第五章 三位一体
THE TRINITY
（编按：因内可能艰涩，标题加长。文中添了『编者按』。另参附录，页19-27，编者中译。）
VAN TIL’S TRINITY: ORTHODOX DOCTRINE
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 5, pp. 63-64.)
我们已经明白，范泰尔有关上帝的「丰满」和「位格性」的观念，都与三位一体论有关。他的位格主义取决于「三位一体的彼此代表」这个事实。让我们再仔细地研究范氏位格主义背后的三一论；这个教义在他的思想里扮演着重要的角色。
（编按：『代表』[representational] 大概可以理解为『约的关系』[covenantal]。）
As we have seen, Van Til’s concepts of the fullness and the personality of God are linked to the doctrine of the Trinity. His personalism depends on the fact that the persons of the Trinity are “representational” of one another. Let us, then, look more carefully at the doctrine of the Trinity that underlies Van Til’s personalism and plays other important roles in his thought.
正如范泰尔其他的教义论说一样，他的三位一体论是以早期教会的信经和宗教改革的信仰告白为起点。他列出基本的《圣经》经文，并且勾画出这项教义的历史发展（IST, 220-227 = IST2, 349-360）。*在这样的历史综览中，范氏与一般改革宗神学家一样，都强调：（一）三位一体是本体论的（ontological），不是单用来指出三个位格在救赎计划上扮演的不同角色（economic Trinity），意思是，上帝的本性是三又是一，这不能只从祂与世界的关系上去理解；（二）主张本体论的三位一体中有从属的关系（subordination）是错误的信念，例如：圣子从属圣父（DF2, 25 = DF4, 48）。范氏特别强调加尔文有关「圣子是上帝本身（autotheotes）」的教导，指出圣子的存有（being）并不是从父得来的（derived），祂自己（of himself）就是上帝，在祂里面（in himself）就是上帝（IST, 227-228 = IST2, 360; SCE, 110-112; TJD, 33-38）。「上帝的存有是从外界而得（derived）」这种说法本身就是自相矛盾。
（*即：《尼西亚信经》，《迦克顿信信经》，《威敏斯特信仰告白》，等。）
As with all his doctrinal formulations, Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity begins with an affirmation of the ancient creeds and the Reformed confessions. He lists the basic biblical texts and sketches the historical development of the doctrine. (IST, 220-227 = IST2, 349-360.) In this historical survey, he emphasizes, as have Reformed theologians generally, (1) that the Trinity is ontological, not merely economic – God is both three and one in his very nature, not only in his relations to the world – and (2) that it is erroneous to assert relations of subordination (as, for example, of the Son to the Father) within the ontological Trinity. (DF2, 25 = DF4, 48, he says, “It is a well-known fact that all heresies in the history of the church have in some form or other taught subordinationism. Similarly, we believe, all ‘heresies’ in apologetic methodology spring from some sort of subordinationism.”) He particularly emphasizes Calvin’s teaching about the autotheotes of the Son: that the Son does not derive his being from the Father, but is God in and of himself. (IST, 227-228 = IST2, 360; SCE, 101-102; TJD – The Theology of James Daane, 33-38.) “Derived deity” is, of course, an oxymoron.
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
[ SCE = A Survey of Christian Epistemology ]
[ TJD = The Theology of James Daane ]
编者按：三位一体的教义（浓缩版）
圣父是神。
圣子是神。
圣灵是神。 每一个位格的神性。
圣子不是圣灵。
圣灵不是圣父。 每一个位格是位格。
圣父是父。 这是圣父的名称，也是祂在三位一体里的生存形态。
圣父是圣子之父。 圣父的生存形态是：不受生。
圣父在永恒里是圣子之父。 父子的关系不是圣父所计划的。祂们就是这样永存。
圣子是子。 这是圣子的名称，也是祂在三位一体里的生存形态。
圣子是圣父之子。 圣子的生存形态是：受生（子）。
圣子是圣父在永恒里之子。 圣子为『子』，不在某一瞬间开始。圣子没有开始。
圣灵从圣父而出。
圣灵从圣子而出。 父子之间的关系称为『生』(generation)；
圣灵与父，与子的关系称为『出』(procession)。
圣父在生子里。
圣子在圣父里。
只有一神，不是三神。 基督教是一神论，不是多（三）神论。
每一位格都有神的所有属性。 本质上，三位格并不存在任何的『从属』关系。
而每一个属性都有所有其他
属性为前提。 上帝的自含丰满。
- 三位一体与神人相互依存主义
THE TRINITY AND CORRELATIVISM
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 5, pp. 64-65.)
- 范泰尔批判「神人相互依存主义」Van Til’s Critique of Correlativism
范泰尔对这个历史分析加上了他独特的看法：撒伯流主义（Sabellianism）和亚流主义（Arianism）这两种异端，本质上是「相互依存主义」（correlativism）的表现。「相互依存主义」宣称上帝和世界是互相依赖的，这种想法违背了「上帝是自含丰满」的教义。这两种异端都视上帝为一种「孤存的一体」（bare unity），若没有世界所提供的多元性，则无法运作（IST, 225 = IST2, 356）。
Then Van Til adds a distinctive twist to the historical analysis: that the heresies of Sabellianism (The view that the three persons are nothing more than historically successive manifestations of the one God.) and Arianism (The view that the Son and the Spirit are mere creatures.) are, at root, manifestations of correlativism. Correlativism asserts that God and the world are dependent upon each other, contrary to the doctrine of God’s self-contained fullness. Both of these heresies see God as a kind of bare unity, which cannot function without the supplementation supplied by the plurality of the world. (IST, 225 = IST2, 356.)
- 不合乎圣经的「一」：全然他者、不能描述、没有主权、需要世界
Unbiblical Oneness:Wholly Other, Undescribable, Not Sovereign, Needs World
范泰尔对于这点的解释不甚清楚，让我尝试补充。就如诺斯底主义（Gnosticism）、新柏拉图主义（Neo-platonism）、以及（不幸地也如）一部份早期教父一样，撒伯流主义和亚流主义认为：上帝只是「一」（oneness），祂与现实世界的距离非常遥远，以致无法被人形容。同样，现代神学家也喜欢说上帝是「全然的他者」（wholly other）。可是，一个不能言说的「一」是一个抽象的「一」，而非一个有位格的绝对者（personal absolute）。在这种情况下，如同我上一章所强调的，这样的「上帝」不可能是真正的主权者。祂（应该说：它）必定是与世界相互依存的，意即：它需要依赖世界，才能存在。
（编按：撒伯流主义：上帝是一，三个位格只不过是一上帝带上三个面具。参；周联联华，《信徒神学》。亚流主义：）
Van Til does not explain his point very clearly; allow me to attempt an elaboration. Like the Gnostics, Neoplatonists, and (unfortunately) some of the church fathers, the Sabellians and Arians saw God as a “oneness” so far from earthly reality as to be beyond human description. Similarly, modern theologians like to say that God is “wholly other.” But an utterly indescribable oneness is an abstract oneness, not a personal absolute. In that case, as I emphasized in the preceding chapter, God cannot be truly sovereign. He (or rather “it”) must be relative to the world.
