第十章 预设（前提）的问题
PRESUPPOSITIONS
IS VAN TIL A PRESUPPOSITIONALIST?
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 10, pp. 131-136.)
有些读者或会觉得奇怪，本书前面九章完全没有集中讨论「预设」（前提）这个观念，但对范泰尔护教学最普遍的称谓，却是「预设主义」（前提派），不是吗？
Some readers will be amazed that nine chapters of this book have passed without any concentrated attention being given to the concept of presupposition. After all, the most common name given to Van Til’s apologetic is “presuppositionalist.”
- 范泰尔很少自称预设主义者（前提派）
Van Til Seldom Designate Himself Presuppositionalist
其实范泰尔本人很少用「预设主义」（前提派）这个观念。首先，他没有标榜自己的护教学为「预设（前提）派」，虽然他有时并不介意别人这样称呼他的护教学。……
Van Til himself used the concept rather sparingly. For one thing, he did not voluntarily characterize his apologetic as “presuppositionalist,” although he did sometimes accommodate the use of that term by others. In discussing Floyd Hamilton’s critique of his apologetics, he uses the term, sometimes in quotes, sometimes without, to allude to Hamilton’s phraseology. (CTK, 255-272.) He uses it similarly in connection with James Oliver Buswell, (CTK, 273-309) who claimed to have invented it to describe Van Til’s position. (CTK, 276.)
- 哲学历史中的先验和后验
A Priori and A Posteriori in the History of Philosophy
说起来，若论及此一概念的历史，将范泰尔称为「预设派」可能会有些许误导。这个历史可以简短总结为：自从古希腊以来，西方的哲学家一直关注先验（a priori）与后验（a posteriori）知识之间的关系。[比较本书（CVT）第5章「宇宙中的事实与定律」的相关讨论。] 后验的知识乃是从经验吸取的知识；先验的知识则独立于经验之外，不靠经验而得。先验的知识会被我们带入经验当中，用以分析和评价我们的经验。
For another thing, it is somewhat misleading to call Van Til a presuppositionalist, in view of the history of the concept. To summarize that history briefly: Western philosophers since the ancient Greeks have been concerned with the relationship between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. [Compare this discussion with the discussion of laws and facts in chap. 5 (CVT). The same fundamental issues are found here, but with different terminology.] A posteriori knowledge is knowledge gained from experience. A priori knowledge is knowledge possessed independently of experience – that knowledge which we bring to our experience in order to analyze and evaluate it.
- 先验的意义：独立于经验之外，不是时间上的先前
The Priority of A Priori Not Temporal Priority: Independence of Experience
[先验的意思是「从先前而来」，听起来像是时间上的先前。有些哲学家宣称，婴孩生来就有先验的知识，也许是「种子」的形式。可是先验知识并不一定在时间上先于经验。重要的是，先验知识相对于经验是独立的，它是分析经验和评价经验的准则。我们对「预设」也必须如此理解。预设不是在我们相信任何事物之前（时间上的「之前」）必须先有的信念；确切地说，预设乃是独立于其他知识的信念，并且在某程度上左右其他的知识。不少范泰尔的批判者并没有掌握这一点。]
[A priori means literally “from before,” suggesting temporal priority. Some philosophers may have claimed that infants are born with a priori knowledge, perhaps in “seed form.” But a priori knowledge does not necessarily precede experience in time. The important thing is that a priori knowledge is independent of experience, and that it serves as a criterion for analyzing and/or evaluating it. The same point must be made regarding presuppositions. A presupposition is not a belief that one must have before (temporally speaking) one comes to believe in other things; rather, it is a belief that is independent of some other knowledge and governs that knowledge to some extent. Many critics of Van Til have erred at this point.]
- 后验的哲学家：洛克等
Philosophers of A Posteriori: Locke et al
有些哲学家的论调是：我们所有的知识都是后验的，人的心智开始时像白纸一张（blank slate──洛克），要让经验书写于其上。但是我们知道有些知识确实不是从经验而来，例如「二乘二等于四」这个命题，在宇宙中任何一个地方都是必然的；然而，这个命题却不像是可以从经验中导出的结果。
Some philosophers have tried to make the case that all our knowledge is a posteriori – that the mind begins as a “blank slate” (Locke) to be written on by experience. But we know some things that do not seem to be derived from experience. For example, the proposition that two times two is four – necessarily and everywhere in the universe – does not seem to be derivable from any experience.
