第十二章 逻辑
LOGIC
LOGIC
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 12, pp. 151-160.)
引言：贺治提出的三要点
Introduction: Hodge’s Three Points
现在我们继续讨论范泰尔对理性的观念，本章集中讨论「逻辑」这题目。我们在上一章看到他如何在「理性在神学的地位」与贺治互动。贺治提出三要点的第一点是：理性有「接受」启示的功能。范泰尔对这一点的理解是：理性有它优先的地位，我们在上一章已经处理过。贺治的第二点是：理性是审核矛盾的审判官。贺治认为理性有「权利决定一件事是可能或不可能。若理性视为不可能，就不论有任何权威、也不论有多少证据，都不能强迫理性领受它是真的。」（IST, 36 = ITS2, 79，引自贺治《系统神学》1:51）
We continue our discussion of Van Til’s view of reason by considering the subject of logic. In the last chapter, we focused on his interaction with Hodge’s view of the place of reason in theology. The first of Hodge’s three points was that reason has the function of “receiving” revelation. Van Til took that as asserting the primacy of the intellect, and we dealt with that in the last chapter. Hodge’s second point is that reason is the judicium contradictionis, the judge of contradiction. Hodge says that reason has the “prerogative of deciding whether a thing is possible or impossible. If it is seen to be impossible, no authority and no amount or kind of evidence can impose the obligation to receive it as true.” [IST, 36 = IST2, 79, quoting Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d.), 1:51.]
范泰尔应该会反对贺治！但他却没有这样作。
Van Til Should Have Disagreed with Hodge! But He Doesn’t.
读者若对范泰尔有一点熟悉，可能预料范氏在这里会对贺氏提出异议。诚然，我们对这段讨论的初步印象是，范泰尔提出贺氏的说法，为要击败他。当然，范泰尔至终会坚持，理性没有权柄判断甚么是可能的，只有上帝有此权柄。
Persons with a little familiarity with Van Til’s thought might expect that he would simply disagree with Hodge here. Certainly, our first impression of the discussion is that Van Til is setting Hodge up for a fall. Eventually, surely, Van Til will insist that reason has no right to judge what is possible, only God does.
范泰尔的回应比较微妙：
他分辨「有神论的逻辑观」与「非有神论的逻辑观」
理性的确有权判断上帝的启示，但问题是：如何判断？
His Response Is More Subtle:
Distinguishes Theistic/Non-Theistic View of Logic
Reason Does Have A Right to Judge Revelation – Issue is: How?
范泰尔的确坚持，只有上帝有至终权柄做这种的判断。可是他在这里并没有直接反对贺治的看法，反之，他用令人惊奇的正面语调来回应贺治。基本上，范泰尔同意贺治所说的，只是透过分辨「（基督教）有神论的逻辑观」与「非有神论的逻辑观」来澄清问题。[范泰尔在《普遍恩典与福音》页183，似乎果断地拒绝贺治的立场：「普林斯顿的方法（译者注：即贺治的立场）在甚么程度上（so far as）用这『诉诸人的理性身为（as such）审判官，来决定一件事是可能或不可能』这方法来处事，是与普林斯顿神学完全矛盾的。」可是，「在甚么程度上」（so far as）和「身为」（as such）似乎暗示贺治的论点可以从正面来理解。范泰尔在《普遍恩典与福音》第184页（也在IST）显然批判贺治，指他没有分辨「基督教的理性观」与「非基督教的理性观」。] 范泰尔至终的结论是，理性有权判断上帝启示的逻辑一致性，可是理性本身必须服在上帝之下。
Van Til does accord to God the ultimate right to make such judgments, but here he does not simply disagree with Hodge; rather, the tone of his response is surprisingly positive. Basically, he also agrees with what Hodge says, but he tries to clarify the question by pressing the distinction between (Christian) theistic and nontheistic views of logic. (In CGG, 183, Van Til seems to reject Hodge’s position flatly: “The Princeton method, so far as it worked by this method of appeal to the reason of man as such as the judge of the possible and the impossible, was flatly opposed to the Princeton theology.” However, the phrases “so far as” and “as such” imply that Hodge’s point could be taken in a good sense. On p. 184, it is plain that here, as in IST, Van Til criticizes Hodge mainly for failing to distinguish Christian from non-Christian views of reason.) Ultimately, Van Til’s conclusion is that reason does indeed have the right to judge the logical consistency of revelation, but reason itself must be subordinate to God.
有神论者的独特处：知道上帝的本性是逻辑的基础
非有神论者离开上帝而独立运作逻辑；
因此，其上帝的来源 = 可能性、或然率
Theist’s Uniqueness: He Knows That God’s Nature Is Foundation of Logic
Non-Theist’s Logic Operates Independently from God;
Thus, His God’s Source = Possibility/Probability
「有神论的逻辑观」与「非有神论的逻辑观」两者主要的差别是，有神论者知道上帝的本性是逻辑的基础；而非有神论者则相信逻辑是「离开上帝而独立地运作」（IST, 37 = IST2, 81）。非有神论者若相信某一种的上帝（god），那个上帝「的来源乃是可能性（possibility）」；他不相信上帝才是可能性的来源（IST, 38 = ITS2, 82）。同样的意思也可用「或然率」（probability）来表达（IST, 38 = IST2, 82）。
The main difference between theistic and nontheistic views of logic is that the theist finds the foundation of logic to be the nature of God, while the nontheist believes that logic “operates independently of God.” (IST, 37 = IST2, 81.) If some god exists for the nontheist, that god “has his source in possibility” rather than the reverse. (IST, 38 = IST2, 82.) The same can be said for probability. (IST, 38 = IST2, 82.)
上帝的本性是理性的；上帝里面有绝对真理系统
我们的理性表达上帝的理性
God’s Nature = Rational; In God = Absolute System of Truth
Our Rationality Expresses God’s Rationality
对范泰尔来说，上帝的本性是理性的，在上帝里有一套绝对的真理系统（DF2, 43; CGG, 142）。我们的理性（rationality）是被造的，可是它表达着上帝的理性。矛盾定律（the law of contradiction）是「在被造的层次表达上帝本性的内在一致性（the internal coherence of God’s nature）」[IST, 11（弗兰姆：范泰尔亲自加强语气）]。
For Van Til, God’s nature is rational. In him is an absolute system of truth. (DF2, 43; CGG, 142.) Our own rationality is created, but it expresses God’s; the law of contradiction is “the expression on a created level of the internal coherence of God’s nature.” [IST, 11 (emphasis by Van Til).]