- 范泰尔精辟的分析：[一 ] 用人的语言描述上帝为「全然他者」：这个「上帝」只是「世界的延伸」; [二] 抽象的『一』乃相互依存；[三]『全然他者』让世界成为至终
Van Til’s Penetrating Analysis: (1) God’s Wholly Other Nature Through Human Language:
Therefore God = Extension of World; (2) Abstract One = Correlative; (3) A “Wholly Other” God Makes the World to be Ultimate
我们可以从不同角度来看这个相互依存性（relativity）。首先，当人们尝试论及「全然他者」的「上帝」时，他们必须使用人的语言，而人的语言是关乎被造世界的言语。所以这位「上帝」充其量也只不过是世界的延伸而已。如此一来，上帝的权能仅是地上能力的延伸，上帝的爱也只是地上的爱的延伸……如此类推。其次，一个抽象的「一」不像三位一体的「一」，它不可能自我定义（self-defined），因此，它必须与世界相互依存。比方说，它的爱若可以被定义的话，一定会被定义为一种对世界的爱，而不是上帝三个位格之间的爱。因为按此观点，上帝的位格不是「众」的（true plurality）。第三，一个「全然他者的存有」不能为世界提供理性和道德秩序的基础，那么，这个基础就必须在世界里寻找。这样一来，世界就成为终极，而这位全然他者──不论它是甚么──就必须与世界相互依存。这种想法与《圣经》中「上帝是掌权的主权者」的教导背道而驰。
We can see that relativity in various ways: First, when people try to speak of the wholly other god, they must do so in human language, language about the created world. Thus, the god becomes a mere extension of the world. God’s power is merely an extension of earthly power, his love is an extension of earthly love, and so on. Second, an abstract oneness, as opposed to a Trinitarian oneness, cannot be self-defined and therefore must be relative to the world. His love, for example, if it is defined at all, must be defined as a love for the world, rather than a love among divine persons, for on this view there is no true plurality of divine persons. Third, a wholly other being does not provide a basis for the rational and moral order of the world. That basis must then be found in the world itself. But then the world is ultimate, and whatever the “wholly other” is, it is relative to the world. This pattern of thought rules out the biblical view of God as sovereign Lord. (In Deuteronomy 6:4, the famous Old Testament confession of faith, the unity of God is intimately related to his lordship. He is the one Lord, whom we are to love with all our heart, permitting in ourselves no rival loyalties. One Lord means one allegiance.)
相反，正统基督教的三位一体教义摒弃这种相互依存主义。正统的看法是：上帝的「一」只与祂自己相互依存，上帝的「一」与祂自身存有的复杂性（complexities）和多元性（plurality）相互依存。世界也是「一而众」的，因为上帝这样造了世界。
Now orthodox Trinitarianism renounces such correlativism. On the orthodox view, God’s unity is correlative only to himself, to the complexities and pluralities of his own being. The world also is a unity and a diversity, because God made it that way.
（编按：正统三一论避免相互依存；若相互依存，就不绝对，不自存，不掌主权。）
- 例子：上帝的爱：一个空白（孤存）的上帝需要世界作为爱的对象
上帝的爱是位格之间的爱；同时是『自含』者的爱
正统的三一论维护上帝的自含（避免相互依存）和上帝是位格（避免非位格主义）
God’s Love: A Blank God Needs World to Love; But: God’s Love = Interpersonal and Self-contained; Trinity Guards Aseity (=> Correlativism) and Personal God ( => Impersonalism)
让我们思想「爱」这个上帝的属性。上帝若只是一，而非三位一体，那么，上帝永恒之爱的对象是谁？是祂自己吗？可是，按照《圣经》的意思，最完整的爱在本质上必须伸向他者，不是只伸向自己。上帝的爱的对象是世界吗？那么，上帝之爱的永恒属性就取决于世界了；也就是说，上帝的爱需要世界。但是，若根据三位一体的教义基础，上帝的爱既是位格之间（interpersonal）的爱，同时也是自含（self-contained） 的爱；上帝的爱乃是圣父、圣子、圣灵之间彼此的爱。这爱，并不依靠世界。
Consider love, as an attribute of God. If God is a mere unity without Trinity, then what is the object of God’s eternal love? Himself? But love in the fullest biblical sense by its very nature reaches out to another, not merely to the self. The world? Then God’s eternal attribute of love depends on the world; it needs the world. On a Trinitarian basis, however, God’s love is both interpersonal and self-contained; God’s love is the love among Father, Son and Spirit for one another, and it is not dependent on the world.
这里我们看到范泰尔如何将上帝的自存性、位格性和三位一体连接起来；这是非常有深度的贡献。三位一体论护卫了上帝的自存性，因为若没有三位一体，上帝就与世界相互依存。三位一体也护卫了上帝的位格性：上帝不是「空白（单独）的一」；这种「一」是非位格性的。相反，上帝是「（三个）位格的一」（a unity of persons）。
We can see how Van Til has related, in a very profound way, the doctrines of divine aseity, personality, and the Trinity. The Trinity guards aseity, for, without it, God is relative to the world. The Trinity also guards the personality of God: he is not a blank unity, which would be impersonal. Rather, he is a unity of persons. [ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
III. 「一而众」的问题 THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 5, pp. 71-76.)
- 范泰尔用三一论解决「一而众」的问题：[1] 殊相若彼此无关，则无从理解；
[2] 共相若是抽象，则排除/毁掉殊相，殊相就失去其独特（殊）性
Van Til: Trinity Solves One-and-Many Problem: [1] If Particulars Are Un-related, They Become Unintelligible; [2] If Universals Are Abstract, Particulars’ Particularity = Destroyed
范泰尔对三位一体教义的另一重大贡献，乃是他用三位一体的教义解决哲学上「一而众」的问题。从广义来说，「一而众」的问题来自人类在事物的复杂性（plurality）中寻求一致性（unity）（DF2, 24）。具体来说：
Another distinctively Van Tillian contribution to our thinking about the Trinity is his use of the doctrine in connection with the “one-and-many problem.” Most generally, the problem is man’s quest “to find unity in the midst of the plurality of things.” (DF2, 24.) More specifically:
「众」必须彼此接触，可是我们怎样知道它们可能彼此接触？我们怎样知道「众」不是以彼此不相关的殊相存在？若真是如此，我们对它们就一无所知，而它们亦将从我们所拥有的知识世界中抽离，它们只不过是抽象的殊相而已。另一方面，我们又怎样知道，我们能达到一个共相（一致）而不会消灭所有的殊相？我们大概是透过普遍化（generalization）来得到共相，也就是借着与殊相抽离（abstracting），以致将殊相包含在更大的一致（共相）里。如果我们继续这个普遍化的过程，直到我们将所有的殊相都予以排除（假如它们都可能被排除），那么，所有殊相的殊性岂不都被消除了吗？而我们最后所得到的不就只是一个抽象的共相吗（DF2, 25-26 = DF4, 48-49）？
The many must be brought into contact with one another. But how do we know that they can be brought into contact with one another? How do we know that the many do not simply exist as unrelated particulars? The answer given is that in such a case we should know nothing of them; they would be abstracted from the body of knowledge that we have; they would be abstract particulars. On the other hand, how is it possible that we should obtain a unity that does not destroy the particulars? We seem to get our unity by generalizing, by abstracting from the particulars in order to include them into larger unities. If we keep up this process of generalization till we exclude all particulars, granted they can all be excluded, have we not stripped these particulars of their particularity? Have we then obtained anything by an abstract universal? (DF2, 25-26 = DF4, 48-49.)
- 傅兰姆的解释：人类将事物分类、普遍化、寻找「共相」; 这是个『抽象化』过程；
但这个寻求共相的抽象化过程达致虚空
Frame Explains: We Classify, Generalize, Seek “Universal” – A Process of Abstraction; But This Abstraction Process, This Search for Universal, Leads to Emptiness
（摘译：）人类自出生以来就尝试在众多的感觉（sensations）中寻找意义。例如：一个小孩认识了Fido（一条狗的名字）；后来借着抽象化（abstraction）得知 Fido, Rover, Spot等都是「狗」；而「狗」 又是「动物」（animals）的一类……以此类推，化零为整（抽象化）。人把所知道的感觉组织分类；每一个步骤，看起来似乎带我们进入事物更深层的本质（essence）那里，直到我们找到存有的本身（being itself），也就是知识的高峰。
Again, let me try to put Van Til’s point into different and perhaps clearer language. After we are born, we gradually learn to organize rationally the “buzzing, blooming confusion” (William James) of our sense experience. A child learns to distinguish himself from his mother, to distinguish one object from another. His mind is organizing sensations into groups, each group representing a thing, an object of knowledge. He is coming to know objects by understanding their relationships with other objects. Fido would be one such object. With additional experience and education, we learn to organize these groups into larger groups. Eventually, we learn that Fido, Rover, Spot, and others themselves form a group that we call “dog.” That represents an advance in learning, for it means that we recognize significant similarities among these animals and differences between them and other types of animals. Indeed, when we learn that Fido is a dog, it seems that we are learning his essence, what he really is. Then we learn that dogs can be grouped into still larger classes: canines, mammals, living beings, being. This process is called “abstraction.” Each of these steps may be seen as going deeper into the reality, the essence of things. Philosophizing about “being as such” seems to be the consummation of human knowledge.