- 先验的哲学家：柏拉图等
Philosophers of A Priori: Plato et al
又有些哲学家，如柏拉图和Gordon Clark，宣称所有知识都是先验的，意指我们的经验不能带来真知识，最多只能提醒我们天生就已经知道的事情。但这种宣称似乎赋予心智绝对的自由，使理性免去「符合我们共有经验」的责任。
Others, like Plato, and perhaps Gordon Clark, have claimed that all knowledge is a priori, and that experience gives us no real knowledge, but at best reminds us of what we know innately. But such a claim seems to give the mind free rein, removing its responsibility to conform itself to the world of our common experience.
- 先验与后验兼顾的哲学家：亚理斯多德等
Philosophers Blending A Priori and A Posteriori: Aristotle et al
很多哲学家介于两种极端之间，如亚理斯多德，他们的立场是：人的知识具有先验和后验两种元素。经验是知识的必要成份，但是经验必须被概念化、被分析，并且根据人类心智中已有的先验观念，才能加以有系统的阐述。然而，事实却证明，我们却很难将意识中的「纯」先验元素与「纯」后验元素区分开来，原因在本书（CVT）第五章讨论过。
Many philosophers in between these extremes, such as Aristotle, have argued that knowledge has both a priori and a posteriori elements. Experience is a necessary ingredient in knowledge, but that experience must be conceptualized, analyzed, and formulated by a priori concepts already in the mind. However, it has proved very difficult to distinguish purely a priori elements from purely a posteriori elements in our consciousness, for reasons such as those discussed in chapter 5 (CVT).
无论如何，先验知识（独立于经验之外而又左右经验）这个观念，自古以来就是哲学讨论的课题。而「预设」这个名词，虽然近两个世纪才为哲学家们普遍使用，但却吸收了许多哲学家在讨论先验时试图关注的意义。
In any case, the notion of a priori knowledge, gained to some extent independently of experience and governing experience, has been a staple of philosophical discussion for centuries. The term presupposition, although its common philosophical use dates back two centuries, captures much of the meaning that philosophers have sought to include under the label a priori.
- 康德反对休谟的经验主义和莱布尼兹的理性主义
发展超验哲学（探索知识的条件）
Immanuel Kant vs. Hume’s Empiricism and Leibniz’s Rationalism;
Develops Transcendental Method (Conditions of Knowledge)
康德（1724-1804）所面对的困扰是：强调后验知识的经验主义 （empiricism）导致了休谟笔下的怀疑主义（skepticism）；强调先验知识的理性主义 （rationalism）又导致莱布尼兹和其他哲学家笔下毫无经验基础的无理据思辨。康德发展出超验方法论（transcendental method）来取代实验主义与理性主义。[范泰尔也把他的方法称为「超验」（SCE,10-13），我将会把此一概念与范氏「支援基督教的论证」放在一起讨论，特别是在本书（CVT）第23章。]
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was troubled that empiricism (emphasizing a posteriori knowledge) was leading to skepticism in the writings of David Hume, while rationalism (emphasizing a priori knowledge) was, in the writings of G.W. Leibniz and others, producing implausible speculations without any grounding in experience. As an alternative to both empiricism and rationalism, Kant developed a “transcendental method.” [Van Til also called his method “transcendental” (SCE, 10-13). I shall discuss that concept in connection with his “Argument for Christianity,” especially in chap. 23 (CVT).]
与经验主义者一样，康德否认我们无需透过经验就能拥有世界本身（in itself）的先验知识。不过他也同意理性主义的说法：如果我们想要理解经验，那么，我们必须首先具备某种先验的知识；并且，借着提出「意义与合理性（rationality）的先决条件是甚么？」此一问题，这种先验知识就能够「超验」地被发现。换言之，即使知识是可能的，那么，甚么是必须先被我们预设为「真」的呢？康德的结论是：我们必须对时间、空间和一些范畴（例如一、众、因、果等等）作出某些假设──这些范畴会被人的心智应用在经验上。
Like the empiricists, Kant denied that we have a priori knowledge of the world “in itself” apart from our experience. But he also agreed with the rationalists that some kind of a priori knowledge was necessary if we are to make any sense out of experience. That a priori knowledge was discovered “transcendentally,” that is, by asking, What are the preconditions of meaning and rationality? Granting that knowledge is possible, in other words, what must we presuppose to be true? Kant concluded that we must make certain assumptions about space and time and about the “categories” (unity, plurality, cause, effect, etc.) that the mind applies to experience.