非信徒保留一些「对上帝的认识」的残余：
因此保留一些「意义和可能性的真正来源」的残余
贺治诉诸这个残余：「人类共同意识」
Unbeliever Retains Some Remnant of Knowledge of God;
Thus Retains Some of True Source of Meaning and Possibility
Hodge Appeals to This Remnant: Men’s Common Consciousness
虽然非信徒压制真理 [我们将会在本书（CVT）第15章详细探索信徒与非信徒之间的区别]，但他们仍然保留了一些残余对上帝的知识（knowledge of God），亦因而保留了一些对可能性与或然率的真正来源和意义的残余认识。当贺治说到上帝在人性中种植的信仰定律（laws of belief）时，他真正诉诸的就是这一点残余的「真正有神论对经验的解释」。从这个意义上来理解，诉诸人类的「共同意识」，不仅非常合理，而且是绝对必须的（IST, 11）。
Unbelievers, though they repress the truth [We will explore in detail the differences between believer and unbeliever in chap. 15 (CVT)], nevertheless retain some remnant of the knowledge of God and consequently of the true source and meaning of possibility and probability. It is to this remnant of a truly theistic interpretation of experience that Hodge really appeals when he speaks of the laws of belief that God has implanted in human nature. It is, of course, not only quite legitimate, but absolutely imperative to appeal to the “common consciousness” of men in this sense. (IST, 11.)
从有神论的意义上，上帝不可能做不道德的事
In Theistic Sense, God Cannot Do What Is Immoral
若从有神论的角度来理解逻辑，可以很正确地说：「上帝不可能作出、认可、或吩咐任何不道德的事。」（IST, 39 = IST2, 84.）「上帝也不可能吩咐任何与祂在我们本性里所刻印的信仰定律相矛盾的事。」（IST, 40 = IST2, 85.）上帝不是不合逻辑的，因为祂必然与祂自己本性的定律（the laws of his own nature）相一致。
Taking logic in the theistic sense, it is quite correct to say, “It is impossible that God should do, approve, or command that is morally wrong.” (IST, 39 = IST2, 84.) Nor is it possible that “God should command anything that ‘contradicts the law of belief which He has impressed upon our nature.’ ” (IST, 40 = IST2, 85.) God is not illogical, for he is consistent with the laws of his own nature.
范泰尔批评贺治：没有区分基督徒和非基督徒使用逻辑的不同
Van Til Critiques Hodge: Didn’t Distinguish Christian/Non-Christian Logic
可是，范泰尔批评贺治没有区分「基督徒使用逻辑」与「非基督徒使用的逻辑」的不同。在这方面，贺治同样犯了范泰尔指责克拉克（Gordon Clark）、卡尔乃礼（E.J.Carnell）、史密夫（Wilbur M. Smith）、步斯威理（Oliver Buswell, Jr.）和路易士（C.S. Lewis）的错误（IST, 39 = IST2, 83-84）。
Van Til critiques Hodge, however, for failing to draw a distinction between logic as used by a Christian and logic as used by a non-Christian. In this respect, Hodge makes the same error that Van Til attributes to Gordon H. Clark, Edward J. Carnell, Wilbur M. Smith, J. Oliver Buswell, Jr., and C.S. Lewis. (IST, 39 = IST2, 83-84.)
因此，不要要求非信徒使用（他们心目中的）逻辑定律，来判断（他们心目中的）福音
甚么是可能或不可能？甚么是矛盾或不矛盾？信徒与非信徒持不同观点
Thus: Don’t Ask Unbelievers to Apply Their Law of Contradiction, As They See It, to the Gospel As They See It
What Is Possible/Impossible? What Is/Isn’t Contradiction?
Christian and Non-Christian Have Different Ideas
范泰尔认为非基督徒与基督徒对于甚么是可能、甚么是不可能、甚么是与我们的道德和理性本性矛盾、甚么是不矛盾，都持截然不同的观念。因此，我们不可要求非信徒「将他们所理解的矛盾定律，应用在他们所理解的福音上」（IST, 41 = IST2, 86），因为这样，他们就会拒绝福音。
Non-Christians, says Van Til, have very different ideas from Christians about what is possible and impossible, and about what contradicts and what does not contradict our moral and rational natures. Therefore, we must not ask unbelievers to “apply the law of contradiction as they see it to the gospel as they see it,” (IST, 41 = IST2, 86) for then they would reject the gospel.
范泰尔评论：若华尔非德诉诸自然人，为要指责人，那是对的
基督的确要求人判断上帝的启示；但也要求人在上帝面前承认自己的愚蠢
Van Til: Warfield’s Appeal to Natural Man Is OK If of An Ad Hominem Nature
Christ Does Ask Natural Man to Judge Revelation;
But Christ Asks Man to Admit His Own Foolishness Before God
试比较范泰尔对第二代普林斯顿神学家华尔非德的评论：「诚然，若华尔非德以指责人
（ad hominem）的方式来诉诸自然人（罪人），那就不错了。基督的确要求自然人（罪人）判断祂的自我宣称的真实性，但祂亦要求罪人承认上帝已经使他们的智慧成为愚拙。」（PDS, 61）
Compare Van Til’s comment about Warfield, the great Old Princeton theologian of the next generation: “To be sure, if Warfield’s appeal to the natural man were of an ad hominem nature, then it would be well. Christ does ask the natural man to judge with respect to the truth of his claims. But then he asks them to admit that their own wisdom has been made foolish by God.” (PDS, 61.)