（摘译：）可是，随着每一层的抽象化（化零为整），我们所能知道的知识就越来越少。比方说：Fido这条狗有它个别的特征，但这些特征不都包括在「狗」的观念里；「狗」包括Fido的一些特征，但并不包括Fido的其他特征。最高层次的抽象观念是「存有」（being）；可是事物和观念越是抽象，其内容就越是虚空。「存有」是最高的抽象观念，甚么都包括了；可是存有里没有甚么具体的内容。「存有」（being）与「虚无」（nothingness）差不多是同义词（黑格尔 G. F. Hegel的说法）！所以我们若说Fido是一个「存有」（being），究竟我们说了甚么东西？甚么都没有说！
On the other hand, the process of abstraction also brings cognitive loss. Fido, after all, is more than just a dog. He is two feet high, black and white, trained to roll over, partial to taking walks and playing ball. None of those qualities is included in the definition of “dog,” for the concept of “dog” covers some animals that have those qualities and some animals that do not. Thus, every step on the abstraction ladder is a step toward emptiness. The highest abstraction, “being,” covers everything. But it includes nothing specific. As Hegel pointed out, “being,” as a general or abstract term, is indistinguishable from “nothing.” It might seem that we gain a very profound level of knowledge when we find “being” as the essence of all things. But actually, to say that Fido is a “being” is to say almost nothing about him.
- 正如「共相」是空虚的，「纯物质」也是空虚的：
寻求『殊相』，『具体』，『本质』的过程也是抽象的，也达致虚空
我们分析五官经验的组成部分：但是这些都是『抽象』；不可能达到
Just Like Universal, Pure Matter is Void of Knowledge:
Abstraction Process, Search for Particular, Concrete, Essence, Also Leads to Emptiness
We Analyze Components of Sense Experience – But They’re Unreachable Abstractions
（摘译：）或者我们可以尝试相反的方向：化整为零。我们从「存有」开始，先列举和描述所有的存有，接着列举和描述所有的动物，最后是所有的狗。甚至Fido这条狗也可以由不同的感觉（sensations）组织起来，例如：它会舔我们的右手；牠的毛是白色的……等等。想要寻求知识的人可以这样作；可是每一个感觉（例：Fido舔我们的右手）都是在一个复杂的、整体的处境（context）中被认识的。
So we might try, as some philosophers have, the opposite process: going down the abstraction ladder, from general to particular. We understand “being” by enumerating and describing the “beings.” We similarly proceed to the living beings, mammals, and dogs. Even Fido may seem like something of an abstraction. For arguably our concept of Fido is put together from many experiences and memories. (The emphasis here on experience will sound “empiricist” to some. However, I do not regard experience as pure sensation without any rational mental activity. There is no knowledge of human sense-data without a rational appropriation of them. In any case, the description here of the cognitive process is not intended as a description of my own epistemology, but only as a description of a common way of formulating the process of human knowledge.) We never see all of Fido at one time: once we see his profile, another time his face, another time his backside. We never see his liver or kidneys, unless we observe him under veterinary surgery; yet, from other learning experiences, we know they are in him. Those who wish to gain knowledge by moving from abstract to concrete will want to reduce knowledge to its smallest constituents. What are the elements that go into our concept of Fido? They are a warm “licking” sensation on our right hand (rather, many momentary ones, strung together by our mind), a visual impression of whiteness with a black patch, etc.
（摘译：）我们以为越找到事物的组成要素，就越接近事物的本质和真相。抽象化帮助我们通过探究物体彼此的关系，来了解事物；殊相化则透过研究关系中的不同
事物，来了解这些关系。
As we move down the abstraction ladder in this way, it seems again that we are learning about essences. When we reduce our experience of Fido to its elements, it seems, we are learning what he “really is.” In moving up the abstraction ladder, we sought to define objects by examining their relationships to one another. In moving down, we seek to define relationships by examining the objects related.
（摘译：）可是，事实真的是这样吗？或者我们只是自己欺骗自己？因为我们事实上从来都没有看见过这些殊相；就像科学家们就从来没有真正看见过分子、原子、亚原子……等粒子一样。这些暂时的感觉，都是抽象的观念（abstractions）。因此，我们不能说：Fido这条狗是由我们大脑将一组理性概念连接起来后所产生的个别感觉！
Or are we fooling ourselves? For we never experience any of these “elements,” momentary sensations or whatever, outside of a broader context. We never actually experience a momentary impression of whiteness; we experience larger complexes of meaning, like Fido himself. When we speak of momentary impressions, we are analyzing experience into what might be plausible constituents, as the scientist analyzes ordinary things into molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. But we have never seen momentary sense impressions any more than the scientist has actually seen his subatomic particles. Momentary sense impressions are actually abstractions from the total reality. In this way, we can see the implausibility of suggesting that Fido is “really” a set of sensations or impressions, glued together, as it were, by the mind.
（摘译：）当我们越朝「殊相」方向进行抽象化，我们所能得到的知识就越来越少。假设我们可以分析出事物最小、最终极的组成要素，这个「终极物质」就会与亚理斯多德所称的「原始物质」非常类似。它既然承载了所有的性质（事物的特性），它本身就没有特性。因此，绝对的殊相既是虚无的，又是存在的。
And as we move down the abstraction ladder, there is also a loss of content, as there was when we tried to move in the other direction. Let us imagine that we could trace the elements of the elements of the elements to the point where we could discover some ultimate element of human experience, as scientists have sought for ultimate particles in the physical universe. Let us call that element “ultimate matter,” for it would be much the same as Aristotle’s “prime matter.” What would it be? If it were identifiable, describable, like Fido, then it would be subject to further analysis and would not be the ultimate constituent of experience. Evidently, then, if it were really ultimate, nothing could be said about it. To put the point differently: it could have no qualities, because it would be the bearer of all qualities. But even to say that is to say something about it. So it seems that the very notion of an ultimate component to experience is self-contradictory (as was, indeed, Aristotle’s concept of prime matter). The ultimate component is both nothing and something.
- 4. 『纯存有』和『纯物质』同样地是虚空，不能理解；因此世界不能理解
Being and Matter Are Both Empty, Un-intelligible; Thus: World = Unintelligible
归根结底，「广泛的存有」和「终极（原始）物质」之间并没有分别；两个概念都是空洞、不可知的，不能告诉我们任何具体知识。如果一切事物的本质和这个世界的真理，要在这两个概念里面才能被发现的话，宇宙就完全没有意义可言。如果事物终极的真相竟是「抽象的存有」，殊相就不存在了。但是，若事物的真相是「抽象的殊相」，宇宙就没有所谓的一致性。如果两者都是事实，那么宇宙将会一片混乱，没有任何真理 [参本书（CVT）第4章]。
In the end, there is no difference between “being in general” and “ultimate matter.” Both concepts are empty, uninformative, and unintelligible. And if the real essence of everything, the real truth about the world, is to be found in either of these concepts, then the world is completely devoid of intelligible meaning. If abstract being is the ultimate reality, then there is no particularity. If abstract particularity is the ultimate truth, then there is no unity in the world. If both are somehow true, then all is chaos, and nothing is true. [Compare this discussion with the discussion of the ways of eminence and negation in chap. 4 (CVT). The issues are the same in both cases.]
