversal of that pattern is one of the goals of redemption. And, as Clark maintains, if we do not reverse these patterns, we fall into skepticism.
这样的改变并不是救赎的全部，也不是成圣的关键，但的确是我们在恩典中长进的一个层面。我们不应该因为克拉克说，在这些情况中意志与情感应该跟随理性，就指控他将理性神化。
This sort of change is not the whole of redemption, nor the key to sanctification, but it is surely one aspect of our growth in grace. It would certainly be wrong to charge Clark with deifying the intellect simply because he believes that in such cases the will and the emotions ought to follow the intellect. [On the other hand, there are pantheistic implications (doubtless contrary to his intention) in some of Clark’s later writings. First, he asserted that there must be an identity rather than a mere correspondence between idea and object in human knowledge, Language and Theology (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980), 29. What does this say about human knowledge of God? Second, he argued that a person is a composite of propositions (see chap.8) and that some human propositions are identical with God’s.]
范泰尔的分析有它的洞见，可是对于批判克拉克来说，并不成功。我们已经看见好几次，他与克拉克讨论时的表现是最差的。……
Van Til’s analysis, therefore, is insightful, but it is not successful as a critique of Clark. We have seen several times in this book how Van Til seems to be at his worst when he interacts with Clark. That suggests to me that the difference between them was not merely theological or academic. But I would not care to speculate as to the precise nature of the problem between them.
可是我认为范泰尔在最基本的区分上，就是对基督徒与非基督徒进路的区分，以及对本体上与运作上关系的区分，都是正确的。
I do think that Van Til’s basic distinctions, between Christian and non-Christian approaches and between ontological and economic relations, are sound as far as they go.
范泰尔所说的，并不能作为「非理性主义者」这项罪名的根据，也不支持杜伊威德（Herman Dooyeweerd）和Robert Knudsen等人说他是「理性主义者」的指控 [JA,74-127, 275-305; HDRA；参本书（CVT）第27章]。杜伊威德批判范泰尔，认为他尝试从《圣经》中找出哲学观念。……
Certainly nothing in these constructions justifies the charge that Van Til is an irrationalist. Nor does Van Til’s position justify the opposite criticism of Dooyeweerd and Knudsen that he is a rationalist. [JA,74-127, 275-305; HDRA; see chap.27 (CVT).] Dooyeweerd bases this criticism on the fact that Van Til seeks to derive philosophical concepts from Scripture. Knudsen’s argument is that Van Til speaks of God’s self-knowledge as “analytical” and thus uses the human “analytical judgment” as a model of divine thought, rather than recognizing God’s mind as transcendent to all human rationality.
杜伊威德的观点只不过显露了他的圣经观的缺陷，却没有指出范泰尔的思想上有甚么问题。我们已经看见，范泰尔认为《圣经》向宇宙所有的范畴说话，包括哲学，而杜伊威德显然否定这一点。……
Dooyeweerd’s point reveals defects in his own view of Scripture rather than any problems with Van Til. Van Til, as we have seen, insists that Scripture speaks to all areas of life, including philosophy; Dooyeweerd evidently denies that Knudsen’s argument fails to take adequate account of Van Til’s own explicit definition of “analytical” (namely, that God’s knowledge does not depend on anything outside himself). In the light of Van Til’s interaction with Clark, it is a bit strange for somebody to accuse him of identifying God’s thought with human reason.
- 傅兰姆论知、情、意
Frame on Mind, Emotion and Will
至于人不同功能之间的关系，我想最好的做法，乃是超越范泰尔与克拉克的辩论。很有趣的是，他们两者都坚持人格的整体性，都看见若把人性过分分割成理性、意志和感情，是危险的。
As to the relationship of the various human mental faculties with each other, I think it best to go beyond both Clark and Van Til. (I will not discuss Dooyeweerd’s view in this connection, beyond this brief comment: Dooyeweerd, too, emphasizes the unity of personality. Dooyeweerd rejects even the soul-body distinction of traditional Reformed orthodoxy as the product of Greek dualism. It is a good thing to emphasize unity of personality, but Dooyeweerd is wrong thereby to oppose any theological analysis of the aspects of personality.) It is interesting that both of them insist on the unity of human personality and suggest that there are dangers in dividing the human mind sharply into faculties such as intellect, will, and emotion.