- 康德之后的理想主义（唯心哲学）
Idealism After Kant
德国的理想（唯心）主义（Fichte、Schelling、黑格尔）和英国的理想主义（Green, Bradley, Bosanquet）继承了康德的超验方法，可是他们对知识的先决条件（preconditions）却持有不同的结论。在理想主义的作品中，预设变成了一个常见的哲学名词。范泰尔的博士论文主题是讨论「理想主义的上帝观」；因此，「预设」一词无疑是借用自理想主义，虽然范氏对理想主义本身大致上是采取严厉批判的态度。
Idealism in Germany (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) and Britain (Green, Bradley, Bosanquet) continued Kant’s transcendental approach, although it reached different conclusions about the preconditions of knowledge. It was in the idealist literature that presupposition became a common philosophical term. Van Til wrote his doctoral dissertation on the idealist concept of God, and, doubtless, picked up the term from that school of thought, even though he was very critical of idealism in general.
- 重视预设的20世纪哲学家
20th Century Philosophers Who Place Premium on Presuppositions
虽然理想主义对二十世纪哲学的影响已经渐趋式微，但无论有否使用「预设」这个字眼，其他学派仍然注重此一观念在人类知识中的重要性。现象学者和存在主义学者强调「生命世界」（life world）的重要性；这个生命世界就是指日常生活经验的世界，它为纯理论的活动提供了预设。
Through the twentieth century, idealist influence on philosophy has waned, but others have emphasized the importance of presuppositions in human knowledge, with or without using the term. Phenomenologists and existentialists have emphasized the importance of the “life world,” the world of ordinary experience, which supplies the presuppositions for theoretical activity.
维根斯坦说，接受「某种生活形式」（form of life）或「语言游戏」（language game）乃是先于接受「那种生活形式或语言游戏中的知识」。科学哲学家们经常强调科学理论的预设，例如博蓝尼（Michael Polanyi）的「默认知识」（tacit knowledge）和孔恩
（Thomas Kuhn）的「典范」（paradigms）。
Ludwig Wittgenstein taught that acceptance of a “form of life” or “language game” was prior to knowledge of anything within that form of life or language game. Philosophers of science have often emphasized the presuppositions of scientific theorizing: e.g., Michael Polanyi’s “tacit knowledge” and Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigms.”
马克思主义者则坚持「委身于一个『生命计划』或『实践』（praxis）」要先于所有的理论。
Marxists have insisted that commitment to a certain life-project or praxis is prior to all theorizing.
有些诠释理论学者强调「『先』委身于一个故事（story）」的必要性。解构主义学者发现，人类沟通中存在着太多偏见，因此，在批判他们的人看来，他们完全否认「语言具有客观内容」的可能性，因而把语言完全约化为「预设的断言」。
Some hermeneutical theorists have emphasized the need of prior commitment to a “story.” And deconstructionists have found so much bias in human communication that, in the view of their critics, they have entirely denied the possibility of objective content in language, reducing language entirely to the assertion of presuppositions.
- 每一位哲学家都必须处理预设的问题，包括范泰尔或证据派的护教学家
Every Philosopher Must Deal with Presupposition, Including Van Til
显然，二十世纪中每一位称职的护教家都要严肃处理「预设」这个概念，将预设和其他方面的人类知识区分出来，也要将自己的观点和所有其他存在的可能性区分出来。范泰尔接受了这个任务。不过，从这个角度来看，范泰尔与其他护教家（包括证据派和古典派）并没有甚么两样。
Clearly, then, any twentieth-century apologist worth his salt would have to deal in a serious way with the concept of presupposition, distinguishing it from other aspects of human knowledge, and distinguishing his own view from the many other possibilities available. Van Til undertook this task, but in this respect he was no different form many other apologists, even from many who would prefer to be called “evidentialists” or “classicists.”
- 多马．瑞德的「常识实在论」影响史鲍尔的古典派护教学
Thomas Reid’s Common Sense Realism Influences Sproul’s Classical Apologetics
[多马‧瑞德（Thomas Reid）是「常识实在论」（commonsense realism）的创始人，他
认为哲学必须作出一些常识上的预设，并且从严格意义上来讲，这些预设是不可证明的，例如感知经验的可靠性、外在世界的真实性等。瑞德的思想成为老普林斯顿学派（Old Princeton；译注：如贺治Charles Hodge、华尔非德B. B. Warfield）护教学的基础，也以各种方式反映在当今福音派的护教学中。
[Thomas Reid, the nineteenth-century founder of the school of philosophy called Scottish commonsense realism, argued that philosophy must make certain commonsense assumptions that are not strictly provable, such as the reliability of sense experience and the reality of the world external to ourselves. Reid’s thinking became the basis of the “Old Princeton” apologetic, and it is reflected in many forms of evangelical apologetics today.
