第六章 上帝的主权
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD
GOD’S SOVEREIGNTY: CENTRAL TO VAN TIL
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 6, pp. 79-80.)
从前面的讨论我们可以意料到，范泰尔有关「上帝主权」的教义是非常扎实的。我们可以这样预期，不仅是因为范氏出自改革宗教会，更因为我们已经看见范泰尔如何讨论上帝的属性和三一论。范氏有关上帝属性的论述，特别着重于上帝「自含」的本性。如果世界不是完全在上帝的掌控之下，那么，在某种程度上，上帝就会与祂以外的事物相互依存。如此一来，上帝就不是完全自含的了。
We should expect to find in Van Til a strong doctrine of the sovereignty of God from what we discussed before. We expect this, not only because of his personal ecclesiastical background, but also from his discussions of the divine attributes and the Trinity, which we have already considered. Van Til’s treatment of the divine attributes focuses on the “self-contained” nature of God. If the world were not wholly under God’s control, he would to some extent be relative to things outside himself. He would not, then, be fully self-contained.
范泰尔的三一论著重在「相互依存主义」这个问题上。上帝不是一个孤存的、与世界的多元性相互依存的「一」。上帝的「一」，只与祂自己三位一体中的「多元」相互依存（relative only to his own Trinitarian plurality）；此一论点强化了范氏对「上帝的自含性」的强调。此外，范泰尔对「一而众」这个问题的论述则强调：上帝──而且唯有上帝──能透知宇宙的真相（实存），也唯有祂才能透彻地解释（exhaustive interpretation）实存。但是，如果上帝在永恒里已经解释了时间、空间中所发生的每件事情；那么，所有事情的发生必定都在祂的预定中（foreordination）：「世界中的事实与定律之所以存在，乃是因为上帝对它们的计划；上帝对世界完全的认识乃涉及上帝对世界的计划。因此，上帝对世界中的事实和定律的认识，是早于世界的存在之先。」（DF2, 11 = DF4, 61-62.）
Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity focuses on the issue of correlativism. God is not a bare oneness that is relative to the pluralities of the world. He is a oneness relative only to his own Trinitarian plurality. This reinforces Van Til’s emphasis on the self-containment of God. And his treatment of the one-and-many problem emphasizes that God, and nobody else, has an exhaustive interpretation of reality. But if God has eternally interpreted everything that comes to pass, then surely nothing can happen without his foreordination: “The facts and laws of the world are what they are because of God’s plan with respect to them. Therefore, his knowledge of the world is involved in his plan for the world. Thus, his knowledge of the facts and laws of the world precede the existence of the world.” (DF2, 11 = DF4, 61-62.)
因此，上帝的预旨（decree）「是时间、空间中所发生一切事情的至终而唯一的决定性力量。」（CA, 11）祂的预旨是 「被造宇宙里所有实体（substance）和能力的来源。」（IST, 247）
God’s decree, then, “is the final and exclusively determining power of whatsoever comes to pass.” (CA, 11.) It is “the source of all substance and power in the created universe.” (IST, 247.)
[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
[ CA = Christian Apologetics ]
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 6, pp. 80-83.)
- 范泰尔是否决定论者？
Is Van Til a Determinist?
范泰尔否认他的立场是一种哲学上的决定论。假如我们的意思是：对范泰尔来说，有限世界里的每一个事件都有一个成因；我想，我们可以称范泰尔为一位决定论者（determinist）。当然，对范氏来说，有限世界里所有的事件，它们的必要成因（necessary cause）和充份成因（sufficient cause）都在上帝的预旨里。
Van Til denies that his position is a form of philosophical determinism. We may, I think, call Van Til a determinist if by that we mean simply that for Van Til every event in the finite world has a cause. Certainly, for Van Til, it is the case that all events in the finite world have their necessary and sufficient cause in God’s decree.