范泰尔没有在这里处理所有问题
例如：非信徒不能用逻辑思考吗？不是的
非信徒往往在逻辑上非常聪明！
信徒与非信徒之间的差别（势不两立）是道德性的，不是形而上（本体）性的
但是，非信徒却使用他的理性（逻辑）来攻击、压抑真理
范泰尔的比喻：一把锐利的锯子，却放错了方向
Van Til Doesn’t Answer All Questions Here
E.g. Is Unbeliever Unable to Think Logically? No
Often Non-Believers Are Excellent in Logic
Antithesis Between Believer/Unbeliever Is Ethical, Not Metaphysical
Unbeliever Uses His Reason to Attack/Repress The Truth
Example: Sharp, Efficient Saw – But Set In Wrong Direction
范泰尔在这段文字较简洁地讨论到逻辑，一些重要的问题仍有待解答，所以我们必须参考他在其他地方所说的。例如范泰尔有否说非信徒没有能力合乎逻辑地思想？范泰尔没有这样说。信徒与非信徒之间的「势不两立」是伦理性的，而不是形而上学的。就算是那些在地狱沉沦的人，「也没有失去理性与道德判断的能力」（the power of rational and moral determination）（PDS, 254）。范泰尔说的是，非信徒可能在逻辑上非常优秀，就如他可能有其他出人头地的天然才干。信徒并不一定在才智上超过非信徒，而且事实往往相反：「蒙召的，按着肉体有智慧的不多」（哥林多前书1:26）。可是非信徒用他的自然恩赐来压制、攻击真理。范泰尔在这方面引用「锯子」（buzz saw）的比喻是有帮助的：非信徒像一把非常锐利有效的锯子，却摆错了方向（DF2, 74 = DF4, 97）。
Van Til’s discussion of logic in this particular context is somewhat abbreviated. It leaves certain important question unanswered, and so we must look at what he says elsewhere on these issues. Does Van Til want to say, for example, that unbelievers have no ability to think logically? No, says Van Til. The antithesis between believer and unbeliever is ethical, not metaphysical. Even the lost in hell “have not lost the power of rational and moral determination.” (PDS, 254.) Van Til is saying that the unbeliever may be very competent in logic, just as he may have other natural gifts in abundance. Believers do not necessarily excel unbelievers in intelligence; indeed, the opposite is often true: not many wise are called (I Cor. 1:26). But the unbeliever uses his natural gifts to repress and attack the truth. Here Van Til’s famous illustration of the buzz saw is helpful: the unbeliever is like a buzz saw that is very sharp and efficient, but has been set in the wrong direction. (DF2, 74 = DF4, 97.)
林前1:26
弟兄们哪，可见你们蒙召的，按着肉体有智慧的不多，有能力的不多，有尊贵的也不多。
重生的人是否获得新的逻辑定律、或新的建构推论的规则？没有
信徒与非信徒的不同在于：逻辑哲学和如何使用逻辑各不相同
Does Regeneration Give Christian New Laws of Logic? No
New Rules for Constructing Syllogisms? No
Difference Is In Philosophy of Logic, and Use of Logic
那么，信徒是否因着重生而获得新的逻辑定律、或新的推理原则呢？当然不是。范泰尔说：「我并不认为基督徒根据新的思想定律来行事，正如他们并没有配上新的眼睛或鼻子。」（DF1, 296；参CGG, 27-29; IST, 254）我们在讨论贺治时已经看到，在逻辑的范围里，信徒与非信徒的不同，乃在于两者的逻辑哲学（DF1, 296）和如何使用逻辑各不相同。
Does regeneration give to believers new laws of logic, or new rules for constructing syllogisms? Certainly not. “I do not maintain,” he says, “that Christians operate according to new laws of thought any more than they have new eyes or noses.” (DF1, 296; cf. CGG, 27-29; IST. 254.) The differences between believer and unbeliever in the area of logic are rather, as we saw in the discussion of Hodge, in the philosophy of logic (DF1, 296) and the use of logic.
如何回应非信徒？非信徒寻求一个非有神论的逻辑基础
可是，在非有神论的世界中，逻辑只是抽象定律用来连接没有意义的事实
How to Respond to Unbeliever?
Unbeliever Seeks Non-Theistic Foundation for Logic
But Non-Theistic World, Logic = Abstract Laws <->Meaningless Facts
我们应如何回应非信徒在这些事上的挑战？从哲学来看，非信徒寻求一个非有神论的逻辑基础。可是在一个非有神论的世界里，逻辑只能是一些纯粹抽象的定律，人用来与没有意义的事实连接。正如范泰尔的比喻所说，「他的逻辑只不过是在一个真空中的旋转门里转，从虚无搬迁虚无到虚无那里。」（CTK, 299）在其他地方，范氏这样形容非信徒：「他们面对的两难是『绝对的无知』与『绝对的无所不知』。」[DF2, 90；参pp. 86-90 = DF4, 108-112; IST, 167 = IST2, 273；参考本书（CVT）第17章提到非信徒结合了「理性主义」（rationalism）与「非理性主义」（irrationalism），与这里所讲的两难是相应的。]
How should we respond to unbelieving challenges on these matters? Philosophically, the unbeliever seeks a nontheistic foundation for logic. But in a nontheistic world, logic can be nothing more than purely abstract laws, which man seeks to connect with meaningless facts. As Van Til illustrates, “His logic is merely the exercise of a revolving door in a void, moving nothing from nowhere into the void.” (CTK, 299.) Elsewhere, he presents the unbeliever as facing “the dilemma of absolute ignorance or absolute omniscience” (DF2, 90 cf. pp. 86-90 = DF4, 108-112; IST 167 = IST 2, 273. See chap. 17 on the unbeliever’s combination of rationalism and irrationalism which is equivalent to the dilemma discussed in this passage): either the unbeliever knows the truth already and thus cannot learn anything new, or else he is ignorant and cannot even ask the questions that would lead to the truth.
又回到「一而众」的问题：在一个偶然的宇宙是没有逻辑秩序的
所有的秩序都只是人思想中所构造的（因此，人原则上是无所不知的）
One-And-Many Problem Revisited: No Logical Order in Universe of Chance
All Order = Created in/by Man’s Mind – Thus Man is, In Principle, Omniscient
这些都是我们在本书（CVT）第5章所探索的「一而众的问题」的不同形式。除了人在自己思想中所创造的秩序以外，一个完全偶然的宇宙是没有逻辑秩序的。人若创造了这秩序，那么在原则上，他肯定完全（无所不知）地认识这秩序。
These are forms of the one-and-many problem that we explored in chapter 5. In a universe of chance, there is no logical order, except one that man creates out of his own mind. If man creates it, then in principle he must know it omnisciently.
但没有理由相信，人所创造的秩序是与事实相符！
按照人的世界观，也不能真正认识事实；因此，人是绝对无知的
But: No Reason to Suppose, Man-Imposed Order Relates To Facts!