参阅R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, Arthur Lindsley等人的古典主义护教学的著作，都采用这种预设基础。我个人认为，他们远不如范泰尔那么清楚「预设」在护教论证中如何运作。]
See appendix A, in which I indicate that the book Classical Apologetics, by R.C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984) claims this kind of presuppositional basis. In my estimation, however, they are far less sophisticated than Van Til in their account of how presuppositions function in apologetic argument.]
无疑地，一个人对「知识的先决条件」的关怀，不能成为他被称为「预设派」的正当理由。
Certainly, one’s concern for the preconditions of knowledge does not in itself justify one’s being labeled a presuppositonalist.
- 预设主义 = 先验主义？范泰尔不是这种预设派！
Presuppositionalism = A Priorism?
Van Til is Not Presuppositionalist in This Sense
「预设主义」这个标签或许有「先验主义」的意味：若不是否定后验知识，就是相对贬低后验知识的重要性。从这个意义上来说，Gordon Clark肯定是一位预设主义者，他也喜欢被贴上这样的标签，他否认人可以从感知经验中学到任何事物。可是，范泰尔并不是这个意义上的预设主义者，范氏肯定经验性的、有事实根据的研究，并且相信有事实证据的研究对于护教学相当重要。[参本书（CVT）第四部份「支援基督教的论证」18-24章。另参IST, 146-147; SCE, 7-13。] 他的立场大致如下：
That label may connote a kind of apriorism, which either denies a posteriori knowledge or minimizes its importance relative to the a priori. Gordon H. Clark was certainly a presuppositionalist in this sense, and he welcomed that label. He denied that anything could be learned from sense experience. But Van Til was not an apriorist in this sense. He approved of empirical, factual study and believed that the study of factual evidence was important to apologetics. [See our later discussion of Van Til’s “Argument for Christianity” (CVT, pt. 4, chaps. 18-24). Some references on this point are IST, 146-147; SCE, 7-13.] In general, he took this position:
我不会人为地将归纳法（induction）与演绎法（deduction）分开；也不会将「对自然事实的推理」和「用先验分析的方式推理人意识的本质」这两件事情分开。我不会人为地将它们彼此抽离或分隔。相反，我认为归纳法与分析推理是同一个解释过程的一部份。[DF1, 258。范泰尔随后为「历史性的护教学」予以认可，并提出警告，他认为，关于「事实」的讨论，应该要包括「向非信徒看待『事实』的哲学（philosophy of fact）发出挑战」。]
I do not artificially separate induction from deduction, or reasoning about the facts of nature from reasoning in a priori analytical fashion about the nature of human consciousness. I do not artificially abstract or separate them from one another. On the contrary I see induction and analytical reasoning as part of one process of interpretation. (DF1, 258. This is followed by an endorsement of “historical apologetics,” with the caveat that discussions of fact should include challenges to the unbeliever’s philosophy of fact.)
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范泰尔甚至说（不是最谨慎的说法），人类「必须拒绝一切形式的先验推理，重新开始把自己建立在上帝的启示上。」（IST, 170，对Clark的回应。正如我们所见，范泰尔回应Clark的时候容易失去平衡。显然，范氏在这里应该反对的不是先验思维本身，而是先验主义的知识论、对后验知识立场的否认、或离开上帝启示的先验推理法。）
He even said, with somewhat less balance, that human beings “must reject every form of a priori reasoning and base themselves upon the revelation of God from the start.” (IST, 170, in response to Clark. As we have seen, Van Til tended to “lose his balance” when he dealt with Clark. Surely he should have objected here, not to a priori reasoning as such, but to apriorism as a theory of knowledge, to the denial of a posteriori knowledge, or to a priori reasoning apart from revelation.)
- 范泰尔支持证据与预设、多元视角
Van Til Supports Evidence and Presupposition, Multiperspectivalism
我们已经看见，范泰尔的知识论是多元视角的（multiperspectival）：他试图在事实与定律之间取得平衡，也就是在上帝话语的启示、上帝作为的启示和上帝同在的启示之间取得平衡。他整理出从上帝、从世界与从人自己所得的关于上帝、世界与人自己的启示，并且发现它们之间相互依赖（interdependent）。在类似的架构下，我们看见范泰尔也试图在知识的先验元素与后验元素之间取得平衡。三一真神不只是一，也不只是三，而是永远的三而一（three in one）。因此，被造的宇宙是一而众（unity in plurality）、定律中的事实（fact in law）、事实中的定律（law in fact）。纯粹的先验和纯粹的后验并不存在。单单寻找任何一面都是枉然、敬拜偶像的，因为所寻找的目标是离开上帝的绝对准则。因此，预设主义若意味着先验主义，那么，范泰尔就不是一位预设主义者。
As we have seen, Van Til’s epistemology is multiperspectival: it seeks a balance between facts and laws, a balance between revelation in word, act, and divine presence. He coordinates revelation from and about God, the world, and the self, and he finds them interdependent. Similarly, we see in this context that Van Til seeks a balance between a priori and a posteriori elements in knowledge. The Trinity is not a mere oneness or a mere threeness, but always three in one. So the creation is unity in plurality, fact in law, law in fact. There is no pure a priori or pure a posteriori. The search for either is fruitless and idolatrous, being the search for an absolute criterion apart from God. Therefore, if presuppositionalism denotes apriorism, Van Til is not a presuppositionalist.