另一种看法乃是：如果「关系」的意义是由关系中的事物来界定，而「事物」的意义又是依靠关系来理解，如此恶性循环下去，我们怎么可能开始整个认识的过程呢？
Another way to look at the problem is this: if, in the end, objects are defined by their relations, and relations are defined by their objects, a vicious circularity enters, so that everything remains undefined. If objects are understood by their relations and relations by their objects, how can the process get started?
- 为甚么会这样？因为两者都是偶像
Why This Result? Because Both Are Idols
为甚么一个对真理的好意追寻，会走进这样的死胡同？范泰尔的分析是：因为这两个概念在本质上都是偶像，因此，一定自我毁灭。它们都是偶像，因为它们来自人想要透知宇宙万物（exhaustive understanding）的欲望；而这一点只有上帝才作得到！正如所有的偶像敬拜一样，我们在被造物中寻找绝对，因此，当我们以为找到的时候，我们会发觉它竟然是全然无能的！
How is it that this seemingly well-intentioned search for truth leads up such a blind alley? Van Til’s analysis is that essentially both concepts are idols, and thus self-destructive. They are idols because they are the result of man’s desire for an exhaustive understanding of the world, an understanding that only God can have. As is always the case in idolatry, we seek for an ultimate within the creation, and when we think we have found it, we discover in due course that it is utterly powerless.
- 范泰尔精辟分析：所有非基督教的思维 = 『抽象共相』+『抽象殊相』；彼此无关
因为它们都试图寻求透知万物的知识（而只有上帝才有这种知识的特权）
Van Til’s Analysis: All Non-Christian Thought = Abstract Unity + Abstract Particularity; They’re Unrelated: Because They All Seek Exhaustive Knowledge (God’s Prerogative)
范泰尔的观点是：不信（《圣经》的上帝）的思维，永远把世界视为抽象共相和抽象殊相的组合。「抽象共相」（即「广泛的存有」或其他类似的观念）和「抽象殊相」（即我们称之为「终极物质」的东西）两个概念本身都是虚空、没有意义的，彼此之间不可能有任何关连。因此，不信的世界观至终要成为不知所云的胡言谬论。这是范泰尔批判「世俗哲学」和「被它影响的基督教神学」的核心观念。…
In Van Til’s view, unbelieving thought always sees the world as a combination of abstract unity (“being in general,” or other variants of the idea) and abstract particularity (what we have called “ultimate matter”). Both abstract unity and abstract particularity are meaningless in themselves and impossible to relate to one another. As such, unbelieving worldviews always reduce to unintelligible nonsense. This is, essentially, Van Til’s critique of secular philosophy (and its influence on Christian theology). …
世俗哲学家追求抽象的共相与殊相，是因为他们狂妄地企图寻找唯有上帝才能拥有的知识。他们看不到，宇宙的可知性并不在于一些抽象观念或宇宙中的抽象层面，而是由于上帝创造并掌管宇宙。世俗主义者试图借着一些非位格的原则解释宇宙，但《圣经》却让我们看见，只有一位有位格的上帝才能解释祂的宇宙。只有在上帝那里，宇宙才有至终的解释和可知的意义。
They pursue abstract unity and particularity because they presumptuously seek a knowledge of the world that is available only to God, and because they fail to see that the intelligibility of the world is not due to abstract aspects of the world; rather, it is due to God’s creation and direction of the world. The secularist tries to account for the world by reference to impersonal principles, but Scripture shows us that only the personal God can account for his creation. Only in God, then, is there an exhaustive and utterly intelligible rationale for the creation.
（编者按：总结/温习范泰尔：人以『自主』自居；自以为无所不知（试图寻求透知）。因此只能找到抽象的，非位格的至终。因此，什么（真）知识都找不到。）
- 非基督徒所找到的准则，必然是「非位格」而「抽象」的；没有权威要求人顺服
All Norms Non-Christian Find = Impersonal, Abstract; No Authority to Claim Obedience
从另一角度我们可以看到：非信徒对宇宙一致性的寻找，本质上是在寻找一种真理的准则。但在任何一个非基督教世界观里，绝对的真理准则必然是非位格的。这个准则若不是「存有」本身，就是「终极物质」；但是它们都没有资格作真理的准则。因为这两个概念都是虚空、没有内容的；它们没有资格要求人相信任何事物，因此，都不可能作真理的准则（AGG, 89-118）。
Another way to look at it is this: the unbeliever’s search for unity is essentially the search for a criterion of truth, a norm or standard. But in any non-Christian worldview, the criterion for truth must be impersonal, rather than personal. Ultimately, that criterion will be a concept of “being as such” or “ultimate matter,” as we have seen. But neither of these concepts can serve as a criterion of truth. Neither has any content. And neither creates an obligation to believe anything, as any ultimate criterion must do. (Compare my argument to this effect in AGG, 89-118.)
- 《圣经》中的上帝 = 位格、绝对、具体、一而众；一套计划包含所有细节
Biblical God = Personal, Absolute, Concrete, One-and-Many; One Plan w/ All Details
上帝与这些偶像（观念）截然不同。祂的计划是整体的、完全一致的；一切都按着次序，没有颠倒混乱。对上帝来说，没有甚么事物是祂不知道的。同时，上帝的无所不知，并不使宇宙中个别事物（殊相）的真实性和可知性受损；而殊相（个别事物的细节）也不使宇宙整体的一致性受损。促使事物终极一致的，并不是甚么观念，也不是甚么原则，而是一个有位格者：上帝。因此，这样的一致性并非虚无和没有内容；而终极的殊相和最小的细节也都在上帝的计划里。上帝的计划就是祂的自我表现。
God stands in contrast to these idolatrous concepts. His plan is perfectly unified; nothing is out of order; nothing is unknown to him. At the same time, his omniscience does not compromise the reality and intelligibility of the particulars, the individual details of his plan. Nor do the details compromise the overall unity. The ultimate unity is a person, not a principle or an abstract concept. Therefore, that unity is not without content. And the ultimate particularities, the ultimate details, are also divine, as God’s plan is his own self-expression.
上帝的计划是一个有位格的「一而众」，因为上帝的本性是「一而众」的。上帝的「多面性」（manifold-ness）可以从祂的属性、思想和计划的多元性中看出。而上帝多面性最突出的展现，就是三位一体里的三个位格。个别位格里的一切，没有不存在于三一真神的一体里；而在三一真神一体里的一切，也没有甚么不完全表现在每一个位格之中。在上帝里面，所有殊相（particularity）都完全的合一；而所有的合一都完全展现在殊相（detail）中。是的，丰富性与合一性都是上帝的本性，而上帝的「合一性」（oneness）就是祂的「丰富性」的合一（unity of the riches of his nature）；上帝的「丰富性」就是祂的自含丰满，也就是在祂「合一性」当中的丰富。
God’s plan is a personal one and many, because his nature is one and many. The “manifoldness” of God is seen in the diversity of his attributes, his thoughts, his plans. But it is seen pre-eminently in the three persons of the Trinity. There is nothing in the person that is not in the divine unity, and there is nothing in the divine unity that is not fully expressed in the persons. In God, all particularities are fully united, and all unity is fully expressed in detail. Indeed, God’s oneness is a unity of the richness of his nature, and God’s richness is his “self-contained fullness,” the richness of his uniform character.
因为上帝是一位绝对的位格，祂有资格作宇宙中最终极的准则，也就是受造者思想中的真理性的最终准则。
Because God is an absolute person, he can also serve as the ultimate standard, the final criterion for the truth of creaturely thought.