Nor: Facts = Intelligible in Worldview Imposed By Man; Thus Man = Absolutely Ignorant
但是，我们没有理由假设，人所创造的秩序是与事实相符；而按照人的世界观，也不能
真正认识事实，因此，人是绝对无知的。范泰尔的整体哲学的结论就是，《圣经》的世
界观是逻辑的前题。
But there is no reason to suppose that that humanly imposed order has any relation to actual facts. Nor can the facts themselves be intelligible in such a worldview. Hence, man is left with absolute ignorance. Van Til’s overall philosophical conclusion is that logic presupposes a Christian worldview.
非信徒如何使用逻辑，与基督徒不同
非信徒用非有神论「评断事情可能或不可能的标准」来攻击基督教
Unbeliever’s Use of Logic = Different from Believer
Unbeliever Uses Nontheistic Standards of Possibility to Attack Christianity
非信徒使用逻辑与信徒不同，非信徒会用他的逻辑来攻击基督教的有神论，以其非有神论的标准，来评断甚么是可能、甚么是不可能，并试图显示基督教在逻辑上是矛盾的，他们会针对一些吊诡的问题，例如三一神论、神的主权与人的责任的关系。
The unbeliever also uses logic differently than the believer. The unbeliever employs his logic to attack Christian theism, bringing to bear nontheistic standards of possibility and impossibility. He tries to show that Christianity is logically inconsistent by bringing up paradoxes like the Trinity and the relationship of divine sovereignty to human responsibility.
基督徒不必向非基督徒证明「基督教能符合非基督徒的逻辑标准」
Christian: Don’t Try to Show Christianity = Logically Consistent According to Non-Christian Standards
范泰尔说，基督徒不必就这些攻击言论而试图显示基督教能符合非信徒的标准，相反，基督徒乃要诉诸「类比」的一致性。
The Christian should not answer such objections, says Van Til, by trying to show that Christianity is consistent by the unbeliever’s standards. Rather, he should appeal to “analogical” consistency.
范泰尔常指出基督教信仰内容的「表面矛盾」：他拒绝接受简易的解决方案
基督教信仰的吊诡性（三一神论）不是真正的矛盾，但却不能除掉「表面矛盾」
根据基督徒的逻辑观，还是会有「表面矛盾」
Van Til Frequently Refers to “Apparent Contradictions” in Christianity
Refuses To Accept Easy Resolutions
Paradox (Trinity) Is Not Really Contradictory; But It Is Impossible to Fully Remove Appearance of Contradictions
Apparent Contradictions Exist in a Christian View of Logic, Too
更要明白这「类比的一致性」原则，我们必须更深入探讨范泰尔常说的基督教信仰中的「表面矛盾」（弗兰姆：在这里，我回到一些曾在1976年出版的《神学家范泰尔》中所探讨过的课题）。我们在本书（CVT）第5章中已看见范泰尔一方面拒绝任何简单的方法解决三位一体的吊诡问题，但另一方面，他又真的坚信三位一体不是真正的矛盾。范泰尔认为，当我们讲论三位一体时，我们的确不可能完全除去表面上的矛盾。若按非信徒的逻辑观念，三位一体的教义显然是矛盾的；但即使按基督教的逻辑观念，这教义依然显为表面矛盾的。同样的情况出现在「上帝里一而众」、「上帝本性与属性的关系」（IST, 229 = IST2, 363-364; DF1, 26）。
To understand this principle better, we should explore further Van Til’s frequent references to the “apparent contradictions” in the Christian faith. (Here I return to some of the territory I explored in 1976 in VTT.) We saw in chapter 5 that Van Til refuses to accept any easy resolution of the Trinitarian paradox: one God in three persons. He does believe that the Trinity is not really contradictory. Yet he also maintains that it is not possible to fully remove from our formulations the appearance of contradictions. The doctrine of the Trinity obviously appears contradictory on an unbelieving view of logic, but this apparent contradiction also exists on a Christian view of logic. The same thing is true with another form of unity and diversity in God, the relation between God’s nature and his attributes. (IST, 229 = IST2, 363-364; DF1, 26.)
对上帝里的必然性与自由性，根据人的逻辑来理解，是有限制的
上帝的计划是由祂的智慧指导的（必然性）；可是上帝是真正自由的（主权、自由）
《圣经》：上帝的创造与救赎大工又是智慧的、又是自由（主权）的
Necessity and Freedom in God: Human Logic = Limited in Understanding It
God’s Plan = Directly By God’s Intelligence (Necessity);
God’s Free Acts Are Truly Free (Sovereignty/Freedom)
Bible: In Creation & Redemption, God is Both Intelligent and Sovereign/Free
范泰尔似乎看见，在理解上帝的必然性和自由性的问题上，人的逻辑是有限制的。若单
说上帝的计划是由祂的智慧指导的，那么，祂自由的行动（例如创造与救赎）就变得必
然：上帝必须创造和救赎我们。但若单说上帝的行动是真正自由的，那就与祂的智慧指导无关，变得全然偶然：上帝无意中创造了。只强调以上任何一者都不是《圣经》的教导，《圣经》乃要求我们同时确认上帝在创造和救赎行动中的智慧指导和完全自由（主权）。
Van Til similarly sees a limit to human logic in dealing with the problem of necessity and freedom in God. If God’s will is directed by his intelligence, then it seems that his free acts, such as Creation and redemption, become necessary: God had to create and redeem us. If, however, God’s free acts are truly free, then it would seem that they must be unconnected with his intelligence and therefore random: God just happened to create. Neither alternative is biblical. Scripture requires us to affirm both the intelligence and the freedom of God’s acts of Creation and redemption.
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两种必然性：「上帝本性的必然性」和「上帝作为的必然性」
范泰尔没有继续解释
2 Kinds of Necessity: Necessity of God’s Nature, Necessity of His Free Acts
Van Til Doesn’t Explain Further
范泰尔指出我们必须区分两种的必然性：「上帝本性的必然性」和「上帝作为的必然性」，但他却没有解释这两种必然性，来解决表面矛盾的问题。他只以一句话来结束这讨论：「这是超过我们有限的头脑所能达到的。」（IST, 249 = IST2, 393；参pp. 176-178 = IST2, 285-286.）
Van Til does suggest that we should distinguish two kinds of necessity: the necessity of God’s nature and that necessity by which his free acts come about. But he does not explain these two kinds of necessity, which might remove the appearance of contradiction. Rather, he breaks off the discussion: “This is as far as our finite minds can reach.” (IST, 249 = IST2, 393; cf. pp. 176-178 = IST2, 285-286.)