- 范泰尔：上帝的预定是位格性的
Van Til: God’s Foreordination = Personal
可是，范泰尔的立场与哲学史中典型的决定论有显著的不同。首先，我们已经看到，在范氏的思想中，上帝的预定（foreordination）是有位格的；而哲学史中决定论的典型则认为，事物的成因至终是非位格性的。「哲学上的必然论（necessitarianism）代表了一种终极的非位格主义 （impersonalism），而贯彻一致的基督教则代表着一种终极的位格主义。」（CTETH, 35; DF2, 62 = DF4, 85.）
But Van Til’s position is different in significant ways from typical deterministic systems in the history of philosophy. For one thing, as we have seen, God’s foreordination on Van Til’s view is personal, while determinism in philosophy typically ascribes events to causes that are ultimately impersonal. “Philosophical necessitarianism stands for an ultimate impersonalism: consistent Christianity stands for an ultimate personalism.” (CTETH, 35; DF2, 62 = DF4, 85.)
- 范泰尔：次等成因可以是「自由」的
Van Til: Secondary Causes Can Be “Free”
范氏的立场与世俗决定论之间另外一个不同之处，在于「第一因」和次等成因之间的区别。范泰尔坚持，虽然我们从来没有脱离上帝的掌控，但有时候我们可以脱离宇宙的因果结构（causal nexus）。范泰尔关于这一点的说明并不多，不过在他的讨论中却暗示了这观点，例如当他引用亚米念所否定的一段话：「一件事，从次等成因（second causes）的角度来看是自由的（contingent偶发的）；同时，从上帝预旨的角度来看，则是必然的（necessary）。」（CTK, 211）在这里亚米念所否定的，正是范氏明显地予以肯定的；换句话说，一个事件，根据上帝的预旨是被必然预定的（necessarily foreordained）；而同时，从它与「有限成因」的关系来看，也可以是自由和偶发的（free, contingent）。
Another difference between Van Til’s position and secular determinism lies in the distinction between primary and secondary causes. Van Til maintains that although we are never free from divine control, we are sometimes free from the “causal nexus” of the universe. This point is less explicit in Van Til, but it is implicit, for example, in a passage where he quotes Arminius as denying “that a thing which, in regard to second causes, is done contingently is said to be done necessarily in regard to the divine decree.” [CTK, 211 (emphasis by Van Til).] Evidently Van Til here intends to affirm what Arminius denies, namely, that events that are foreordained necessarily according to the divine decree may nevertheless be contingent (i.e., free, not determined) in relation to finite causes.
- 范泰尔颂扬（基督徒的）人的自由：自发性、自决性、动力
Van Til Celebrates (Christian) Human Freedom:
Spontaneity, Self-Determination, Momentum
借着摒弃决定论，范泰尔因此可以积极地坚持人的自由。他的自由观是非常健全的。举例来说，我们应该注意到，范泰尔一方面坚持上帝的国度是人最高的良善；另一方面，他说：「人的『伦理的理想』应该是自我实现的（self-realization）。」（CTETH, 44）「自我实现」的意思是「人必须努力锻炼（work out）自己的意志」（CTETH, 45），也就是说，人的意志「在他的反应上（reactivity）应该越来越有自发性（spontaneous）；……在他的自决性上（self-determination）应该越来越坚定（fixed）；……他的动力（momentum）应该越来越强。」（CTETH, 45）
By rejecting determinism, Van Til is able, positively, to maintain a robust view of human freedom. We should note, for example, that he sees no difficulty in maintaining both that the kingdom of God is man’s highest good, and that “the ethical ideal for man should be self-realization.” (CTETH, 44. The term self-realization comes from the idealist vocabulary, though of course in its broader context Van Til’s view is significantly different from idealism.) Self-realization means that “man must work out his own will.” [CTETH, 45 (emphasis by Van Til).] That means that man’s will must “become increasingly spontaneous in its reactivity … become increasingly fixed in its self-determination. … increase in momentum.” [CTETH, 45-46 (emphasis by Van Til). See also Van Til’s reference to the “spontaneity” of the biblical writers inspired by God in PDS, 25-26, and his account of the development of obedience in the Christian education of the young in ECE, 152-155.]