- 三一论如何解决「一而众」：上帝是位格；祂的属性是丰满的；祂自我认识；自我表
达（永恒计划）；因此世界是一而众，同时可以理解
How Doctrine of Trinity Solves One-and-Many Problem: God is Person; God’s Attributes Are “Full”; God Knows Himself; Expresses Himself (One Eternal Decree); Therefore World is One and Many, And Is Intelligible
从这些意义来理解，范泰尔认为，三位一体就是「一而众的问题的解答」。这里的意思不是说：三位一体提供了一个模式，照此模式，抽象的「一」和抽象的「众」就能有意义地结合在一起。不是！它们不可能有意义地被结合。三位一体也不是要让我们看到：人类的知识若建立在（《圣经》的）有神论的根基上，至终可以透知宇宙万物。不是的！人不可能透知这个世界，绝对不可能（参IST, 24 = IST2, 61.）。这种尝试等于是快跑冲向「抽象存有」和「抽象殊相」的砖墙。
In those senses, Van Til says, the Trinity is the “solution to the problem of the one and the many.” It is not that somehow the Trinity furnishes a model by which abstract unity and abstract particularity can, after all, be meaningfully joined. They cannot be meaningfully joined. Nor is it that the Trinity shows us how human knowledge of the creation can be exhaustive, after all, but on theistic presuppositions. No, human beings cannot know the world exhaustively, period. (See IST, 24 = IST2, 61.) When we try to do that, we run into the brick walls of abstract being and abstract particularity.
确切的说，三位一体的教义呼召我们在信心中仰望上帝。我们必须认识到，虽然我们不可能透知宇宙，但上帝却完全透知。我们之所以能在一定的范围内认识世界，是因为上帝赐下祂的启示，同时也赐予能力，使我们能在有限的、「类比」（analogical）的层面上效法祂的思想。尽管在某个范围内，我们不能认识（透知）这个世界，可是我们可以相信世界是一个能被认识的（intelligible）整体。同时，对我们来说如同奥秘的事物，并非源自一个终极的「混沌」或「无意义」（meaninglessness, 即：虚空），而是源自上帝那奇妙、丰富、超越我们理解的心思意念。我们虽然无知，但仍可以确实知道，上帝至少赐下了足够的知识，使我们能够藉以遵行祂的旨意。而我们为甚么要追求知识呢？至终而唯一的理由就是为要遵行上帝的旨意。
Rather, the doctrine of the Trinity calls us to look to God in faith. We are to understand that although we do not know the world exhaustively, he does. Insofar as we can know the world, it is because he gives us revelation and the ability to repeat his thoughts on an analogical, finite level. And insofar as we cannot know the world, we can trust that the world is nevertheless an intelligible whole. Things that are mysterious to us do not spring from an ultimate chaos or meaninglessness; they spring, rather, from the wonderful riches of God’s thought, which transcends our understanding. And in our ignorance we may also be sure that God has at least given us sufficient knowledge to do his will. And, in the final analysis, the only reason why we should seek any knowledge at all is to do God’s will.
- 上帝呼召我们信祂：不是盲目的信
God Calls us to Faith: Not Blind Faith
所以，我们是被呼召来信靠上帝。可是，这样的信心是盲目的信心吗？如果是，那么，三位一体的教义并没有有意义地解决「一而众」的问题。在范泰尔和我（傅兰姆）的观点里，我们的信心不是盲目的。首先，相信宇宙的创造者对祂所创造结构的解释，是最合理不过的事。其次，三位一体的教义让我们大体看见，终极的「一」和终极的「众」如何可以被调和。它们若被视为一个位格的特性，而不是抽象的特性，它们就可以被调和。
So we are called to faith. But is this a blind faith? If so, then the Trinity really does not solve the problem in any meaningful sense. In Van Til’s view and mine, our faith is not blind. In the first place, it is the most rational thing in the world to believe the Word of the world’s Creator as to the structure of his work. Second, the Trinity shows us at least in very general terms, how ultimate unity and diversity can be reconciled. They can be reconciled if they are seen not as abstract qualities, but as qualities of a person.
一个广泛的「存有」不可能整合我们经验中的殊相，因此，也无法提供我们任何亮光去解释这样的经验。可是，我们若把世界看作是一位有位格的创造者的精心设计，祂将宇宙万事思考透彻后，把所有的事物都安置在最妥善的位置上；那么，这个解释是充满意义的，能给我们无限的亮光去解释万事。在这个「一」里包含了「众」；这个「一」，是「众」（所有殊相）的合一（DF2, 26 = DF4, 48-49）。
“Being in general” does nothing to unite the particulars of our experience and therefore to illumine that experience. But it is immensely illuminating to see the world as the craftsmanship of a person who has thought everything through and given everything its proper place. Here is a unity that includes the details, a unity that is a unity of the details. (This is the way I understand Van Til’s use of the term “concrete universal” in application to God, as in DF2, 26 = DF4, 48-49. This phrase comes from idealist philosophy, but Van Til seeks to sharply differentiate his view from theirs.)
这里我将用范泰尔的话作总结：「我的合一像甚么？像一个孩子和他的父亲一起漫步走过一个森林。」（WIB, 20，范泰尔，《我为甚么信神》，台北：基督教改革宗翻译社。）
I will summarize with a statement from Van Til: “My unity is the unity of a child who walks with its father through the woods.” (WIB, 20.)
[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]
[ AGG = John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God ]
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
[ WIB = Why I Believe in God ]
FACTS AND LAWS
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 5, pp. 77-78.)
- 日常生活中也有「一而众」的问题
One-and-Many Problem Exists In Everyday
「一而众」的问题，不仅存在于终极的层面，也存在于日常生活的层面。有些读者会抗议说：「纯粹的存有」和「纯粹的物质」是否能被理解，对我们并不重要；因为一般人并不关心最高或最低阶层的抽象，他们只想知道「中层」（最高以下、最低以上）的事物。可是，范泰尔的分析却牵动了人类知识的每一层次（IST, 22-23）。
The problem of the one and the many exists not only at the ultimate level, but also at the level of everyday knowledge. Some readers may protest that it is not important whether “pure being” and “pure matter” are intelligible concepts, for most people are not worried about the highest and lowest levels of abstraction. They only seek to know the middle levels. But the Van Tillian analysis affects all of human knowledge. (Here, see Van Til’s discussion in IST, 22-23.)
- 科学处理事实与定律
Science Deals with Facts and Laws
科学的知识，就是将事实（facts）在定律（laws）之下组织起来；或说，设定一些定律来描述（解释）事实；两者是同一回事。日常生活中，我们也在尝试组织事实，在一些常规的范畴（categories）里组合不同的资讯和经验。同样的模式也适用于许多不同的学科，例如Rousas J. Rushdoony（鲁萨斯·约翰·拉什杜尼1916 年 4 月 25 日 – 2001 年 2 月 8 日）指出，在政治范畴里，人们尝试借着法律调和不同（「众」）人的利益，以期社会能有秩序（「一」）（JA, 339-349）。
Scientific knowledge involves grouping facts under laws, or formulating laws to describe the facts, which is the same thing. In everyday life we also seek to organize facts, to bring various kinds of data and experience together under regular categories. This pattern describes many different areas of knowledge. Rousas J. Rushdoony, for example, indicates how politics seeks to reconcile the interest of the many to the order (unity) of society through the formulation of laws. (JA, 339-349.)