- 「范泰尔是预设派」的意义
In What Sense Van Til is a Presuppositionalist
然而，从另一个意义上来讲，范泰尔可以被称为预设主义者。他毫无疑问地相信上帝的启示是所有人类思维的绝对权威（因此也优先于人类思维）。我们已经看见，他的「类比知识观」要求我们「效法上帝的思维而思维」。我们也看见，在范泰尔眼中，启示必须是我们生命所有范畴中终极的真理准则。
However, Van Til may be called a presuppositionalist in another sense. Certainly he believed that God’s revelation has absolute authority (and thus a certain priority) over all human thought. We have seen that his concept of analogical knowledge requires us to “think God’s thoughts after him.” We have seen that, in Van Til’s view, revelation must serve as our ultimate criterion of truth in all areas of life.
在某种意义上，这个启示赐给我们一先验的知识，它左右我们对经验的解释，这也是先验知识的传统功能之一。但有些启示，我们是从经验（后验）当中去发现的，这一点和传统上对先验知识的理解不同。我们透过阅读《圣经》（在圣灵的光照之下）、并透过观察上帝在宇宙中和在我们身上的创造作为来认识祂，也就是说，我们是透过经验来领受启示。因此，范泰尔才能够在前面的引文中，以鲜明的对比来描述「先验思维」与「以上帝启示为根基的思维」。
This revelation is given to us a priori, in a sense. It governs our interpretation of experience, and that is one traditional function of a priori knowledge. But we discover it partly through our experience, unlike a priori knowledge in the traditional sense. We learn about God by reading the Bible (under the illumination of the Holy Spirit) and by observing his handiwork in creation and in ourselves. That is, we receive revelation through experience. This is why Van Til is able, in the previously quoted passage, to draw a sharp contrast between a priori reasoning and basing ourselves upon the revelation of God.
因此，我们可以称范泰尔为预设派，也可以不这么称呼他。但更重要的是要去明白，范泰尔在甚么意义上肯定了传统哲学上的先验主义，又在甚么意义上拒绝了它。
So, we may or may not choose to call Van Til a presuppositionalist. But it is more important in either case to understand in what ways Van Til affirms, and in what ways he rejects, traditional apriorism.
[ CTK = A Christian Theory of Knowledge ]
[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]
[ SCE = A Survey of Christian Epistemology ]
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
[ DF1 = The Defense of the Faith, 1st edition ]
THE MEANING OF PRESUPPOSITION
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 10, pp. 136-137.)
- 心中的坚持（委身）──傅兰姆
Heart Commitment – Frame
范泰尔使用「预设」一词，来指明上帝的启示在人类思维中应当扮演的角色。我相信他从来没有为「预设」下过定义。我尝试替他下这个定义：「预设」是心中的基本坚持（basic heart commitment）。对基督徒来说，我们的坚持（委身）是向着「在祂话语中启示自己」的上帝。对非基督徒来说，他们则用别的东西来取代，例如另一位神明、他们自己、欢乐、钱财、理性或其他，这些东西成为他们生命终极委身的对象，不但掌控他们整个生命，也包括他们的思想（DF2, 83, 216）。我们的终极委身在我们的知识（理性）中扮演相当重要的角色，它决定了我们判断真与假、对与错的终极准则。我们只要一致地坚持自己所委身的终极准则，就不能接受任何与它矛盾的「真理」。
Van Til uses the term presupposition to indicate the role that divine revelation ought to play in human thought. I do not believe that he ever defines the term. I have tried to define it for him as a “basic heart-commitment.” For the Christian, that commitment is to God as he reveals himself in his Word. Non-Christians substitute something else – another god, themselves, pleasure, money, rationality, or whatever – as that to which they are ultimately committed and that which governs all of life, including thought. (DF2, 83, 216.) Our ultimate commitment plays an important role in our knowledge. It determines our ultimate criteria of truth and falsity, right and wrong. As long as we consistently maintain our ultimate commitment, we cannot accept anything as true or right that conflicts with that commitment.