非常有意思！在这里，范泰尔并没有呼吁消除人的意志，反之，人的意志需要被强化。当然，他并不提倡人应该越来越任性、自私；也不是说人的意志应脱离被造的地位，从「依靠上帝」的情况中解放出来！更确切的说，范氏的意思是：人的灵魂应该越来越坚决委身于遵行上帝的旨意；而这个委身应该越来越自发、坚决，它的动力也应该越来越强。范泰尔的意思是：属灵的成熟，应带来更多内在的自我约束，并且越来越不需要外在的强迫。「在基督里长进」的意思是：我们变得越来越愿意遵行祂的旨意；我们的顺服越来越带着喜乐，也越来越成为我们内心的热望（passion of our heart）。遵行上帝的旨意成为我们的习惯（「习惯」一词的意思在这里是正面的）。上帝的成熟仆人，不需要被别人（父母亲、牧师或其他人）驱使，才追求上帝的义。他爱慕圣洁，并且在圣洁上不断地稳定成长。对范泰尔来说，人的自由，并不是一个与亚米念派人士辩论时迫不得已、勉强承认的概念；相反，人的自由，在基督徒的生活中，是一个事实，并且具有积极、实用的重要性！
Remarkably, here, Van Til calls for the strengthening of the human will, not its abolition. Of course, he is not advocating an increase of willfulness or selfishness, or an attempt to sever the will’s created dependence on God. Rather, he calls for an increase in the soul’s resolve to do God’s will. But that resolve is to become more and more spontaneous, fixed, and growing in momentum. What he means is that spiritual maturity brings more internal and less external constraint. Growing in Christ means that we become more and more willing to do his will; our obedience becomes more delightful, more the passion of our own heart. It becomes habitual, in a good sense. A mature servant of God does not need to be browbeaten (by parents, preachers, and others) into seeking God’s righteousness. He loves holiness and steadily increases in it. For Van Til, then, human freedom is not a concept grudgingly conceded in the debate with Arminians. It is a fact of positive and practical importance in the Christian life.
- 极端加尔文主义者和亚米念主义者的共同错误
Hyper-Calvinists and Arminians Both Mistaken
我们必须记住，对范泰尔来说，创造主和被造者之间的区别至为重要。很多时候，神学家们错误地假设：若我们把任何主权归给上帝，就必须剥夺人的自发性和自由。这是极端加尔文主义者（hyper-Calvinists）和亚米念主义者共同的错误。前者放弃了人的责任，以维护上帝的主权；后者则损害了上帝的主权，以维护人的责任。两者都没有想到，他们在这一点上，是把上帝和人视为同一等级的存有（a common scale of being）；以致任何被归给上帝的东西，都必须从人那里剥夺过来，人不可以拥有；反之亦然。
We should keep in mind here the importance that Van Til places on the Creator-creature distinction. Often, theologians assume that any sovereignty we ascribe to God must remove spontaneity and freedom from man. This is an error both of hyper-Calvinists, who compromise human responsibility in order to maintain divine sovereignty, and of Arminians, who do the reverse. Unwittingly, both hyper-Calvinists and Arminians at this point see God and man on a common scale of being, so that anything ascribed to God must be taken from man, and vice versa.
- 有些特权唯上帝独有；但有例外；《圣经》分辨两者
Some Prerogatives = Only God’s;
But There Are Exceptions; Bible Distinguishes Two
当然，有一些特权是上帝独有的，例如唯有上帝有权接受被造者的敬拜；也只有祂有终极的权利收取人的性命。当我们把这些权利归给上帝时，等于否定人能拥有这些权利。可是我们要谨慎，不可将这样的推论应用在神人关系的每一方面上。比方说，我们不应该假设：既然人的得救是上帝预定的，那么，人是否决志信主就无关紧要了。相反的，《圣经》说，人若想得救，必须要有信心。有时很明显地，上帝的第一因否定了被造者的因果性；可是有时候，上帝的第一因却支持了被造者的因果性。我们怎样知道甚么时候是否定？甚么时候是支持？答案很简单：《圣经》会告诉我们。
Certainly there are some prerogatives that belong exclusively to God, for example, the right to receive religious worship and the ultimate right to take human life. Ascribing these rights to God means denying them to man. But we must beware of applying such reasoning to all aspects of the divine-human relationship. For example, we should not assume that because salvation is foreordained by God, human decisions are of no consequence. The Bible says that human faith is necessary for salvation. Sometimes, evidently, God’s primary causality negates creaturely causality, but sometimes the former reinforces the latter. How can we tell when there is negation and when there is reinforcement? The answer is simply that the Bible tells us.