- 非基督徒没有基础去支持定律
Non-Christian Has No Basis for Laws
可是，在不信（非基督徒）的根基上，人没有理由去相信，宇宙中存在着一些可以用来准确描述事实的定律。谁能知道宇宙的真相竟然是有规律的（regular）呢？若世界至终来自「机率（或然率）」或「终极的物质」，那么，它当然就会是随意或混乱的。如果我们的感官或理性，看起来像是要告诉我们：「事情不是这样的，宇宙是有规律的。」那么，在一个混乱的世界里，为甚么我们应该相信我们的五官和理性能告诉我们真理呢？
On an unbelieving basis, however, there is no particular reason to believe that there are laws that accurately describe facts. Who is to know that reality is regular at all? If the world is ultimately the result of chance (or “ultimate matter,” which is the same thing), surely it is equally likely that the world will be random or chaotic; and if our senses and reason seem to be telling us differently, why should we believe that in a world of chaos they would be telling us the truth?
- 若宇宙由机率主宰，定律就只是理性中的抽象观念？
World is Chance: Laws Are Abstractions of Mind?
机率（或然率）若主宰一切，定律又从哪里来？定律并不存在于这样一个客观的世界里，因为世界是由机率（或然率）所造成，而不是由一位创造主所设计，并赐予它规律和结构。从康德（Immanuel Kant）以后，大多数哲学家都相信，秩序和结构都来自人的理性（思想）。但是我们为甚么要相信，这些结构能符合真实世界的真相？世界既然没有秩序，这些结构和定律就不可能适用于其上！那么，这些定律岂不就只是一些抽象的观念（abstractions），就如「纯粹的存有」那样，与现实世界没有关系？
And if chance is king, where do laws come from? They do not exist in the objective world, because that world is the result of chance, not the product of a designer who gives it a structure of regularity. Since Kant, most philosophers have believed that structures of order originate in the human mind. But why should we believe that such structures would have any application to the actual world? Indeed, if the world is not orderly in itself, they cannot apply to it. Are these laws not, in the end, abstractions that (like “pure being”) have no application to the world?
将这些因素连结起来：「主观的定律」应用在「没有定律的现实」上。情况不单令人绝望，而且互相矛盾！不但不能带来更多的知识，反而只叫人成为怀疑主义者，无法相信「认识真理的可能性」。
Put these factors together: subjective laws applied to lawless facts. The situation is not only hopeless, but contradictory. It will not lead to greater knowledge, but only to skepticism about the very possibility of truth.
- 日常生活中，抽象定律并不要求我们降服
In Everyday Life, Abstract Laws Do Not Impose Obligation
同样，科学知识和日常生活的知识，与抽象（哲学）的思辨一样，是需要准则的。可是，非位格的定律并没有赋予我们准则，并以这些准则要求（oblige）我们相信甚么或不相信甚么。回到上述Rushdoony的主张：非位格的律法不能得到人心，也没有权利要求人在政治社会里效忠。
It is also the case that scientific and everyday knowledge, like the more abstract speculation discussed in the last section, require criteria. But laws, conceived impersonally, do not impose upon us criteria, obligations to believe one thing rather than another. Much less (to recall Rushdoony’s concerns) can impersonal laws claim the allegiance of persons in political society.
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因此，预设三一真神，不仅在形而上学（对宇宙终极的探索）上是必须的，同时在日常生活上也是必须的。
Therefore, it is not only metaphysical speculation about ultimates, but concrete, everyday knowledge as well, that requires a Trinitarian presupposition.
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
[ JA = Jerusalem and Athens ]
附录
三一真神乃『具体共相』：
范泰尔的『具体共相』与唯心主义的『绝对』的对照
TRIUNE GOD AS “CONCRETE UNIVERSAL”:
VAN TIL’S “CONCRETE UNIVERSAL” VS. “THE ABSOLUTE” OF IDEALISM
James Baird (圣约大学哲学系毕业Philosophy graduate, Covenant College)
[ From: James Baird, “Van Til’s Concrete Universal.” Reformed Forum.
https://reformedforum.org/van-tils-concrete-universal/ ]
有人批评范泰尔：祂的『三一真神是具体共相』乃怪癖
SOME CRITICIZE VAN TIL’S “TRINITY AS CONCRET UNIVERSAL” AS IDIOSYNCRATIC
（摘译：）有哲学家批评范泰尔『怪癖』，因为范氏说三位一体是『具体共相』。让我尝试诠释范泰尔的三一论，和指出其价值。
Laurence O’Donnell, III, a Cornelius Van Til scholar and critic, has labeled Van Til’s trinitarian theology “idiosyncratic.” He made this remark with respect to Van Til’s conception of the trinity as a concrete universal. In response to O’Donnell’s ascription of idiosyncrasy, I would like to briefly exposit Van Til’s trinitarian thought and perhaps throw light on its value.
查：『具体共相』的起源：黑格尔，『绝对唯心（理想）主义』
『具体共相』（据称能）连接宇宙中所有个体（殊相）在一个彼此依靠的系统里；
唯心主义者坚持，他们的『绝对』就是这个『具体共相』
『绝对』是一个涵盖万物的『主题性』概念 (mental subject)
ORIGIN OF “CONCRETE UNIVERSAL”: HEGEL, ABSOLUTE IDEALISM
“CONCRETE UNIVERSAL” ALLEDGELY CONNECCTS ALL INDIVIDUALS
INTO INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEM
“THE ABSOLUTE” IN IDEALIST PHILOSOPHY PURPORTS TO BE THIS “CONCRETE UNIVERSAL”
“ABSOLUTE” IS AN ALL-INCLUSIVE MENTAL SUBJECT
查：『具体共相』这格复杂的概念，乃源自黑格尔 (1770-1831)，『绝对唯心（理想）主义』的创始者。什么是『具体共相』？一位哲学历史家的定义：『绝对共相』是一种属性，透过它，所有的个体（殊相）在一个彼此依靠 (mutual interdependence) 的系统里，彼此相关 (related with one another)。简言之：『具体共相』把万物连接起来，藉之把意义赋予万物。
The idea of a concrete universal is a complex concept that originated with the founder of absolute idealism, G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). Historian of philosophy Robert Stern defines a concrete universal as a property that all individuals have whereby they are “related with one another in a system of mutual interdependence.” Stated simply, a concrete universal is something that connects everything together and thereby gives everything meaning.
『绝对唯心（理想）主义』认为『绝对』 (The Absolute) 就是那『具体共相』；它是一个涵盖万物的思想主体（编按：一个作为『主体』的概念）。
The absolute idealists identified the Absolute – an all-inclusive mental subject – as their concrete universal.
范泰尔极力批评唯心主义者：他们忽略《圣经》的上帝和祂的启示，
因而陷入一大堆哲学难题的困境，是无法解决的
VAN TIL IS HIGHLY CRITICAL IDEALISM:
BECAUSE IT NEGLECTS CHRISTIAN GOD AND HIS REVELATION,
THEY FACE A PLETHORA OF PHILO. DILEMMAS, FOR WHICH THERE’S NO ANSWER
范泰尔极力批判『绝对唯心（理想）主义』。他认为：绝对唯心主义忽略了基督教的上帝和祂的启示；因而陷入一大堆哲学难题困境，是不能逃脱的：『从非基督教的观点，是没有解决方案的。』
Van Til was highly critical of absolute idealism. As I alluded to in a previous post (http.://reformedforum.org/absolute-idealism-analytic-philosophy-part-2/), Van Til thought that the absolute idealists’ neglect of the Christian God and his revelation led them to a plethora of philosophical dilemmas for which “there is no answer … from a non-Christian point of view.”
例如：『绝对』存在，由『或然（偶然）』掌控的宇宙也存在；
两者怎能共存？
EXAMPLE: ABSOLUTE EXISTS, WORLD DRIVEN BY CHANCE ALSO EXISTS;
HOW CAN THEY CO-EXIST?
例如：『绝对唯心主义』者设定『绝对』是存在的，同时一个有『或然率（偶然）』操纵的世界也是存在的；但他们不能解释：两者怎能同时存在？
For example, absolute idealists posited the existence of both an Absolute and a world driven by chance, but the never sufficiently explained how these two can co-exist.