比喻：一个装满了水的桶子
Illustration: Full Bucket Difficulty
范泰尔以一个他名为「一个装满了水的桶子」的比喻，来说明上帝与世界之间显为表面矛盾的关系。
Van Til’s paradigm case of apparent contradiction in the relationship between God and the world is what he calls “the full bucket difficulty”:
对非基督徒而言，我们的立场就如在一个装满了水的桶子再倒入水。他会说：「你
们基督教的三位一体自足性就如一个已装满了水的桶子，对上帝而言，已不能加添
甚么，祂不能从所造之物中获取任何荣耀。但你们的宇宙历史观，就如将水倒入这个装满了水的桶子，万物都要增添上帝的荣耀。」（CGG, 10；参pp. 27, 73; DF1, 61-62; IST, 63-64 – IST2, 119-120.）
To the non-Christian our position may be compared to the idea of adding water to a bucket that is already full of water. “Your idea of the self-sufficient ontological trinity,” he will say, “is like a bucket full of water. To God nothing may be added. He cannot derive glory from His creatures. Yet your idea of history is like pouring water into the full bucket. Everything in it is said to add to the glory of God.” (CGG, 10; cf. pp. 27, 73; DF1, 61-62; IST, 63-64 = IST2, 119-120.)
其他的表面矛盾
Other Apparent Contradictions
范泰尔也指出其他「表面矛盾」的课题。有邪恶的问题：上帝让邪恶出现，却又不为邪恶负责（IST, 248 = IST2, 390-391; NS, 271; CTETH, 36, 139）。范泰尔也看见以下的课题存在表面矛盾：上帝的隐秘旨意与启示旨意之间（CGG, 27）、人的祷告与上帝的永恒计划之间（CGG, 27; DF 1, 61）、人是上帝的形像的狭义与广义之间（CTETH, 46; DF1, 29）、人是在亚当里与人不在亚当里之间（DF1, 249-251）、罪既能够又不能够破坏上帝的作为（CGG, 199-200）、没有重生的人既能够又不能够认识真理 [IST, 26-27 = IST2, 64-65; IST, 112-113 = IST2, 194-195。弗兰姆：参我在本书（CVT）第15章有关「势不两立的概念」的讨论]、基督的神性与人性之间（DF1, 205）、上帝既预定一切与福音的白白邀请之间（CGG, 10）。
Van Til also notes other areas of “apparent contradictions.” There is the problem of evil: God brings evil to pass, but he is not to be blamed for it. (IST, 248 = IST2, 390-391; NS, 271; CTETH, 36, 139.) Van Til sees apparent contradictions in God’s secret and revealed wills (CGG, 27); prayer and the counsel of God (CGG, 27; DF 1, 61); the image of God in the “wider” and “narrower” senses (CTETH, 46; DF1, 29); mankind existing and not existing in Adam (DF1, 249-251); sin being able, yet unable, to destroy the work of God apart from common grace (CGG, 199-200); unregenerate man being able, yet unable, to know the truth [IST, 26-27 = IST2, 64-65; IST, 112-113 = IST2, 194-195. See my discussion of “Antithesis” in chap. 15 (CVT).]; the deity and humanity of Christ (DF1, 205); and the free offer of the gospel (CGG, 10).
范泰尔与克拉克争辩「吊诡」的问题
指控文件指出，有些难题是改革宗神学不能解决的。
克拉克竟声称可以解决，这叫人「惊奇」！
Clark Controversy: Issue of Paradox
Complaint: Reformed Theologians Cannot Resolve Some Difficulties
Clark Claims He Can Resolve Them: “Amazing!”
在范泰尔与克拉克争辩中，论及有关上帝的主权与人的责任这吊诡问题。指控文件中赞同克拉克有关上帝的主权与人的自由并不矛盾的讲法，但却承认这方面仍存在困难，这是（改革宗神学家）无法解决的（指控文件，页22）。其中一个难题是，既要坚持上帝的预定和护理，又要否认上帝是罪的创造者（指控文件，页23）。对这些过去许多伟大神学家都承认无法克服的困难，但克拉克竟声称可以解决，指控人员表示「惊奇」（指控文件，页24）！最后，他们相信克拉克的解决方案是等于不太承认人的责任（指控文件，页26）。
During the Clark controversy, the issue of paradox was raised in connection with divine sovereignty and human responsibility. The Complaint agreed with Clark in saying that divine sovereignty and human freedom were not actually contradictory. But it also asserted that “there are difficulties here which [Reformed theologians] are unable to solve.” (Complaint, 22.) Among these is the problem of reconciling comprehensive foreordination and concurring providence with the denial that God is the author of sin. (Complaint, 23.) The complainants find it “amazing” that Clark thinks he can solve such problems, when the greatest theologians of the past have confessed their inability to do so. (Complaint, 24.) In the end, they believe that Clark’s solution to the problem does violence to human responsibility. (Complaint, 26.)
克拉克答辩：《威敏斯特信仰告白》本身鼓励我们作逻辑推论
一个不能解决的问题，意指已查考所有经文，考虑所有含义，而仍找不到一点解决办法
这意味着：已完全穷究了《圣经》
克拉克：《圣经》本身暗示问题的答案，即：否认阿米念主义的自由意志
Clark’s Answer: Westminster Confession Encourages Logical Inference
Cannot Solve Problem? Implies All Scripture = Exhausted, All Implications = Exhausted, and Cannot Find Any Hint of Solution
Implies: Exhaustive Knowledge of Scripture
Clark: Bible Hints at Solution, i.e.: Deny Arminian View of Freedom
根据答辩文件，克拉克指出《威敏斯特信仰告白》本身就鼓励我们从《圣经》作逻辑推论，因而亦鼓励我们去解决一些在逻辑上表面矛盾的问题（答辩文件，页35）。而且，答辩文件更指出：「一个人若声称这是一个不能解决的问题，在逻辑上意指他已查考所有经文，考虑所有含义，而仍找不到一点解决办法，……这等于声称，他已完全穷究了《圣经》。」（答辩文件，页36）克拉克声称《圣经》本身已对难题提供了暗示，否定传统亚米念主义的自由意志观。（答辩文件，页36-37。议会的报告中并没有讨论这课题。）
The Answer replies that the Westminster Confession itself encourages logical inference from Scripture, and therefore, presumably, also intends to encourage resolution of apparent logical contradictions. (Answer, 35.) Further, it says: “He who claims that a given paradox cannot be solved, logically implies that he has examined every verse in Scripture, that he has exhausted every implication of every verse, and that there is no hint of a solution. … This is a claim to an exhaustive knowledge of all Scripture.” (Answer, 36.) Clark’s claim, on the contrary, is that Scripture itself provides hints for a solution of the problem, which amounts to denying free will in the traditional Arminian sense. (Answer, 36-37. The Report of the General Assembly committee did not discuss this particular issue.)