- 非信徒无意中承认上帝存在，这是「预设」的另一种意义
Unbeliever (Unconsciously) Concede God Exists: A Different Presupposition
在范泰尔的著作中，有少数地方是以不同的方式来使用「预设」一词。比方说，他劝告护教者应该「向非基督徒表明，即使在他们对上帝的实质否定中，他们依然真正地预设了上帝（he is still really presupposing God）。」（CTK, 13）显然，当非基督徒在这种意义上预设上帝时，他并不承认上帝是他生命终极委身的对象。范泰尔这里的论点是：非基督徒借着假设「宇宙可以被了解」（intelligible），而默认了他所否认的上帝的存在。这是「预设」的次要意义，这种次要意义与范泰尔的通常用法相关，却又在某种程度上有所不同。因为非基督徒在这层意义上「预设」上帝是违背其意愿的；这就说明，在其意识的某一层面上，他承认上帝的真实性与重要性。
There are a few instances in Van Til’s writings in which he uses the term presupposition differently. For example, he urges the apologist to show “the non-Christian that even in his virtual negation of God, he is still really presupposing God.” (CTK, 13.) Clearly, when the unbeliever “presupposes” God in this sense, he is not acknowledging God as his ultimate commitment. Van Til’s point here is that, in assuming the intelligibility of the world, the unbeliever implicitly concedes the existence of the God he explicitly denies. This lesser sense of presuppose is related to Van Til’s more common use of the term, but it is somewhat different. For the unbeliever to presuppose God in this context is for him to think, say, or do something, contrary to his own inclination, that indicates at some level of his consciousness a recognition of God’s reality and significance.
- 预设事物：必须条件
Presupposing Things: A Necessary Condition
在范氏著作的某些地方，「预设」所指涉的对象并不是人，而是论据、方法、知识、学科、事物的状况（如宇宙的可知性 intelligibility）等等。[例如科学（CA, 24）、对自己与事物的意识（DF2, 77）、方法（DF2, 100）。] 在这种情形下，被预设的对象是一个必须的条件（a necessary condition）或使某事物合法化的因素（legitimizer）。我们可以说：假定ｘ预设了ｙ，所以，一个人如果要有意义地解释ｘ，ｙ就必须是他委身（坚持）的对象。也许借着这个公式，我们就可以将「预设」的这一类用法，与范泰尔的基本定义连系起来。[关于范泰尔的「预设的思维方式」（reasoning by presupposition），参本书（CVT）第23章。]
There are also passages in Van Til in which the word presuppose is used, not of persons, but of things: arguments, methods, knowledge, academic disciplines, states of affairs (like the intelligibility of the universe). [Examples: science (CA, 24), consciousness of self and objects (DF2, 77), and methods (DF2, 100).] In such contexts, that which is presupposed is a necessary condition or that which legitimizes. Perhaps we can relate these uses to our basic definition by saying that if x presupposes y, then y is that to which a person must be committed if he is to give an intelligible account of x. [For Van Til’s concept of “reasoning by presupposition,” see chap. 23 (CVT).]
- 预设的同意词：起始点、参考点
Presupposition’s Synonyms: Starting Point, Reference Point
范泰尔有时会使用其他的辞汇来表达与「预设」相同的意义，尤其是「起始点」（starting point）与「参考点」（reference point）。我认为这些名词比较不清楚（参拙著DKG, 125-126），特别是「起始点」，因为它含有时间序列的「开始」的意味；然而正如我们所见，这不是预设必须具备的意义。
Van Til sometimes uses other phrases as equivalents to presupposition, especially “starting point” and “reference point.” These latter phrases are, in my estimation, less clear. (See DKG, 125-126.) “Starting point,” in particular, suggests a temporal sequence which, as we have seen, is not necessary to the concept of presupposition.
- 预设式推理 = 范泰尔为基督教信仰所作的「超验论证」
Reasoning by Presupposition: Van Til’s “Transcendental Argument”
最后，范泰尔的「预设式推理」（reasoning by presupposition）是指对基督教有神论的超验论证（transcendental argument）。因为范氏提倡这种论证，所以他在某种意义上肯定可以被称为预设主义者。我们将会在本书（CVT）第23章讨论这种形式的论证。
Finally, there is the phrase “reasoning by presupposition,” which for Van Til designates the “transcendental argument” for Christian theism. Because he advocates this sort of argument, Van Til may certainly in one sense be called a presuppositionalist. We shall discuss this form of argumentation in chapter 23 (CVT).