可是，这些共识在他们的辩论上，或在范泰尔的《系统神学导论》中并没有起甚么作用。……
Nevertheless, this agreed premise of the unity of personality plays no role in the Complaint, the Answer, or in Van Til’s Introduction to Systematic Theology. Van Til and Clark, rather, carry on their argument as if the three faculties were each self-contained and separate from the others, each competing for lat-out dominance within the mind.
相反，对于我来说，我们的感情给我们的理性判断提供很多重要的线索。我们理性的判断也影响了我们的感情。我们选择所信、所感觉的，因此，我们的意志也影响我们的信念与感情。我们的信念与感情也影响了我们的意志，如此类推。因此，我们的所谓功能是相互依存的（interdependent），并不那么地自足自存（self-contained）！
On the contrary, it seems evident to me that our feelings supply legitimate data for our intellectual judgments, that our intellectual judgments influence our feelings, and to some extent we choose what to believe and feel (so that the will influences beliefs and feelings), that our beliefs and feelings influence the will, and so on. Thus, our “faculties,” if we choose to call them that, are highly interdependent, not self-contained.
Furthermore, “following one’s anger over one’s sober judgment” (assuming we are talking about what the Bible calls sinful anger) may be called a choice of emotion over intellect, but it may also be described as the choice of one emotion (anger) over another (our affection for God’s will), or as the choice of one belief (that sinful anger will have good results) over another (that sinful anger will be counterproductive to any good purpose). Each rational decision has emotional characteristics, and each emotional decision has rational characteristics.
以上所表述的，让我们看见，情感、理性与意志其实是很难分割的。甚么叫做「情感」？甚么叫做「理性的信念」？其实是相当含糊和随意的。我们的行为是整个人的行为。我们可以分开用理性、意志、感情等来形容我们所做的（IST, 91 = IST2, 161-162），可是我们的理性层面也包含了感情与意志等等的层面。可能我们应该把理性、感情与意志看作我们整个人性的不同视角（详见DKG, 328-346）。
These considerations make emotions, intellect, and will very hard to distinguish. Indeed, it is to some extent a matter of arbitrary choice as to what we call “emotion” and what we call “intellectual conviction.” Our acts, in other words, are acts of the whole person. They may be characterized intellectually, volitionally, emotionally, and perhaps in other ways as well. (Van Til, interestingly, correlates reason and intuition in IST, 91 = IST2, 161-162.) But the intellect itself has emotional and volitional aspects, etc. Perhaps it is best to see intellect, emotions, and will as perspectives on the whole personality. (See my DKG, 328-346, where I have worked out this approach in some detail.)
按照这种分析，我们当然可以作出一些的提醒，鼓励人们慎思明辨，不要只靠一时的感受。我们是否称这些思辨与感受为理性、感情、或意志，其实并不重要，毕竟这些思考和感受发生的时候，并没有带着标签！而它们的确都具有三个层面。同时，我们也应该避免视理性为「军官」，在我们的脑袋里指挥，左右其他的「功能」。更重要的是，我们必须避免将道德性和本体性混为一谈：我们不可视救赎只为了高举一个功能。救赎，乃是全人的改变！
On this sort of analysis, we can make the obvious points about how people should follow their sober judgments rather than their momentary inclinations. It is unimportant for present purposes whether we describe these judgments and inclinations as intellectual, emotional, or volitional. They do not, after all, come with labels on them, and they always have all three aspects. At the same time we can avoid seeing the intellect as a kind of master sergeant, subduing and bossing around the other “faculties” up in our heads. More important, on this basis we can avoid the temptation to confuse the ethical with the metaphysical – to see salvation as the elevation of one human faculty rather than the transformation of the whole person.