范泰尔不被说服；克拉克没有完全解决吊诡的问题
乍眼看来，「上帝完全的预定」似乎与「人真正的选择」相矛盾
「乍眼看来」是否意味，若多看一些，就会能解决？
范泰尔：不会
Van Til = Not Persuaded; Clark Didn’t Fully Solve Paradox
At First Sight, Complete Foreordination Seems to Contradict Genuine Choice
“At First Sight”: Will Problem = Solvable After Second Sight?
CVT: No
范泰尔不会被答辩文件说服，他亦无意为亚米念的自由意志观辩护。但他亦不相信克拉克已解决了这吊诡问题。究竟甚么具体难题是未解决的呢？这是很难判断的。范泰尔说：「当说到宇宙历史中的万事都由上帝决定，乍眼看来，必然否定了人的真正选择。」（CGG, 10）「乍眼看来」这短语似乎意味若「多看一眼」问题就会解决，但这不是范泰尔的观点。范氏认为，人类永远无法达到看来不矛盾的地步。那么，到了天堂又如何？我们在那里会否发现解决吊诡的方案？可能也不！根据范泰尔的观点，我们没有能力解决这些吊诡问题，是与我们的有限性有关，即使到了天堂，我们依然是有限的。
Van Til, however, was not persuaded by the Answer. Certainly he had no interest in defending the Arminian concept of free will. But he did not believe that Clark had fully solved the paradox, either. What, specifically, is unresolved? That is hard to say. Van Til says, “That all things in history are determined by God must always seem, at first sight, to contradict the genuineness of my choice.” (CGG, 10.) That phrase, “at first sight,” might seem to suggest that the problem can, in fact, be resolved – “at second sight.” But that is not Van Til’s view. He holds, in fact, that human beings never reach the point where these matters no longer appear contradictory. What about heaven? Will we there discover solutions to the paradoxes? Probably not, according to Van Til, since our inability to solve them is related to our finitude. And, of course, in heaven we remain finite.
傅兰姆论范泰尔：基督徒越来越欣赏上帝的智慧和良善
我们在恩典中长进，晓得欣赏上帝的主权（自由）
我们在灵性上成熟，体会「上帝有答案的」，就不再因「矛盾」而抱怨
范泰尔的终点是属灵的，而不是逻辑上的
范泰尔有很多属灵的洞见，可是往往把它们约化为逻辑或神学原则
Frame on Van Til: Christians Grow in Appreciating God’s Wisdom, Goodness
We Grow in Grace, Appreciate Sovereignty/Freedom
We Mature, Appreciate: God Has Answer, We Don’t Complain Any More
Van Til Is Making a Spiritual (Not Logical) Point
Van Til Makes Penetrating Spiritual Insights (But Reduces to Logic/Theo.)
范泰尔在这里的意思大概是指基督徒会成长，越来越晓得欣赏上帝作为的良善和智慧。假如在「乍眼看来」，我们会觉得上帝的主权与人的责任相矛盾，那么，当我们在恩典中不断长进，我们就会在「多看一眼」的情况下，不会那么冲动地作判断。吊诡的问题永不能真正地解决，但我们在灵性上长大成熟，越体会「上帝有答案的」，我们就不再因不能解决的「矛盾」而抱怨。我相信范泰尔在这里对「表面矛盾」所作的回应，是一个属灵的劝勉，而不是逻辑的论据。（正如我们在其他相关地方所见，范泰尔往往透彻观察属灵生命的现象，并作出个人的分享，只是他会把这些洞见以逻辑和神学原则来表达。）
Perhaps what Van Til means to say is that Christians grow in their ability to appreciate the goodness and wisdom of God’s ways. If our first impulse (“at first sight”), in contemplating divine sovereignty, is to claim that it contradicts human responsibility, we may nevertheless have better impulses (“at second sight”) as we grow in grace. The problem is never actually resolved, but we gain the spiritual maturity to appreciate that God has an answer, and we do not go around complaining about an unresolved contradiction. This is, I believe, a spiritual, rather than a logical, point that Van Til wants to make about apparent contradictions. (As we shall see in other connections, Van Til often makes penetrating observations on issues of spiritual life and interpersonal communication, but he tends to reduce them all to issues of logic and theological principle.)
就算属灵成熟，还是有逻辑上的问题；范氏应否称它为「表面逻辑矛盾」？
若否定阿米念主义的架构，人的选择 ＝ 真正的选择
因此，为甚么范泰尔要坚持这难题是逻辑上的难题？
Even With Spiritual Maturity, Logical Problem Remains
Should Van Til Call This “Apparent Logical Contradiction”?
If We Reject Arminian Construction, Choice = Genuine
So Why Does Van Til Insist: Problem = Problem in Logic?
范泰尔坚持，就算属灵成熟，还是有逻辑上的难题。甚么难题？就以上的例子而言，在一个上帝预定一切的宇宙中，人「真正」的选择是显为矛盾的，范泰尔描述这是「表面逻辑矛盾」，这样说对吗？当我们拒绝阿米念的自由意志观，我们所相信的根本就不会与上帝的完全主权产生矛盾。当我们拒绝阿米念的架构时，我们也根本不会认同「完全无因或自主的选择」才是「真正」的选择。按改革宗的立场，所有人类的选择都是真正的选择，所以，为何会有所谓「真正选择」的难题？而范泰尔又为何坚持这难题是逻辑上的难题？
Van Til, then, would insist that even with spiritual maturity, the logical problem remains. What is the problem? In this example, it is a problem with the “genuineness” of my choice in a God-ordained universe. But is Van Til right in describing this problem as an “apparent logical contradiction”? Once we reject the Arminian concept of free will, we do not then affirm anything that actually contradicts the comprehensiveness of divine sovereignty. Also, once we reject the Arminian construction, we must also deny that a “genuine” choice must be an uncaused or autonomous choice. On a Calvinistic basis, all human choices are genuine choices. So why is there a problem with genuineness? And why does Van Til insist that the problem is a problem in logic?