- 作者与小说的比喻
The Author and Novel Illustration
第一因可以「否定」或「支持」次等成因，是因为上帝与世界并不存在于同一个存有等级上。上帝所作的（God’s agency），不一定会消灭人所作的（human agency）。实存（reality）有两个不同的层次：创造主的和被造者的。宇宙里也有两个不同的因果层次（levels of causality）：上帝所导致的成因（第一因）和宇宙中的被造物所导致的成因。多数的事件，都是既有第一因，也有次等成因；但是，上帝当然「也可随己意，『不用』次因、『超乎』次因或『背乎』次因，自由行事。」（《威敏斯特信仰告白》，5:3。）
Primary causes can either negate or reinforce secondary causes because God and the world are not on a common scale of being. It is not the case that divine agency always eliminates human agency. There are two distinct levels of reality: that of the Creator and that of the creature. There are also two distinct levels of causality: divine causation and causation from within the world. Most events have both primary and secondary causes, but God may, of course, work “without, above, and against” (Westminster Confession of Faith, 5:3.) the secondary causes at his pleasure.
也许下面的比喻是最好的（范泰尔没有用这个比喻，是Vern Poythress向我建议的）：在一本精心设计的小说里，作者会创造一个世界，所有的事件都在这世界里发生，每一个事件彼此间也含有意味深长的因果关系。在小说的世界里，每一个事件都有可以理解的成因。但是，每一件事都还有一个更高的「因」，这个「因」存在于作者的思想里。在一般的情况下，作者会维持他创造的世界的秩序和因果结构。当然，他也可以任随己意，「不用」这个因果秩序、「超乎」这个因果秩序或「背乎」它来自由行事。不过，一般说来，当一个作者混乱了小说中的因果结构时，故事的叙述就不容易令读者感到满意。文学评论家会批评这样的作者强词夺理。
Perhaps the best illustration (though Van Til does not use it – it was suggested to me by Vern Poythress) is this: In a well-crafted novel, the author creates a world in which events take place in meaningful causal relationships to one another. Each event has an intelligible cause within the world of the novel. But of course each event also has a higher cause, in the author’s mind. Normally, such an author will try to maintain the orderly causal structure of his created universe. He may, of course, also work “without, above, and against” that causal order when he is pleased to do so. Usually, however, when an author disrupts the causal order of his novel, the narrative becomes less satisfying. Critics accuse such an author of bringing things about by a deus ex machina.
因为真神是无限智慧的，当祂放松世界里的因果规律时，不但不会破坏祂剧本（计划）的力量，反而藉此更加彰显祂的大能。当然，上帝与宇宙的关系还有一方面与「小说－作者」的比喻不同：上帝创造的世界是真实的，不是虚构的。不过两者也有相同点，两者都有两层不同的因果等级。我们可以这样说，在正常的情况之下，世界里的事件都有两套必要条件（necessary conditions）和两套充份条件（sufficient conditions）。
Because the true God is infinitely wise, his relaxations of causal regularity in the world do not corrupt, but enhance, the power of his drama. And, of course, in the case of God there is also the difference that his creation is real, not fictional. But the two cases are parallel in that in each there are two levels of causality. We may put it this way: normally, events in the world have two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions.
中华网络圣约学院ccnci.org；中华展望圣约学院 [email protected]（PayPal）
因此，范泰尔的「二圈思维的形而上学」──就是他对创造主和被造物的区分，使他可以同时坚持上帝的主权，又坚持人的自由。
Thus, it is Van Til’s “two-circle metaphysics,” his distinction between Creator and creature, that enables him to have a strong doctrine of divine sovereignty together with a strong doctrine of human freedom.
- 「上帝的主权」是「人的责任」的基础
Sovereignty of God = Foundation for Human Responsibility
范泰尔也处理了人的道德责任问题。他的论点是：人的道德责任与上帝的主权不仅一致，而且前者是建立在后者的基础上！除非上帝的旨意是完全自我决定的（self-determinative），否则从某一个程度来说，世界一定是由机率（chance）所控制。因此：
Van Til also addresses the moral responsibility of man. He argues that it is not only consistent with, but actually based upon, divine sovereignty. Unless God’s will is utterly self-determinative, the world is controlled to some extent by chance. Therefore:
身为基督徒，我们坚持，上帝的绝对旨意若不存在，人的决定性经验不可能有任何前进的目标，不可能按照任何计划运作，甚至乎不可能发生。
As Christians we hold that determinate human experience could work to no end, could work in accordance with no plan, and could not even get under way, if it were not for the existence of the absolute will of God.