[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
[ CTK = A Christian Theory of Knowledge ]
[ CA = Christian Apologetics ]
[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]
[ DKG = John Frame, Doctrine of the Knowledge of God ]
MISUNDERSTANDINGS
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 10, pp. 137-138.)
有些作者（如Mark Hanna和R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner约翰·格斯特纳, Art Lindsley等人）把预设误解为单纯的假设（assumption），意指一种随意选用、没有理性根据的信念。这不是范泰尔的理解，在讨论范氏思想时，我们不应该有这样的假设。
Some writers understand a presupposition to be a mere supposition, assumption, or postulate – a belief chosen arbitrarily, with no rational basis. [E.g., Mark Hanna, Crucial Questions in Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981), and Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, Classical Apologetics.] This is not Van Til’s understanding, and it should not be assumed in discussions about him.
对范泰尔来说，基督徒的预设具有最坚固的理性基础──即上帝的启示。我们甚至可以说，基督徒的预设在某一种意义上是可以被证明的；在讨论范泰尔对基督教信仰的论证（证明）时，我们将会看见这一点。范泰尔也不认为预设只是为了思考而采用的假说（hypothesis）。虽然卡乃尔（E.J. Carnell）是持这样的预设观（参CVT第21章）；但对范泰尔来说，预设是绝对的（categorical），不是假设的（hypothetical）。
For Van Til, Christian presuppositions have the strongest possible rational ground, namely, the revelation of God. Indeed, Christian presuppositions are even provable in a sense, as we shall see in our examination of Van Til’s argument for Christianity. Nor does Van Til use presupposition to refer to a hypothesis adopted for consideration, as does, for example, Edward J. Carnell. [See the discussion in chap. 21 (CVT).] For Van Til, presuppositions are categorical, not hypothetical.
再者，我们也不应该过分强调「预设」（presupposition）一词中的「预」（pre-）字，以免暗示「预设」必须在时间上先于所有其他知识。「预设」的「预」字是「至」、「最」的意思，意指相对于其他信念来说，「预设」是至高的 （pre-eminent）。范泰尔说：「人对自我、对事物的意识，已经预设了上帝的自我意识，以及『自我』和『事物』本身的可理解性（intelligibility）。在此，我们并不是要思考一种时间上或心理上的优先次序。我们只是在处理一个问题：『甚么是解释事物时最终的参考点？』」（DF2, 77.）
Nor should we emphasize the pre- in presupposition to suggest that a presupposition must be held at some point in time prior to all our other knowledge. The pre- in presupposition refers to the “pre-eminence” of the presupposition with respect to our other beliefs. Van Til says, “Man’s consciousness of self and of objects presuppose for their intelligibility the self-consciousness of God. In asserting this we are not thinking of psychological and temporal priority. We are thinking only of the question as to what is the final reference point in interpretation.” (DF2, 77.)
有人会问，在人们相信上帝之前，我们怎能期望他们会预设上帝的启示？答案是：（一）借着上帝的自然启示（罗1:21），每一个人都已经认识上帝。那些选择不要认识上帝的人，是违背自己最可靠的知识去选择「不认识祂」。（二）即使我们现有的知识不足以让我们预设上帝，也不能免除我们预设上帝的义务。确切地说，恰恰因为我们有预设上帝的义务，因此，更有义务去寻找这些尚未得着的知识。（三）即使在某种意义上，人们不可能遵守「预设上帝」这项要求，依然不能消减这个要求的合理性。加尔文主义的一贯教导是：倘若离开恩典，上帝所吩咐的事，堕落的人一件也无法办到。
The question is sometimes asked, How can people be expected to presuppose God’s revelation before they have come to believe in God? The answers are: (1) Everyone knows God already by virtue of natural revelation (Rom. 1:21). Those who choose not to believe in him do so contrary to their own better knowledge. (2) Even if presupposing God did require knowledge in addition to what we have, the lack of such knowledge would not invalidate the obligation to presuppose God. Rather, that obligation would entail the further obligation to gain that additional knowledge. (3) Even if the requirement to presuppose God’s revelation were in some sense impossible for man to obey, that fact would not invalidate it. Calvinism typically teaches that God commands what depraved man cannot do apart from grace.
[ CVT = John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ]
[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
PROXIMATE AND ULTIMATE
(From John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995, chapter 10, pp. 138-139.)
从前面几段中，我已经将「预设」的专门定义澄清为「一个人心中的终极坚持」（ultimate commitment），而非基督徒对神的预设则是一种例外的用法。
In the preceding sections, I have reserved the word presupposition, as Van Til usually does, for a person’s ultimate commitment. The example of the non-Christian’s presupposing God was an exception.