看深一层：范泰尔将这问题喻为「倒满水的水桶」
上帝既是自含的荣耀，人的选择还能是重要而「真实」？
上帝的荣耀是否不能容纳「加增」？
Look Deeper: CVT Sees Problem = “Full Bucket” Problem
God = Self-Contained in Glory; Can Man’s Choice = Important/Genuine?
Does God’s Glory Preclude Addition?
我们需要看更深一层。范泰尔将这难题比喻作「一个装满了水的桶子」。正如我们之前所讲，这难题要表达既没有任何事能增添上帝的荣耀，但上帝又创造了万物来荣耀祂。应用在有关「选择」的例子上，难题就是既然上帝已作了宇宙历史的一切决定，但人的决定却仍有重要意义，这是范泰尔所谓「真正」的选择。
We need to look a bit deeper. Van Til sees this problem as a form of the full bucket problem. As we have seen, that problem is that nothing can be added to God’s glory, yet he makes creatures to glorify himself. Applied to “choice,” this means that God’s choices have fully determined the course of history, yet human choices are, somehow, also important or significant – what Van Til calls, somewhat awkwardly, “genuine.”
所以这「真正选择」的难题，其实就等于「上帝的荣耀既不能增添、却又要求人荣耀上帝」一样。这真是一个逻辑上的难题，但重要是判断这是哪一类的逻辑难题。
So the question of “genuine choice” boils down to the question of how God’s glory precludes, yet demands, addition. This is indeed a logical problem of sorts, but it is important for us to see what kind of logical problem it is.
三位一体是类似的难题：看来矛盾？言之过早的结论
表面矛盾是可以解决的，只要将用字较含糊的意义加以说明
从一种意义上，上帝是一；从另一种意义上，上帝是三（传统信仰）
Similar to Problem of Trinity: Contradiction? Premature Conclusion
Can Resolve Apparent Contradictions: Are Terms Ambiguous?
God Is One In One Sense, Three In Another Sense (Orthodox Stance)
我认为，有关三位一体在逻辑上的难题也是类似的难题。《圣经》告诉我们，上帝是三又是一，上帝既是三又不是三、既是一又不是一，这样三位一体的教义，就是一个逻辑上的矛盾。但正如我在之前关于三位一体的论述，这样的判断是不成熟的，是言之过早。在逻辑的讨论上，有一种常用的表达来化解表面矛盾：上帝在一个意义上是三，在另一意义上是一，彼此并没有矛盾。
It is, I think similar to the logical problem connected with the Trinity. Scripture tells us that God is three and that God is one. From that teaching, one might allege that because God is three and not-three (or one and not-one), the doctrine of the Trinity is a logical contradiction. But, as I indicated in my earlier discussion of the Trinity, such a judgment would be premature, to say the least. It is common in discussions of logic to note that an apparent contradiction may be resolved through consideration of ambiguities in the terms: if God is three in one respect and one in a different respect, then there is no contradiction.
范泰尔：我们不能描述上帝如何又是一、又是三
我们不能表述这项教义在逻辑上的一致性
表面的逻辑矛盾仍然存在
Van Til: We Cannot Demonstrate How God Is Three And One:
We Cannot Demonstrate the Logical Consistency of the Doctrine
Apparent Contradiction Remains
教会也常这样声称，上帝是一又是三，这是从不同的意义上来理解。正如我们在之前的讨论中见到，范泰尔也不会反对这种说法，但他却指出我们其实并不能精确地描述上帝在怎样的意义上是一，在怎样的意义上是三。所以我们不能将三位一体教义在逻辑上的一致性表述清楚，并因而仍留下一些表面的矛盾。
The church has always made the claim that God is one and three in different senses, and, as we saw in the earlier discussion, Van Til does not dispute this claim. But he does claim that we do not know precisely how God is one and precisely how he is three; so we cannot demonstrate the logical consistency of the doctrine. For that reason, some appearance of contradiction remains.
「一个装满了水的桶子」的难题也是这样，从一种意义上来说，上帝的荣耀不能增添；但从另一种意义上来说，上帝又容许人增添祂的荣耀。由于我们根本不充份知道上帝与宇宙历史的关系，以致我们不能精确地描述不同层面的意义。于是，表面的矛盾仍存在于上帝与宇宙历史之间，在「上帝的预定」与「人的真正选择」这难题上，尤为显著。
The same is true of the full bucket problem. God’s glory doubtless precludes addition in one sense and permits it in another. But we do not know enough about God’s relation to history to define precisely what those sense are. Therefore, apparent contradiction remains in God’s relation to history and specifically with respect to divine foreordination and the genuineness of human choice.
范泰尔：在所有的启示与所有的人类知识之间都有表面的矛盾
所有的《圣经》教训都是表面矛盾的
我们的知识是类比的，因此必然是吊诡的
Van Til: There Is Apparent Contradiction in All Revelation
And in All Human Knowledge, In All Teaching in Scripture
Our Knowledge = Analogical, Therefore Must Be Paradoxical
既然在上帝的本性上（三位一体）有表面的矛盾，而在上帝与世界的基本关系上又有表面的矛盾（一个装满了水的桶子），范泰尔就见到在所有的启示与所有的人类知识之间存在着表面的矛盾。「既然上帝是不能被人透知的，所以对我们来说，在我们的认知过程中，肯定会感到矛盾的。我们的知识既是类比的（被造者的知识），就必定会显为吊诡的。」（DF1, 61）「我们虽绝不接受有真正的矛盾，但对表面的矛盾这现象，却会热烈欢迎承认的。」（CGG, 9）「所有的《圣经》教训都是表面矛盾的。」[CGG, 142 (emphasis by Van Til)；参DF2, 44-46 = DF4, 67-69。]
Since there is apparent contradiction in the basic nature of God (the Trinity) and in the fundamental relation of God to the world (the full bucket), Van Til sees apparent contradiction in all revelation and in all human knowledge: “Now since God is not fully comprehensible, to us we are bound to come into what seems to be contradiction in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and therefore must be paradoxical.” (DF1, 61.) “While we shun as poison the idea of the really contradictory we embrace with passion the idea of the apparently contradictory.” (CGG, 9.) “All teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory.” [CGG, 142 (emphasis by Van Til); cf. DF2, 44-46 = DF4, 67-69.]