- 改革宗圈子内的危机
Dangers within Reformed Community
我觉得，改革宗神学家们应该避免提倡理性的优先性。当然，这个观念本有道理，是叫人们不要跟着自己的怒气行事。而在改革宗神学的圈子中，提倡理性的优先，的确有它的原因，特别因为自由派和新正统派神学否定了上帝启示中有任何理性（命题）的内容，他们认为我们从启示中只得到空洞的「感觉」或「存在相遇」。再者，改革宗神学也必须正视福音派圈子中「感情至上」的现象（emotionalism），这并不只是灵恩运动如此。可是，用「理性的优先性」来形容人的心（psychology），是颇误导的。
I think it is advisable for Reformed theologians to avoid advocating the primacy of the intellect. The phrase can, to be sure, be used to make some legitimate points about “following anger” and so on. And its use in Reformed theology is understandable in light of the challenges of liberalism and neo-orthodoxy, which denied any propositional or intellectual element in revelation, leaving us with empty “feeling” or “encounter.” And, of course, Reformed theology has also had to contend with various kinds of emotionalism within evangelicalism, and not only within the charismatic movement. However, the primacy of the intellect is rather misleading as a general concept of human psychology.
我相信，这个观念的确在某些改革宗圈子促进了一种「惟理性精神」（intellectualism）。在这些圈子中，成圣、主的带领、敬拜、讲道、门徒训练、辅导和传道人的装备（神学教育），都自然地偏向一种学术训练的模式。而很多时候，培养敬虔的情操、体贴服事人在情感上的需要、甚至建立牧养的技巧等，都往往被忽略，甚至被轻视了。这种态度似乎更接近「理性主义哲学」多于《圣经》的教导。
I believe this concept has also encouraged an unfortunate intellectualism in some Reformed circles. In those circles, sanctification, guidance, worship, preaching, discipleship, counseling, and ministerial preparation have often been too easily and closely assimilated to the model of academic learning. Cultivating godly emotions and ministering to the emotional needs of people, even the development of pastoral skills, have often been neglected – and even treated with a kind of smug contempt. [For an example, consider Richard Muller’s The Study of Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991) in the lighy of my critique, “Muller on Theology,” WTJ 56 (spring 1994): 133-151. Muller’s reply to me, “The Study of Theology Revisited: A Response to John Frame,” WTJ 56 (fall 1994): 409-417, is even more smug than his book. I will not be permitted to publish an additional response in WTJ, so I will say briefly here that (1) in the reply Muller seems more interested in discrediting a critic than in making progress on the issues, and (2) he writes, well, like a man who knows that his opponent will not be permitted to reply.] This sort of attitude has much more in common with rationalistic philosophy than with the Bible.
- 《圣经》是一本充满感情的书！
Bible, An Emotional Book!
《圣经》是一本充满着感情、同时又充满着理性内容的书。《圣经》启示上帝的真理，不只是学术上的命题，《圣经》也讲述故事、颁发命令、自我重申、颂唱诗歌、向上帝祷告、提供视听教材（象征性的记号，特别是圣礼），还吩咐我们要彼此祝福、亲嘴问安。保罗在罗马书中，亦往往从逻辑论据中激发出赞词来敬拜上帝！我深信，改革宗的信徒们需要在这些层面上多下工夫，以致更全面体会《圣经》的信息。
The Bible is a very emotional book, as well as a book with profound intellectual content. It does not reveal the truths of God merely as academic propositions. It tells stories, issues commands, repeats itself, sings songs, offers prayers, gives us visual aids (symbols, especially the sacraments), and calls upon us to greet one another with a holy kiss. Paul breaks off from logical arguments in Romans to shout praise. I do believe that Reformed people need to regain that perspective in these areas.
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]
[ JA = Jerusalem and Athens ]
[ HDRA = Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics ]
[ DKG = John Frame, Doctrine of the Knowledge of God ]
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