因为这缘故，我们坚持，上帝的绝对旨意是人的意志的前提（译者按：先决条件）。从这个角度来看，一个绝对掌权的上帝，表面上是拦阻人负责任的最大障碍，但其实，这正是人有可能有道德责任的基础（DF2, 62 = DF4, 84-85；参CGG, 140）。
It is on this ground then that we hold to the absolute will of God as the presupposition of the will of man. Looked at in this way, that which to many seems at first glance to be the greatest hindrance to moral responsibility, namely the conception of an absolutely sovereign God, becomes the very foundation of its possibility. (DF2, 62 = DF4, 84-85; cf CGG, 140.)
[ CTETH = Christian Theistic Ethics ]
[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
[ CTK = A Christian Theory of Knowledge ]
[ PDS = The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture ]
[ ECE = Essays on Christian Education ]
[ CGG = Common Grace and the Gospel ]
EVIL
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 6, pp. 83-86.)
- 上帝的主权凌驾罪与邪恶：加尔文：上帝容许罪恶？
God Is Sovereign Over Sin and Evil: Calvin: Permissive Will?
从范泰尔的观点来看，上帝的主权范围包括了所有事物，因此，也包括邪恶与罪。上帝不为罪负责，可是我们必须否认有任何事能够不本于祂（in spite of him）或回避祂的永恒计划(in circumvention of his purpose)而独立发生(IST, 248=IST2, 391)。在讨论这方面的问题时，他经常引用加尔文驳斥Pighius（皮吉乌斯）的论文《论上帝永恒的预定》，其中说到，上帝的预旨「是包括罪恶这个事实，也容许罪恶这个事实」（IST, 248 = IST2, 391）。按照范泰尔的看法，我们可以「用『上帝的容许(permissive will of God)』这个观念，来强调人绝对要为罪负责。可是在应用此一观点时，我们绝不可推翻《圣经》清楚的教导：上帝拥有掌控万事的终极权能──即使这权能是一个奥秘。」(IST, 175)
On Van Til’s view, divine sovereignty extends to all things, and therefore also to evil and sin. God is not responsible for sin, but we should deny “that anything happens in spite of him and in circumvention of his purpose.” (IST, 248 = IST2, 391.) In this connection he often refers to Calvin’s polemic against Pighius in his treatise The Eternal Predestination of God. God’s decree “is inclusive and permissive of the fact of sin.” (IST, 248 = IST2, 391.) According to Van Til, we may “speak of the permissive will of God in order to stress man’s undoubted responsibility for sin, but this distinction may never lead to subversion of the clear teaching of Scripture on the all-controlling if ultimate and mysterious power of God.” (IST, 175.)
- 范泰尔：邪恶的存在是奥秘；自由意志并非绝对；邪恶不是幻觉；上帝并非无能
Van Til: Evil = Mystery; Free Will Not Ultimate; Evil is Not Unreal; God is Not Weak
「一个良善、完全掌管一切的上帝，怎可能在祂创造的宇宙中容许、甚至预定邪恶？」范泰尔回应这一类有关邪恶的问题时，「奥秘」是一个很重要的观念。因为范泰尔坚持圣经对「上帝主权」的教导，他就不能诉诸人的自由意志来为上帝「辩护」，也不
能用「邪恶并不是真的」或「上帝是软弱无能的」等论调来回应。可以确定的是，他
对这一类问题发表的言论不多；可是我认为，他已经说明了每一个最根本、最重要的
观念：
“Mysterious” is the operative word to describe Van Til’s response to the “problem of evil,” the question of how a good, all-powerful God could permit or even foreordain the presence of evil in his creation. Because of his biblical view of divine sovereignty, he is unable to “defend” God by appealing to human free will, the unreality of evil, the weakness of God, etc. Positively, he says relatively little about the problem, but I think he says everything that is essential:
基督徒如此宣称（基督徒回应「邪恶」此一问题的基本立场，是符合他的良心），因为他是按照他的基本预设来解释他的道德良心，正如他也是以此来解释他所有的经历一样。他知道审判全地的主一定行事正直。所有关于邪恶和罪的事实与难题，都从《圣经》的事迹（上帝的救赎计划）里得到它们的意义和真正的解决。基督徒的良心所作的是非判断，都从圣经事迹里──也惟独从圣经事迹里──取得它们的意义（DF2, 218 = DF4, 305, #5a; DF2, 213-216）。
The Christian claims this [with respect to the problem of evil his position is in accord with conscience] because he interprets his moral consciousness, as an aspect of his total experience, in terms of his presuppositions. He knows that the judge of all the earth must do right. All the facts and problems of evil and sin take their meaning from and find their solution in terms of the story of Scripture. The approvals and disapprovals of his conscience take their meaning from this story and from this story alone. (DF2, 218 = DF4, 305, #5a; cf. the argument with Montague on pp. 213-216.)