有人猛烈批评范氏的立场；逻辑矛盾是太严重的问题了
克拉克是对的：《威敏斯特信仰告白》的确批准我们从《圣经》作逻辑推论
《圣经》若充满矛盾，我们如何作推论？
Some Critique This View Harshly; Logical Contradiction = Serious Problem
Westminster Confession Does Authorize Us to Make Inferences from Bible
If Bible = Full of Contradictions, How Can We Make Inferences?
可以想象得到，有些基督徒会对范泰尔这些话猛烈批评。对于改革宗的基督徒而言，在逻辑上矛盾是很严重的问题。克拉克引述《威敏斯特信仰告白》的话是正确的，《威敏斯特信仰告白》的确授权我们对《圣经》作逻辑推论。但如果《圣经》是充满矛盾，即使是表面的矛盾，我们又怎能作出逻辑推论呢？
Understandably, some Christians respond to these statements very harshly. For Reformed Christians, logical contradiction is a very serious matter. Clark is right in citing the Westminster Confession as authorizing us to affirm the logical entailments of biblical teachings. But if the Bible is full of contradictions, even apparent ones, how can we derive such entailments?
按逻辑原则，从矛盾的前提（premises）可以推出所有和任何的结论
Logic: From Contradictory Premises, Any/All Conclusions Validly Follow
Logic textbooks tell us that from contradictory premises, any and all conclusions validly follow. Consider the following argument:
- God is one. (Premise)
- Either God is one or the moon is made of green cheese. (Follow from point 1 by the logical operation called addition. If a statement is true, then the statement or any other statement is true.)
- God is not one. (Premise)
- Therefore, the moon is made of green cheese. (Follows from points 2 and 3. Since point 3 denies the first half of the “or” statement, the second half must be true.)
《圣经》也不例外：（表面的）矛盾可以推出任何的结论
Same Thing With Scripture: (Apparent) Contradictions -> Any Deduction
This example shows how from contradictory premises (points 1 and 3 in this case) any manner of nonsense will follow validly. (Any statement whatever could have been substituted for “the moon is made of green cheese.”) Therefore, once we allow that Scripture contains contradictory teachings, we must also admit that anything at all may be validly deduced from Scripture. Indeed, if Scripture contains even one contradiction, it implicitly teaches everything, and therefore nothing. The presence of contradictions in Scripture would entirely invalidate the statement of the Westminster Confession that the counsel of God is to be found in the “good and necessary consequences” of Scripture as well as in Scripture’s explicit statements. If there are contradictions in Scripture, then everything, and therefore nothing, is “good and necessary consequence.”
当然，范泰尔没有教导人说《圣经》是矛盾的；只是表面似乎如此
但是，我们会不会从表面矛盾的前提推出废话来？
Of Course, CVT Doesn’t Teach Scripture = Contradictory; Only Apparently
But: Will We Draw Nonsense From Apparently Contradictory Premises?
范泰尔当然没有教导人说《圣经》是矛盾的，他强调的正正相反。他只是说，所有的《圣经》教训都是表面矛盾的。但是当我们用逻辑来分析《圣经》时，表面的矛盾与真正的矛盾一样是难题。在上述的论据例子中，第一句和第三句只是表面矛盾，这也是范泰尔论及三位一体时所声称的。然而，《圣经》却真的教导我们，上帝是一又是三。假如我们按《威敏斯特信仰告白》所言，从《圣经》作逻辑推论，我们会否也如上述的论据例子一样，从表面矛盾的前提推出废话来？
Of course, Van Til does not teach that Scripture is contradictory – quite the reverse. What he says, however, is that all Scripture is apparently contradictory. However, apparent contradiction poses the same problems as real contradiction for the logical analysis of Scripture. Let us say that in the illustrative argument presented above, points 1 and 3 are only apparently contradictory, which is in fact Van Til’s claim about the Trinity. Nevertheless, Scripture does teach that God is one and that God is three. If we are to draw logical inferences from Scripture, as the Westminster Confession prescribes, will we not find ourselves in the same bind, deducing nonsense from apparently contradictory premises?
回答：避免建构这种的论据
Reply: Avoid This Kind of Construction
我们可以这样回答：既然我们对上述论据例子中的第一句的「一」和和第三句的「非一」的意义有点不清楚，我们就要避免建构这种的论据。用字的意义含糊会使我们很难从这些前提推出合理的结论。
One reply might be this: since we know that there is some unclarity about the sense of “one” and “not one” in points 1 and 3, we should simply avoid constructing arguments of this kind. The ambiguity in the terms should make us reluctant to draw any inferences at all from these particular premises.
但是，我们怎样能从《圣经》作出任何的推论？
But: How Can We Make ANY Inference From Scripture?
假如「所有的《圣经》教训都是表面矛盾的」，我们就不能从经文前提作出任何的逻辑推论。而且，不单三位一体的教义有表面矛盾，其他的教义如上帝的属性和上帝与世界的整体关系都有表面矛盾，那么，我们怎能从《圣经》的教训作出任何的逻辑推论呢？
But if “all teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory,” then any logical deduction from scriptural premises would seem to be ruled out. Since there are apparent contradictions not only in the doctrine of the Trinity, but also in the doctrine of the divine attributes and the doctrine of God’s overall relation to the world, how can we draw any logical inferences at all from biblical teaching?
必须考虑范泰尔的「界限观念」和「类比系统」的观念
Consider CVT’s Concepts of “Limiting Concept” and “Analogical System”
要回答这些问题，我们将探讨范泰尔的「界限观念」和「类比系统」，这是下一章的主题。
To answer these questions, we will have to look into Van Til’s ideas of “limiting concept” and “analogical system.” These will be the topics covered in the following chapter.
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
[ CGG = Common Grace and the Gospel ]
[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]
[ PDS = The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture ]
[ DF1 = The Defense of the Faith, 1st edition ]
[ CTK = A Christian Theory of Knowledge ]
[ VTT = John Frame, Van Til: The Theologian ]
[ NS = Nature and Scripture ]
[ CTETH = Christian Theistic Ethics ]
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