首先：偶然的世界似乎会减弱『绝对』的绝对性；
其次：绝对可能吞灭偶然世界
FIRST: WORLD OF CHANCE MIGHT REDUCE ABSOLUTE’S ABSOLUTENESS
SECOND: ABSOLUTE MIGHT ABSORB WORLD OF CHANCE
一方面，偶然的世界似乎会减弱了『绝对』的绝对性。另一方面，『绝对』似乎会把偶然的世界吸收掉。『绝对唯心主义』的『绝对』，就是他们用以统一万物的概念，似乎吞灭了『众』（偶然的世界），反之亦然。
On the one hand, the world of chance seems like it should reduce the absoluteness of the Absolute. On the other hand, the Absolute seems like it should absorb the world of chance. Absolute idealism’s unifying element (the Absolute) appears to swallow its plural element (the world of chance), and vice versa.
与『绝对唯心主义』对照的是范泰尔的立场，他根据《圣经》坚持：
三一真神乃是真正的『具体共相』，
不论在时间（时空）中，或在永恒里
IN CONTRAST TO ABSOLUTE IDEALISM, VAN TIL HOLDS, ON BASIS OF BIBLE:
TRIUNE GOD IS THE TRUE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL (a) IN TIME, (b) IN ETERNITY
与『绝对唯心主义』相对照的是范泰尔的思想：他根据《圣经》坚持，三位一体的上帝是真正的『具体共相』，不仅在时空里是如此，在永恒里也是如此。
In contrast to absolute idealism, Van Til held on the basis of Scripture that the triune God is the true concrete universal, in time and in eternity.
上帝在永恒里是『具体共相』：一般为祂本体上是三而一 (ontological Trinity)：
因为祂是自存的上帝，以三位格永存
[1] 父，子，圣灵彼此渗透；他们共享同一个神性本质
GOD IS CONCRETE UNIVERSAL IN ETERNITY, BECAUSE HE IS ONTOLOGICAL TRINITY
I.E. BECAUSE HE IS SELF-EXISTENT GOD, EXISTING IN 3 PERSONS
[1] FATHER, SON, SPIRIT INTERPENTRATE; THUS SHARE IN ONE/SAME DIVINE ESSENCE
上帝在永恒里是『具体共相』，因为祂的三一『本体』 (triune ontology)，换言之，因为祂是自存的上帝，以三位格永存。父，子，圣灵彼此渗透 (fully inter-penetrate one another)，因此在同一个神性（本质）上有份。（编按：共有同一个神性本质。）
God is the concrete universal in eternity by virtue of his triune ontology, i.e., via his nature as the self-existent God in three persons. Father, Son, and Spirit fully interpenetrate one another, and therefore share in the same divine essence.
[2] 而唯一的神性本质并不腐蚀三位格之间的区别
[3] 同时，三位格之间的区别，并不割裂唯一的神性本质
[2] AND THE ONE DIVINE ESSENCE DOESN’T ERODE DISTINCTIONS BET. 3 PERSONS
[3] DISTINCTIONS BET. 3 PERSONS DON’T DIVIDE ONE DIVINE ESSENCE
而唯一（同一）的神性本质，并不腐蚀三位格之间的区别；三位格之间的区别，也没有割裂唯一（同一）的神性本质。父，子，圣灵，是『一上帝，本质相同，权能和荣耀同等。』(…one God, the same in substance, equal in power and glory.) （《威敏斯特小要理问答》，6。）
The one divine essence does not erode the distinctions between the three divine persons, and the distinctions between the three divine persons do not divide the one divine essence. Father, Son, and Spirit are “one God, the same in substance, equal in power and glory” (Shorter Catechism, Q&A 6).
上帝在时间（时空）中是『具体共相』，因为祂在永恒计划里是三而一：
因为祂借着在时空里的大能作为（创造，护理，救赎），实现了祂的永恒计划
GOD IS CONCRETE UNIVERSAL IN TIME: BEC. HE IS ECONOMICAL TRINITY:
BEC. HE WORKED OUT HIS ETERNAL DECREE BY HIS ACTS IN TIME: CREATION, PROVIDENCE, REDEMPTION
上帝在时空里是『具体共相』，因为祂的『计划中的三位一体』 (triune economy)，换言之，透过祂的永恒预旨（计划）。这计划，借着祂在时空中的大能作为：创造，护理，救赎而实现。
God is the concrete universal in time by virtue of his triune economy, i.e., via his free eternal decree as worked out by his temporal acts of creation, providence, and redemption.
上帝在创造时把一个独特的本性，和一个（与祂，和与宇宙的）『约的关系』赋予给每一个受造个体；
GOD, AT CREATION, GAVE EACH OBJECT DISTINCT NATURE & COV. RELATIONSHIP
(WITH GOD HIMSELF, AND WITH REST OF WORLD)
当三一真神创造时，祂把一个独特的本性赋予每一个受造之物，同时给他们与自己（上帝），和与世界的『约的关系』 (covenant relationship)。
When the triune God created, he gave each object a distinct nature and a covenant relationship with himself and the rest of the world.
这些个体的『本性』和『约的关系』并不与上帝对宇宙的至终（末世）计划抽离
THESE “NATURES” AND “COVENANT RELATIONS” ARE NOT ABSTRACT FROM
GOD’S OWN DESIGN FOR ALL OF HISTORY: FINAL PURPOSE FOR WORLD IN JESUS CHRIST
上帝向祂的被造物赐予这些『本性』和『关系』，并不与祂对历史的计划抽离。反之，万物都由上帝借着祂智慧的大能所创造，保存，和掌管，都期待祂借着基督里，实现世界的至终目的。
God did not provide objects with these natures and relations in abstraction from his own design for the rest of history. Rather, objects are created, preserved, and governed by the wise power of God in expectation of his final purpose for the world in Jesus Christ.
因此范泰尔成功地设定了一个『具体共相』，以连接宇宙万物，并把意义赋予万物，
这『具体共相』就是：
上帝本体上的三位一体，和上帝在祂永恒计划里的三位一体
THUS: VAN TIL SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED A “CONCRETE UNIVERSAL”
AS HIS METHOD TO CONNECT ALL OF UNIVERSE AND GIVE EVERYTHING ITS MEANING:
GOD’S ONTOLOGICAL TRINITY AND ECONOMIC TRINITY
范泰尔的改革宗哲学方法论，成功地设定了一个具体的共相，能连接万物，也把意义赋予万物：换言之，三一真神；本体的三一真神，和永恒计划中的三一真神。
Van Til’s Reformed method of philosophy successfully identified a concrete universal that is able to connect everything together and thereby give everything meaning – namely, the triune God in his ontology and economy.
范泰尔与唯心主义不同：
一（上帝的本质，圣约末世论）与众（三位格，每一被造物）
有同等的终极性
UNLIKE IDEALISM: ONE (GOD’S ESSENCE/COV. ESCH.) AND MANY (3 PERSONS/INDIV. CREATURES) = EQUALLY ULTIMATE
与『绝对唯心主义』不同的是，统一万物的（上帝的本质，和圣约的末世论），和众多的元素（殊相：三位格，和个别的被造物），在范泰尔的形而上学里，是同样地至终的(equal ultimacy)。
Unlike in absolute idealism, there is an equal ultimacy between the unifying elements (the divine essence/covenantal eschatology) and the plural elements (the divine persons/individual created objects) in Van Til’s theory of reality.
再者：范泰尔的『基督教形而上学』暗示了一个『基督教知识论』
FURTHER: VAN TIL’S CHRISTIAN METAPHYSICS IMPLIES CHRISTIAN EPISTEMOLOGY
不但如此，范泰尔认为，他的形而上学（『实在』的理论， theory of reality）暗指着一个基督教的知识论。
Furthermore, Van Til thought that his Christian theory of reality implied a Christian theory of knowledge.