- 批判：非基督徒不能分辨善恶；或说：善不可能胜利
Critique: Non-Christian Cannot Distinguish Good/Evil; Or Good Cannot Triumph
范泰尔接着批判非基督徒对邪恶的宣称：非基督徒不能分辨善恶；或者，如果他能分辨，他不可能盼望善会得胜。「那些自认为是『良善』的人，只能透过『压制他人所认为的良善』，才能使全地被他们所认为的善所说服；而那些被压制的人，也会认为自己才是『良善』的。如此一来，政治的权势将永远取代所有伦理的区分。」(DF2, 218 = DF4, 306)这一段话，仿佛是范泰尔针对后现代主义、解构主义和「政治正确(political correctness)」等当代运动所发出的预言。这些潮流尝试将所有的道德论述相对化，同时又试图要求别人遵从他们的道德价值观。当他们宣称「所有其他人的价值观都是相对的」之时，他们却视自己的价值观是绝对的 [范氏分别称这两种想法为
「非理性主义」和「理性主义」，参本书（CVT）第17章]，而且还会用粗暴的权力
逼人服从。
He adds a reductio of non-Christian claims about evil: either the non-Christian cannot distinguish good from evil, or, if he can, he cannot hope that good will triumph: “If those who think they are good succeed in making what they think is ‘good’ to prevail upon earth, it can only be the suppression of the ‘good’ of others who also think they are ‘good.’ Thus power politics would forever replace all ethical distinctions.” (DF2, 218 = DF4, 306.) This passage is almost prophetic of postmodernism, deconstruction, and the “political correctness” movements today, which relativize all moral discourse while seeking to require everybody to conform to their values. They claim that everybody else’s values are relative, while theirs are absolute [Van Til’s “irrationalism” and “rationalism,” respectively. See chap. 17 (CVT).], and theirs are to be enforced by raw power.
下面是范泰尔对邪恶问题的另一个回应：
Here is another response by Van Til to the problem of evil:
- 上帝用最好的方法达成祂的目标：最好的方法就是上帝选用的方法
God Uses Best Means to End: Best Means = Means God Chooses to Use
基督徒的神义论（「神义论」意指「上帝的义」，这是指任何就「邪恶的问题」而提出的解释方案…）…必须以一个预设为起始点，那就是：上帝是自足的（self-sufficient）。一个自足的上帝，掌控万事，因而知道万事，理所当然能用最好的方法达到祂的目标。可是甚么是最好的方法呢？就是上帝喜悦、认为适用的方法。既然是上帝所喜悦使用的方法，它们有可能是人的理性不能理解、不能测透的。约伯受苦的原因，是他完全不能明白的。…唯有当他完全将自己降服在上帝主权的手中时，他才找到了问题的答案。诚然，上帝的智慧显明在宇宙中，人可以知道其中的一部分。可是，上帝的确在某种程度上隐藏了自己，没有人可以试图用自己设定的标准来赞同或谴责圣洁上帝的作为。因此，改革宗神学的神义论，与天主教和亚米念主义的神义论非常不同。（IST, 237-238 = IST2, 376-377。参John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 149-190。中译：《卫道学概论》。）
A Christian theodicy (theodicy means “justification of God.” It refers to any attempted solution to the problem of evil. Van Til does not distinguish between “theodicy” and “defense,” as do such writers as Alvin Plantinga.) … will need to start frankly from the presupposition of the self-sufficient God. It goes without saying that this self-sufficient God, who controls all things and knows all things because he controls them, can use the best means to attain his end. But what are the best means? They are those that God sees fit to use. And since they are those that God sees fit to use they may be wholly beyond the reach of human understanding. It was wholly beyond Job’s understanding to know why he should suffer. … He found the solution only when finally he surrendered himself fully into the hands of the sovereign God. To be sure, the wisdom of God appears in the world, and man can see something of it. Yet it remains true that God is a God that hideth himself, and no man should essay to approve or condemn the deeds of the Holy One by standards of his own devising. The Reformed “theodicy” is therefore quite different form the Romanist and Arminian. (IST, 237-238 = IST2, 376-377. For an expansion of this “Jobian” response to the problem of evil, see John Frame, AGG, 149-190.)