还有其他的例外：「既然人的意识理所当然是次要（proximate）的始点，那么，上帝就永远是人类解释中最基本的──因此也是终极的──参考点。」（DF2, 77；参IST, 72）
There are other exceptions: “If then the human consciousness must, in the nature of the case, always be the proximate starting point, it remains true that God is always the most basic and therefore the final reference point in human interpretation.” (DF2, 77; cf. IST, 72.)
有人抗议说：我们不能要求人在他们的思维中预设上帝，或以上帝为始点；因为他们必须以最接近他们的事物──即他们自己的意识──为始点。当我们应用范泰尔的「始点」（starting point）时，这种抗议的说服力就会降低；因为范泰尔的「始点」（starting point）不是指在时间上的开始，而是指一个人生命中最高的权威。我们若认为预设的问题是时间方面的问题，那么，任何事物都可以作我们的始点。其实，我们思想内容的先后次序并不重要。
Some have objected that we cannot ask people to presuppose or “start with” God in their thinking, for they must always “start with” whatever is most immediate to them, namely, their own consciousness. This objection becomes less plausible when we reply that Van Til’s “start with” in such a context does not have a temporal meaning, but simply refers to that which has supreme authority over a person. If we do treat the question as a temporal one, the answer is that we can “start with” anything. It does not matter in what order we consider the various items we think about.
更重要的是，就算我们真以自己的意识为始点，我们依然不能对自己的意识有正确的解释，因为我们已经离开上帝。诚然，对自己意识的真正洞见，一定会带引我们与上帝面对面，因为我们是上帝的形像。所以，加尔文强调「对上帝的认识」和「对自己的认识」之间的相互依赖性。因此，就算在时间的意义上，真正与自己的意识相遇的同时，也就是与上帝相遇。
But, more importantly, even if we do begin with our own consciousness, we will not be able to interpret that consciousness rightly apart from God. Indeed, a true insight into our own consciousness brings us face-to-face with God, for we are his image. Hence Calvin emphasized the interdependence of our knowledge of God and of the self. Therefore, even in the temporal sense, a true encounter with consciousness will simultaneously be an encounter with God.
就算我们必须在时间上以自己的意识作为「起始点」，那也不表示我们就必须接受意识所提供的当时标准，来作为我们的规范性准则（normative criteria）。「时间上的先后次序」和「归范性」是两个不同的问题，「起始点」这词可能带来混淆，因此，它不是「预设」的最佳同义词。
And even if we must “start with” the consciousness in a temporal sense, that does not mean that we must accept as normative the present standards or criteria that that consciousness affords us. The temporal question and the normative question must be kept distinct. The term start with confuses that distinction, and therefore is not a good synonym for presuppose.
范泰尔的说法是：人的「自我」或「意识」是「次始点」或「次预设」，上帝才是「终极的预设」。我们知道自己的意识；我们也必须预设这样的自我认识，才能去认识其他的事物。[当然，如果我们不认识我们有限的环境，我们也没有办法认识自己，因此，自我认识并不先于对外在环境的认识。自我、世界、与上帝是同时被我们认识的，因为他们都是每一项知识（each act of knowledge）的不同视角（perspectives）。这并不是说，三者彼此相同；而是说，他们是一起、同时被认识的。这是我的阐述，但我认为大体上符合范氏的视角主义（perspectivalism）。] 无论如何，我们的终极预设必须是上帝；祂必须是我们惟一的预设。使徒正是预设了这个关系，所以他写道：「我们的心若责备我们，上帝比我们的心大，一切事没有不知道的。」（约一3:20）
Van Til’s formulation is that the self or consciousness is the “proximate” starting point or presupposition, while God is the “ultimate” one. We know our own consciousness, and we must presuppose that self-knowledge when we come to know anything else. (Of course, it is also the case that we cannot know ourselves without at the same time knowing something of our finite environment. So knowledge of self is not prior to knowledge of the things outside ourselves. Self, world, and God are known simultaneously, as perspectives on each act of knowledge. That does not mean that the three are identical to one another, only that they are known together. This is my formulation, but I think it is in accord with Van Til’s overall perspectivalism.) But our ultimate presupposition must be God alone. The apostle assumes that relationship when he write, “Whenever our hearts condemn us, God is greater than our hearts, and he knows everything” (1 John 3:20).
[ DF2 = The Defense of the Faith, 2nd edition ]
[ IST = An Introduction to Systematic Theology ]
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