上帝既然根据祂的三一计划创造了，并掌控整个宇宙，
我们一切的思想，必须降服在祂的模式计划下，这计划以基督为终极目标
SINCE GOD CREATED, CONTROLS ALL RE. TRIUNE COUNSEL,
WE MUST SUBMIT ALL OUR THINKING TO HIS ESCH PLAN, CULM. IN CHRIST
上帝既然根据祂的三一永恒计划 (triune counsel) 创造万物，掌控万物，我们的思想必须顺服祂和祂的末世计划：这计划将在基督里实现，达到终点。因此，范泰尔坚持，基督徒的思想必须是『具体思维』；我们必须常常记住三一真神伟大的，属天的救赎计划。
Since God created and controls all things according to his triune counsel, we must submit all our thinking to him and his eschatological plan, as culminated in Jesus Christ. Thus, Van Til insisted that Christians must think concretely; we must always remain mindful of the triune God’s great plan of heavenly redemption.
因此，范泰尔成功地根据改革宗神学，在哲学方面作了整合 (philosophical integration)
THUS: VAN TIL SUCCEEDED IN PHILOSOPHICAL INTEGRATION OF REFORMED THEOLOGY
依我看来，范提尔根据三位一体而设立的『具体共相』，对改革宗神学在哲学方面的整合 (philosophical integration)，是很有前途的。就算他对三位一体论的建构有点显得怪癖：因为它是『位格性』的，而在某些层面上是与众不同的，然而，是非常值得我们考虑，钦佩的。在我的思想中，范泰尔与『绝对唯心主义』在寻求一个『具体共相』方面的互动，
设立了一个精彩的榜样，教我们如何用改革宗的神学答案来面对哲学的问题。
It seems to me that Van Til’s trinitarian understanding of the concrete universal is a promising philosophical integration of Reformed theology. Even if his trinitarian formulations are idiosyncratic in the sense of being personal and unique in some limited respects, they are nonetheless worthy of deep consideration and admiration. In my mind, Van Til’s interaction with absolute idealism’s search for a concrete universal is a wonderful example of how to address philosophical questions with Reformed theological answers.
Sources (omitted.)
范泰尔论『事实』与『定律』
FACTS AND LAWS
[ Cornelius Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 4th Edition, p. 50. ]
上帝创造；因此受造宇宙不同层面必然相关；这些关系有上帝设立
不同层面可能是高等，低等，或平等
GOD CREATED; THUS ASPECS OF CREATED UNIVERSE ARE RELATED IN
RELATIONSHIPS ORDAINED BY GOD
THESE ASPECTS MAY BE INFERIOR, INFERIOR, OR EQUAL
我们若认真正视创造论，结果必然是：宇宙（受造实在created reality）的不同层面之间必然彼此相关，这些关系乃由创造主在它们之间设定的；它们彼此是高等，低等，或同等。被造世界的所有层面既然都是同等地被造，没有一个层面比其他更为终极 (more ultimate)。
If the creation doctrine is thus taken seriously, it follows that the various aspects of created reality must sustain such relations to one another as have been ordained between them by the Creator, as superiors, inferiors, or equals. All aspects being equally created, no one aspect of reality may be regarded as more ultimate than another.
因此这些层面，不论『一』或『众』，乃平等；同样地由上帝所造，同样地依靠上帝
THUS ASPECTS OF CREATION: “ONE” & “MANY” ARE EQUAL;
THEY ARE EQUALLY CREATED BY GOD, EQUALLY DEPENDENT ON GOD
因此我们可以说，受造的『一』和受造的『众』从这个角度看是彼此同等的 (equal)；他们都同等地从上帝而出，同等地依靠上帝。上帝支撑着『一』而『众』。
Thus the created one and many may in this respect be said to be equal to one another; they are equally derived and equally dependent upon God who sustains them both.
『事实』（殊相）必然根据『共相』或『定律』运作；因此宇宙有秩序
FACTS/PARTICULARS ACT RE. UNIVERSALS LAWS; THUS UNIVERSE IS ORDERLY
宇宙的事实，或『殊相』，都必然根据宇宙性的『共相』或『定律』运作。因此，受造宇宙是有秩序的。
The particulars or facts of the universe do and must act in accord with universals or laws. Thus there is order in the created universe.
另外：定律也不把『殊相』变成抽象的；或减弱『殊相』的个别性
『定律』，只不过是我们对上帝对待『殊相』的方法的概括性理解而已
ALSO: LAWS DON’T REDUCE PARTICULARS TO ABSTRACTIONS,
OR REDUCE THEIR INDIVIDUALITY
LAWS ARE ONLY GENERALIZATION SOF HOW GOD WORKS WITH PARTICULARS
另一方面，定律也不会，永不可能把『殊相』（个别细节）约化为抽象的『殊相』，或在任何意义上减弱它们的个别性。『定律』不过是对上帝如何对待『殊相』的方法的概括性理解 (generalizations) 而已。
On the other hand, the laws may not and can never reduce the particulars to abstract particulars or reduce their individuality in any manner. The laws are but generalizations of God’s method of working with the particulars.
上帝可以随时设定某一个『事实』与受造宇宙的『定律』之间的新关系
事实和定律，本身没有任何原因，让上帝不能如此行
GOD CAN, ANYTIME, SET A FACT IN NEW RELATION TO CREATED LAW
NO INHERENT REASON IN FACTS/LAWS, WHY GOD CAN’T/SHOULDN’T DO THIS
上帝随时可以拿一个『事实』，使它与受造宇宙的定律设立一个新的关系。换言之，根据事实和定律的本质来说，没有任何理由，上帝不可能这样行。
God may at any time take one fact and set it into a new relation to created law. That is, there is no inherent reason in the facts or laws themselves why this should not be done.
因为《圣经》中的上帝是如此，因为『事实』和『定律』是如此 (被造，依靠上帝)，
因为我们是如此理解『一』和『众』，因此：神迹必然是可能的
BECAUSE THIS IS THE BIBLE’S GOD, BECAUSE FACTS/LAWS ARE SUCH,
BECAUSE WE UNDERSTAND “ONE” AND “MANY” IN THIS WAY,
WE MUST LEAVE ROOM FOR MIRACLES
就是因为这种根据《圣经》的『上帝』观因而有的，对『事实』和『定律』的关系，对时间中的『一』和『众』的理解，我们必须认为『神迹』是可能的。（注脚21。）而神迹是一个在基督教立场核心的信念。
It is this sort of conception of the relation of facts and laws, of the temporal one and many, imbedded as it is in that idea of God in which we profess to believe, that we need in order to make room for miracles. [Note 21.] And miracles are at the heart of the Christian position.
上帝不是干扰！上帝从来就不断的作工！
GOD DOESN’T INTERVENE! GOD IS WORKING ALL THE TIME!
（注脚21。奥利芬特，威敏斯特神学院护教学教授。）从这个意义来说，神迹不是上帝干扰一个平常是机械性的过程。反之，神迹乃是上帝把事实和『定律』设在一种不寻常的关系中；与在一般情况中『事实』和『定律』的关系不同就是了。换言之，范泰尔说，因为『定律只不过是人对上帝怎样在宇宙中工作的一种概括性理解(generalization)』，上帝行神迹时，并不是干扰，因为，祂一直不断地在宇宙中作工。
[Note 21, by K. Scott Oliphint, editor.] Miracles, in this sense, are not an intrusion of God into an otherwise mechanistic process. Rather, they are God’s setting certain facts and “laws” into relationships that are different from the way such facts and laws ordinarily relate. In other words, because, as Van Til says, “laws are but generalizations of God’s method of working,” there is no intrusion of God in a miracle, since he is there working all along.
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