- 邪恶的存在是奥秘；范泰尔运用「终极成因」和「近因」；
傅兰姆认为不妥当
Evil = Mystery; Van Til’s Use of “Ultimate/Proximate” Causes
Not Successful (Frame)
归根究底，范泰尔的神义论诉诸上帝的奥秘和智慧。上帝有答案，可是祂并没有选择向我们启示它，至少没有完全地启示。我们的思维必须降服在祂的启示之下；当上帝沉默时，我们也应当沉默。
Essentially, Van Til’s theodicy is an appeal to God’s inscrutable wisdom. God has the answer, but he has not chosen to reveal it to us, at least not comprehensively. Our thinking must be subject to his revelation, and where that revelation is silent, we must be silent as well.
有一次，范氏显然想进一步去诉诸上帝的奥秘。当他回应Buswell（奥利弗·巴斯韦尔James Oliver Buswell, Jr.（1895 年 1 月 16 日 – 1977 年 2 月 4 日）是一位原教旨主义长老会教育家和机构建设者。）的批判时，他引用了加尔文《论上帝的永恒预定》。在该篇论文中，加尔文试图证明绝对的上帝不是罪的创造者，亦不需要为罪负责。加尔文的论点是：上帝是罪行的终极成因（ultimate cause），而罪人自己则是罪的近因（proximate causes）。范泰尔在这里花了不少篇幅引用加尔文和贺治的话，并且同意他们的看法（DF2, 183-187）。虽然这种处理邪恶问题的进路，有改革宗传统的渊源，我却认为它终究是不能令人满意的。我看不出来，为甚么单单因为上帝不是近因，就能解除祂和罪的关系，而不需要为罪负责。如果我雇用A君杀B君，我与A君同样有罪，不是吗？「间接」这种方式，并不能将谋杀的罪责从我身上除去。对上帝来说，不也是一样吗？一般说来，改革宗神学的看法认为，上帝向我们启示的准则，是反映出祂本性的准则；虽然在某些情况里，上帝有一些特权是我们人没有的。显然，在这个情况（邪恶）下，祂有这些特权！可是祂在这件事上，又没有向人启示些甚么。
At one point, Van Til appears to go beyond this appeal to mystery. Replying to Buswell’s criticism, he cites Calvin’s treatise On the Eternal Predestination of God, in which Calvin claims to absolve God from the charge of being the author of sin (theologians rarely define “author of sin.” Although they always insist that the phrase does not apply to God. That creates confusion, especially between Calvinists and Arminians. I take it to mean “doer of sin,” with some note of “commending sin.”). Calvin’s argument is that God is the “ultimate” cause of sinful acts, while the wicked themselves are the “proximate” causes. Van Til quotes Calvin and Hodge at length in this connection, and with approval. (DF2, 183-187.) Although this approach to the problem of evil has some roots in Reformed tradition, I believe it is ultimately unsuccessful. I do not see how God is absolved from complicity in evil merely because his causality is once removed from the event. If I hire A to kill B, I am as responsible as A, am I not? The indirectness of my murder does not remove the guilt from me. Is it different with God? Normally, on a Reformed view of the matter, the standards that God reveals to us are standards that reflect his own nature, though there are some cases where he has prerogatives and rights that we do not have. Evidently he has such rights in this case. But he has revealed little or nothing to us in this connection.
至终，邪恶再一次被归结为「奥秘」。终极成因和近因的区分并没有解决问题。范泰尔若只提出约伯的神义论，可能更为妥当。
In the end, the matter resolves again into mystery. The proximate-ultimate distinction does not help. Van Til would have been better off to stick with his Jobian theodicy.
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]
[ AGG = John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God ]
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